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Abstract  
A firm’s ability to survive and prosper is often a function of its ability to design and develop 
new products that meet the needs of heterogeneous markets. The way in which a product is 
designed can have profound implications for product market structure and who is able to 
profit from an innovation, but despite this few industry studies have examined how and why 
product and industry architectures co-evolve and correspond across time.   
 
Notions of architectural co-evolution and correspondence are grounded in the modularity 
literature and assume a path towards increasing product modularity and industry 
specialisation. However, scholars have recently hinted that a reverse path towards increasing 
product and industry integration may be equally feasible. This research study contributes to 
the literature by proposing three stylised hybrid product and industry reintegration types that 
enhance our understanding of how and why reintegration may occur in product markets. 
Furthermore, the presence of a correspondence in the design characteristics between 
architectural layers (the so-called ‘mirroring hypothesis’) has also been suggested in the 
literature, such that product component design is often a blueprint for the way task, 
knowledge and firm boundaries are partitioned within a given product market. This research 
study finds that architectural correspondence is hard to sustain over time as firms often 
maintain a broader knowledge than task boundary for strategically important product 
components that offer differentiation opportunities or competitive advantage, contributing to 
the literature on contingencies that ‘mist the mirror’.      
 
Of particular interest to this research study is the UK personal pensions sector, a non-physical 
product, largely under-explored in the product modularity literature. By analysing the co-
evolution and correspondence of a non-manufactured product over a 30-year period this 
research study breaks new ground. The research study makes use of a retrospective 
longitudinal research design, based upon semi-structured interviews with a purposive sample 
of 31 key personnel. The interview data was subject to a combination of matrix and template 
analysis. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1  Background  
The management of innovation across time is a key concern for managers. With external 
factors such as increasing deregulation, internationalisation of product markets, and 
fragmentation and specialisation occurring in many product markets, coupled with the 
economic and financial turbulence that began in 2007-8, a key challenge for firms is to be 
able to respond to the inherent complexity in managing new and existing product lines. In 
many instances, whether firms develop physical products or service-orientated propositions, 
many are responding to these challenges by shortening development cycles and increasing 
product variety in order to customise product or service designs for the needs of 
heterogeneous markets and segments.    
The product design concept of modularity1 has, therefore, quickly gained favour in many 
product markets, as diverse as bicycles (Galvin & Morkel, 2001); motor vehicles (Argyres & 
Bigelow, 2010), semiconductors (Funk, 2008),  stereo systems (Langlois & Robertson, 1992), 
and air-conditioning systems (Furlan, Cabigiosu & Camuffo, 2014) to name but a few, and 
the research community has significantly increased in importance over the last 20 years, as 
indicated by the sheer volume of theoretical and empirical contributions. Although the 
concept of modularity spans across a number of diverse literatures and disciplines from 
mathematics and engineering to operations management, one strand of the modularity 
literature focuses on product design suggesting that product architectures can be partitioned 
into loosely-coupled2 product components3 which interact together as a coherent whole 
through standardised interfaces, permitting greater degrees of substitutability within and 
across products and product families, and hence firms can benefit from economies of 
substitution (ie, Garud & Kumarswamy, 1995).  
                                                          
1
 The ĐoŶĐept of ͚ŵodularitǇ͛ is disĐussed iŶ detail iŶ Chapter Ϯ. Here, ŵodularitǇ ĐaŶ ďe ĐoŶĐeptualised as the 
degree to which any system can be separated/partitioned into distinct sub-systems/components 
2
 Loose-coupling and tight-coupling were terms coined by Orton and Weick, (1990) to reflect the ease-of-
separation of an architecture into distinct sub-systems or components. In other words, integrated product 
architecture are tightly-coupled and modular product architectures are loosely-coupled 
3
 A product component can be defined as a distinct portion of a product that embodies a core design concept 
(Clark, 1985) 
14 
 
Strong advocates of modularity as a design principle4 (ie, Fine, 1998; Sanchez & Mahoney, 
1996; Schilling, 2000) have stressed its potential benefits ranging from faster and 
technologically-superior product component upgrades, self-reinforcing network externalities, 
through to more efficient supply chain partnerships, and there is growing empirical evidence 
which supports increasing product modularity (and to a lesser extent, increasing integration5) 
across a number of different product markets. On a similar note, some scholars (ie, Schilling, 
1998; 1999) have stressed the negative aspects of sponsoring an integrated product 
architecture and its association with major reworks and redesign in the product development 
process, risk of architectural lock-in and high ex-ante, sunk costs of development.        
In this research study, the degree of product modularity or product integration are 
conceptualised as ‘static’ design concepts, in other words it relates to the design 
characteristics of a given product architecture at a given cross-sectional point in time. 
However, as MacDuffie (2013) notes an analysis of product modularity as a design principle 
without a discussion of modularisation as a process6 is incomplete. Modularisation as a 
process refers to the various supply- and demand-side processes that usually precede a given 
state of modularity-in-design; in other words, modularisation-as-process is concerned with 
the evolvability of product designs.  
Tracing to the work on technological trajectories (Nelson & Winter, 1977, 1982), 
technological paradigms (Dosi, 1982), and dominant designs (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978), 
product architectures can also be conceptualised as technological systems (ie, Schilling, 
2000), rarely static and constantly evolving through periods of continuity and discontinuity. 
The product modularity literature has built upon these foundations to posit that product 
architectures tend to evolve towards more open and modular designs over time, with 
modularity becoming a common characteristic of many dominant designs (ie, Murmann & 
Frenken, 2006; Shibata, Kodama & Yano, 2005).  
 
                                                          
4
 Modular product architectures have modularity-in-design such that sub-systems/components can be easily 
separated/partitioned 
5
 Integrated product architectures have integration-in-design such that sub-systems/components cannot be 
easily separated/partitioned 
6
 Modularisation-as-proĐess ǁas ĐoŶĐeptualised ďǇ MaĐDuffie ;ϮϬϭϯͿ as the role of the desigŶers͛ kŶoǁledge 
in modularising product architectures. In this research study, I take a broader view than that proposed by 
MacDuffie. I conceptualise any supply-side or demand-side influence on the design of a product architecture 
as a ͚ŵodularisatioŶ͛ or ͚iŶtegratioŶ͛ proĐess.  
15 
 
Furthermore, prior literature that charts the evolution of productive capabilities (ie, Jacobides 
& Hitt, 2005; Jacobides, Knusden & Augier, 2006), knowledge (ie, Henderson & Clark, 
1990), and transaction costs, (ie, Baldwin, 2008), all suggest that products and industries 
often co-evolve towards more modular or specialised designs over time. This research study 
complements the extant literature by showing how efficiency considerations and the 
trajectory of productive capabilities within the focal product market are instrumental in 
propelling architectures towards increasing product modularity and industry specialisation. 
More specifically, however, the findings of this research study highlight how the co-evolution 
of efficiency considerations and productive capabilities originate at the product component 
level across different time periods which results in systemic effects in future time periods.       
Despite this large body of work on increasing product modularity and industry specialisation, 
a few empirical studies have challenged this assumption and have noted that products, firms 
and industries may co-evolve towards increasing (re)integration in building and construction 
(Cacciotori & Jacobides, 2005), disk drives (Christensen, Verlinden & Westerman, 2002); 
bicycles (Fixson & Park, 2008) and Swiss watch manufacturing (Jacobides & Winter, 2005). 
However, whiles these studies examine processes that help illuminate under what product 
market conditions reintegration occurs, there remains a gap in our understanding of how 
reintegration actually happens – for example, questions such as why and where in a product 
architecture does product component reintegration take root? Is product component 
reintegration associated with industry reintegration? These issues remain largely under-
explored, and this research study aims to contribute to our understanding of how reintegration 
takes root in product and industry architectures. As a consequence, the research study aims to 
contribute to the literature by proposing three stylised hybrid product architecture types.          
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Many scholars have also hypothesised that product architectures are a kind of roadmap for 
partitioning task, knowledge and firm boundaries. In other words, the architecture of firms 
(and hence industries) corresponds to, and is a reflection of, product architecture (ie, Colfer & 
Baldwin, 2010; Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996), Advocates of ‘mirroring’7 may go as far as to 
suggest that the presence of an architectural correspondence has many important benefits for 
firms related to the speed, flexibility and efficiency of product development.   
The hypothesised correspondence of product component, task, knowledge and firm 
boundaries has important implications for firms and the evolution of product markets. For 
example, partitioning product component, task, knowledge and firm boundaries draws an 
industry towards increasing specialisation and fragmentation which, in turn, has implications 
for knowledge and productive capability development processes and ultimately for the 
division of rents and surplus (ie, Jacobides, 2008; Jacobides, et al., 2006). The concept of 
correspondence, however, is not without critics, with disadvantages cited relating to the 
decay of product component knowledge, and foregoing higher performance or quality 
outcomes that may be achieved through integration or via extensive collaboration and co-
development with external firms (ie, Brusoni, Prencipe & Pavitt, 2001; Zirpoli & Becker, 
2007). 
Empirical support for correspondence across numerous studies is significant, but mixed – 
suggesting the need to focus less upon whether correspondence holds and more upon the 
contingent conditions under which it holds (Campagnolo & Camuffo, 2012; Furlan, 
Cabigiosu and Camuffo, 2014). By adopting a retrospective longitudinal research design, the 
research study aims to examine contingencies that may ‘mist the mirror’ across time. 
Moreover, the research study shows how architectural correspondence and non-
correspondence can both be present at the same time. As a consequence, I propose further 
contingencies that may mist the mirror and bring much-needed clarity and a call for 
uniformity to the literature.  
                      
                                                          
7
 The ͚ŵirroriŶg hǇpothesis͛ is aŶ eǆteŶsioŶ of CoŶǁaǇ͛s Laǁ ;ϭϵϲϴͿ, aŶd forŵalised ďǇ Colfer aŶd BaldǁiŶ 
;ϮϬϭϬͿ as the arĐhiteĐtural ĐorrespoŶdeŶĐe or ͚ŵirroriŶg͛ ďetǁeeŶ a produĐt͛s ĐoŵpoŶeŶts, tasks, kŶoǁledge 
and firm boundaries. In the extant literature, various terms are used interchangeably such as 
mirroring/correspondence/matched versus non-mirroring/misting/non-correspondence/unmatched. In this 
research study, I will use the term correspondence and non-ĐorrespoŶdeŶĐe to sigŶifǇ ͚ŵirroriŶg͛ ďetǁeeŶ 
product component, task, knowledge and firm boundaries.   
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1.2 Rationale 
Given the broad and accepted understanding of increasing product modularity and industry 
specialisation, I was intrigued by the case of the UK personal pensions product market that 
appears not to fit this canonical pattern, seemingly undergoing numerous co-evolutions of 
product and industry architecture during the 30-year period of this research study.  
The UK personal pensions product market is a unique product market with considerable size 
and value, with total invested assets of £2,405bn8 at the end of 2012. My focus in this 
research study is the individual personal pensions segment which is situated within the 
overall UK pensions product market as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: UK pensions landscape9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8
 Source: Association of British Insurers (ABI) report 2012, downloaded https://www.abi.org.uk/Insurance-and-
savings/Industry-data/~/media/DBDADF2BB9CD4C8B88419CD2B9E37D5E.ashx 
9
 Source: ONS, downloaded http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171766_269503.pdf 
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Individual personal pensions10 have been chosen on conceptual grounds, rather than 
representativeness (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The choice of product market context was 
also influenced by my prior employment in the sector as a product architect between 2000 
and 2011. However, despite this personal familiarity, my over-arching objective was to select 
a setting that would illuminate the main concepts and, thus, I selected UK personal pensions 
precisely because it had undergone numerous periods of both continuity and discontinuity in 
the period between 1984 and 2014. Therefore, while my approach pays close attention to the 
specific dynamics of a particular product market context, it is acknowledged that it is likely to 
undermine its generalizability to other settings (Guba & Lincoln, 1982).  
 
Referring back to the extant literature, few (if any) empirical studies have examined the co-
evolution and correspondence of architectures in a setting characterised by non-physical, 
service-orientated products. The extant modularity literature has often examined 
manufactured products and this has carried through into examinations of the hypothesized 
correspondence between architectural layers. For example, as discussed in Fixson (2003, 
2005) and Campagnolo & Camuffo (2010), among others, the aircraft engine, motor vehicle 
and computer hardware and software industries have dominated the architectural co-evolution 
and correspondence research landscape, and there is a compelling need to broaden out 
empirical findings to other settings and contexts. 
As a non-physical product, an examination of the UK individual pensions product market 
contributes to scholarly work in at least two important ways: (1) with the exception of 
Jacobides (2005) examination of the US mortgage banking sector, how architectures co-
evolve in a non-physical, knowledge-intensive sector is under-explored, (2) as a regulated 
product market, how industry regulation influences the direction and speed of architectural 
co-evolution across time is an important topic that deserves increasing attention. In other 
words, examining the processes underpinning co-evolution and correspondence in UK 
personal pensions may help illuminate to what extent such regulated product markets 
conform to our current understanding of how and why architectures co-evolve.  
 
 
                                                          
10
 Hereafter referred to as ͚persoŶal peŶsioŶs͛ 
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Furthermore, an understanding of architectural co-evolution and correspondence would be of 
significant interest to practitioners in the UK personal pensions product market. For example, 
how managers should decide between architectural choices and organize for innovative 
activities remains a strategically important concern. This research study aims to highlight that 
a dynamic view is often required such that decisions made in one time period may be less 
than optimal in subsequent time periods. By charting how and why the product market has 
co-evolved in a particular way across time may assist managers in future decision-making.          
1.3. Research aims   
The aim is to explore how supply-side processes11 may be associated with the co-evolution 
and correspondence of architectures in the UK personal pensions product market. To achieve 
this, as I discuss in chapter 3, I constructed a retrospective longitudinal research design12, as 
quoted in Fixson & Park (2008:1298-1299), Pettigrew (1990:269) highlights that 
“theoretically sound and practically useful research on change should explore the contexts, 
content, and process of change, together with their interconnections through time” 
I hope, in turn, to make a contribution to the product modularity literature by answering the 
following questions: 
 RQ1: What supply-side processes are associated with the co-evolution of architectures?  RQ2: Are the design characteristics of product architecture associated with the design 
characteristics of firm and/or industry architecture? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11
 Supply-side processes may relate to processes such as knowledge and productive capability development, 
transaction costs, property rights, supply-side externalities, competitive dynamics, regulation and so on. This 
contrasts with demand-side processes such as user/consumer demands which are not the focus of this 
research study. 
12
 I ǁill use the terŵ ͚retrospeĐtiǀe loŶgitudiŶal researĐh͛ to sigŶifǇ the ŵethodologiĐal approaĐh, as the term 
has been used in a number of similar studies by authors such as Snelgrove & Havitz (2010)     
20 
 
In this research study, as I explain in chapter 3, I started from a loose set of ideas and 
frameworks drawn from the extant literature, however the primary focus is to develop new 
insights and constructs that relate to the research questions via iteration between theory and 
data (Yin, 2014). I began the data collection phase with an a priori product architecture 
typology (as described in section 2.1.8) synthesized deductively from the extant literature in 
order to illuminate product architecture evolution in the UK personal pensions product 
market and to structure and tighten the data collection process (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
However, the focus of the data collection and data analysis phases has been to inductively 
derive new insights into how supply-side processes are associated with evolutions of product 
architecture, explaining my choice of combining matrix and template analysis as a data 
analysis method. The matrix I developed emerges from the product architecture typology and 
this was followed by inductively-orientated template analysis to generate themes within the 
structuring device of the matrix.  
 
Rather than using secondary sources to construct the product architecture typology, instead I 
synthesized extant literature from across a number of domains. I then asked respondents 
participating in the research study to match the stylized product architecture types to the 
actual product architectures that existed in the product market across time, in order to 
generate a retrospective product timeline and to establish construct validity – a similar idea to 
creating a personal lifeline in psychology research (Brannen & Nilsen, 2010).  
  
Data was collected via semi-structured interviews with thirty-one key personnel across six 
different firms. As I discuss in chapter 3, I chose thirty-one respondents based upon practical 
considerations, but also because this generated over thirty hours of interview data, and 
allowed for many different explanations and perspectives to be reconciled (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). Next, following the semi-structured interviews, I synthesized the thirty-
one ‘product timelines’ in order to establish a ‘best fit’ which was subsequently member-
checked (Horrocks & King, 2010) ex-ante with the pilot group, and ex-post with an expert 
panel. The synthesized product timeline then served as the structure for the data analysis 
phase.  
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In chapter 5, the findings are positioned within the context of prior work to identify a number 
of new insights and contributions. Moreover, given the practical and topical nature of the 
research question to practitioners in the product market, the findings of this research study 
also offer managerial insights for firms in the product market, as well as public bodies, such 
as industry lobbying groups and the regulator. The unique characteristics of the UK personal 
pensions product market may limit its generalisability, however this research study breaks 
new ground in analysing a regulated product market that has such importance to consumers 
and the wider UK economy.  
1.4 Outline of the thesis 
The thesis is structured around 6 chapters as follows:  
Chapter 1 introduces the main theoretical basis of this research study and orientates it to the 
UK personal pensions product market; it then justifies the importance of the research study 
and its value as a contribution to knowledge and practice.  
 
Chapter 2, Literature Review, provides a review of the extant literature relevant to this 
research study. It is divided into two sub-sections and begins with a discussion of the product 
modularity literature, in particular the notions of product architectures as integrated or 
modular, and as open or closed. Next, I introduce the idea of hybrid product architectures and 
technological platform architectures and propose a stylised product architecture typology 
which is subsequently used to structure and tighten the data collection and data analysis 
phases. I then turn to modularisation-as-process and discuss the principal theoretical 
perspectives that have dominated the strategic management research landscape. Finally, I turn 
to architectural correspondence, the so-called ‘mirroring hypothesis’, and review its 
theoretical underpinnings and mixed empirical evidence 
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Chapter 3, Research Methodology Design and Methods, places the research study within the 
ontological and epistemological research traditions, moving onto a discussion of my subtle 
realist commitments. I then turn to discuss the qualitative research design, based upon thirty-
one semi-structured interviews with key personnel, across six firms. Interview data is 
analysed using a blend of matrix and template analysis to inductively derive themes and 
concepts, within the structuring device of an a priori matrix. The chapter continues with a 
discussion of the process of data collection and analysis, its ethical considerations and the 
justification of the data analysis methods employed. Finally, I then discuss quality measures 
and issues around researcher positionality. 
.  
Chapter 4, Data Analysis and Study Findings, presents the findings of the research study by 
illustrating the templates within the matrix structure. Within the retrospective longitudinal 
period between 1984 and 2014, five sub-periods are identified as of importance to 
respondents and the findings are structured as distinct time-periods in order to create a 
narrative of architectural co-evolution and correspondence across time.    
 
Chapter 5, Discussion, makes use of the findings in order to reflect back on prior work in the 
field. This process of synthesis with the extant literature aims to develop an understanding of 
how processes influence architectural co-evolution and correspondence across time. I then 
draw out the study’s main contributions.      
 
Chapter 6, Conclusions and Contribution, summarises the research study’s contribution to 
academic knowledge, management practice and public policy. Furthermore, future research 
directions are discussed to guide prospective studies. The chapter, and the thesis, concludes 
with a few personal reflections.  
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2. Literature Review 
This chapter is divided into two sub-sections that correspond to the two over-arching research 
questions.  
Section 2.1 reviews the extant literature in relation to RQ1 ‘what supply-side processes are 
associated with the co-evolution of architectures?’ Section 2.2 examines the literature in 
relation to RQ2 ‘are the design characteristics of product architecture associated with the 
design characteristics of firm and/or industry architecture?’ 
In section 2.1, I examine the extant literature in relation to product modularity to contrast the 
design properties of modular and integrated product architectures, and open and closed13 
product architectures. Then, I formalise a stylised product architecture typology that draws 
upon existing frameworks (such as Sanchez, 2008; Shibata, et al., 2005), but encompass the 
notion of a hybrid product architecture, and embeds the idea of evolution. Finally, I turn to 
‘modularisation-as-process’, and explore how and why architectures may co-evolve. In terms 
of the range of ‘processes’, as I noted in chapter 1, my aim is to demark the boundary of this 
research study by focusing attention on supply-side processes that may be associated with 
architectural co-evolution.  
In addition to proposing a stylised product architecture typology, within this sub-section of 
the chapter, I highlight two significant gaps in the extant literature where I seek to make a 
contribution. The first significant gap concerns connecting how and why product markets 
reintegrate with nuanced changes in stylised product architecture type. The extant literature 
on reintegration in product markets has tended to focus on either endogenous processes at 
firm level or exogenous processes at the industry level. In this research study, I aim to use 
empirical data to connect systemic processes that lead to reintegration, at least in this product 
market, with changes in product architecture in order to propose more nuanced stylised types 
of hybrid product architecture. Few (if any) prior studies have done so.  
 
 
                                                          
13
 Whereas the integrated-modular continuum is primarily associated with the ease of partitioning and degree 
of coupling between components, open and Đlosed priŵarilǇ refers to the ĐoŶĐept of ͚oǁŶership͛ of the 
architecture and its interfaces   
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The second gap concerns our understanding of modularity-as-process, how such processes 
combine to propel architectures either towards or away from product modularity and industry 
specialisation. In this research study, I aim to examine which processes combine and whether 
they combine at the product component level to evolve product components towards being 
more modular or more integrated.  
Section 2.2 of this chapter then proceeds to examine the hypothesised correspondence 
between product component, task, knowledge and firm boundaries, known as the ‘mirroring 
hypothesis’ (ie, Colfer, 2007; Colfer & Baldwin, 2010). I review its theoretical foundations 
before analysing the growing body of mixed empirical evidence, and reviewing recent 
contingent perspectives that ‘mist the mirror’.    
Within this sub-section of the chapter, I highlight two further significant gaps in the extant 
literature. First, I highlight that the lack of uniformity in how correspondence or non-
correspondence is assessed in prior work, one possible explanation of the inconsistent and 
mixed results. As a consequence, I propose a ‘weak test’ and a ‘strong test’ of 
correspondence that may provide much-needed uniformity in future scholarly work. Second, 
I propose further contingencies that may mist the mirror based upon characteristics at both 
the product architecture and product component levels of analysis.       
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2.1 Architectural co-evolution   
2.1.1 What is product architecture? 
The concept of an architecture has been well-established across a number of research 
communities, such as strategic management, product development, organisation design and 
technology management (ie, Clark, 1985; Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996; Simon, 1962; Ulrich, 
1995) and can be traced back to Herbert Simon’s seminal paper “The Architecture of 
Complexity” (1962). A product architecture can be conceptualised as a schematic, “the 
scheme by which the function of a product is allocated to physical components” (Ulrich, 
1995:419), and encompasses the arrangement of product components and the way they fit or 
connect together, “it is an arrangement of functional elements; the mapping from functional 
elements to physical components; and, the specification of the interfaces among interacting 
physical components” (Ulrich, 1995:420). Product architectures, therefore, can be 
conceptualised to encompass three distinct features: (1) an architecture that is the blueprint 
for the design and the way in which components14 are arranged, (2) product components 
which contribute to the products’ function, and (3) interfaces which document how 
components fit and connect together (Baldwin & Clark, 2000).       
Product architectures have been further stylised as two ideal types, integral15 or modular 
(Schilling, 2000; Ulrich, 1995) as shown in Figure 2: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The integrated-modular continuum 
 
 
                                                          
14
 IŶ this researĐh studǇ, I shall use the terŵ ͚produĐt ĐoŵpoŶeŶt͛ to distiŶguish it froŵ ͚firŵ ĐoŵpoŶeŶt͛ or 
͚iŶdustrǇ ĐoŵpoŶeŶt͛. Other studies haǀe used the siŵpler terŵ ͚ĐoŵpoŶeŶt͛ or ͚ŵodule͛. 
15
 Although UlriĐh ;ϭϵϵϱͿ uses the terŵ ͚iŶtegral͛, I ǁill use the terŵ ͚iŶtegrated͛ throughout this researĐh 
study  
 
Integrated Modular 
26 
 
An integrated product architecture is one where product components, interfaces and the 
nature of their relationship is complex, interdependent and non-standardised, whereas, a 
modular product architecture has relationships between product components and interfaces 
that are simple, independent and standardised.  
The concept of modularity has been applied to many kinds of complex systems (Ulrich, 1995; 
Fixson, 2003, comprehensively review modularity across various domains). In the 
management literature, however, modularity has gained increasing attention as a concept that 
has the potential to be applied to many different phenomena, such as products, processes, 
knowledge, firms and industries (ie, Colfer & Baldwin, 2010; Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996). 
Modularity is a systems concept based upon the notion of partitioning a system into simpler 
sub-systems or components (Simon, 1962, von Hippel, 1990), invoking the initial ideas of 
information-hiding and parallelism (Parnas, 1972) and decomposition (Alexander, 1964; 
Simon, 1962), focusing on reducing or removing interdependence. Product architectures are 
often hierarchically-nested16 (Alexander, 1964; Clark, 1985; Schilling, 2000), and differ in 
the degree to which they have been partitioned into ‘loosely-coupled’ or ‘tightly-coupled’ 
product components (Orton & Weick, 1990). In other words, tightly-coupled product 
components exhibit a high degree of interdependence17 with each other and design changes to 
one product component may have knock-on design consequences for other product 
components (for example design changes to product component A have significant knock on 
design consequences for product component B), whereas loosely-coupled product 
components exhibit a high degree of independence from each other, and design changes to 
one product component often have no (or few) design consequences for other product 
components (for example, design changes to product component A have few or no design 
consequences for product component B).  
 
 
 
                                                          
16
 In this context, hierarchically-nested refers to sub-components being part of larger components which, in 
turn, form part of an architecture. A product can, therefore, have many different levels within its systems 
hierarchy 
17
 For the purposes of simplicity, in this research study interdependence and independence have the same 
meaning as tight-coupling and loose-ĐoupliŶg, aŶd refer to the ĐoŵpoŶeŶts͛ ease of separatioŶ/partitioŶiŶg 
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In the extant literature, terms such as tight-coupling, integration and interdependence are 
often used inter-changeably, as are loose-coupling, modular and independence. I will also 
assume the terms have similar meaning and use the terms interchangeably, except where I 
note otherwise.      
The primary focus of the integrated-modular continuum is the relative interdependence or 
independence (or tight-coupling or loose-coupling) of product components within a given 
product architecture. However, product architectures also incorporate the concepts of 
ownership and ‘interfaces’ (how product components connect together) and, as a result, a 
number of scholars have extended Ulrich’s continuum to encompass the degree to which a 
product architecture is either proprietary or non-proprietary, and the extent to which its 
interface specifications are either non-existent, specialised (firm-specific)18 or industry-
wide19 (ie, Fine, Golany & Naseraldin, 2005; Sanchez, 2008; Schilling, 2000). Taken together 
the integrated-modular and open-closed continuums can be represented in a 2x2 matrix as 
follows:  
 
 
 
 
Open and integrated 
 
Closed and integrated 
 
Open and modular 
 
Closed and modular 
 
Figure 3: Component coupling and ownership properties of stylised product architecture 
types20  
                                                          
18
 Firm-specific interfaces are interfaces between product components that are defined, and used only within 
firm boundaries (ie, Fine, Golany, & Nasersaldin, 2005; Schilling, 2000)  
19
 Industry standards are standards which have permeated across firm boundaries and have been used by 
many firms as an industry-wide basis to connect product components. Therefore, they may emerge over time 
or be imposed by a third-party such as a standards-setting organisation (such as the DVD forum) or by 
Government  
20
 Based upon typologies in Sanchez (2008) and Shibata, Kodama and Yano (2005) 
Component 
coupling 
Ownership 
Closed Open 
Modular 
Integrated 
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As I explain in section 2.1.7, a 2x2 representation as illustrated in figure 3 has a number of 
limitations, and throughout this section of the chapter, I will build upon this prior work to 
propose a revised product architecture typology. The idea that product architectures can be 
characterised as either modular or integrated, or open or closed, is now discussed in sections 
2.1.2-2.1.5. Following this, in section 2.1.6, I introduce the idea of non-perfect or hybrid 
product architectures.  
2.1.2 Integrated product architectures 
Integrated product architectures usually incorporate product components that are tightly-
coupled and interdependent with each other, and connect together via interfaces that are 
closed, often idiosyncratic, (Sanchez, 2008) or even non-existent (Mikkola, 2003, 2006). In 
such integrated designs, interdependent product components work tightly together to achieve 
a products’ function, in other words, there is a ‘many-to-one’ relationship between product 
components and product functions (Ulrich, 1995).  
Integrated product architectures are often created to serve a single use or market purpose 
(Sanchez, 2008), statically-optimised along some dimension (Sanchez & Mahoney, 2013) 
such as maximum performance or lowest cost (Sanchez, 2008). Moreover, Schilling 
(2000:316) described such integrated designs as exhibiting high levels of ‘synergistic 
specificity’ - the constituent component parts of the product architecture are highly ‘specific’ 
to each other. For example, desktop, inkjet printers are often optimised for the lowest cost 
and at the broadest level can be conceptualised as consisting of two primary product 
components, (1) the ink cartridge and (2) the printer outer shell. The ink cartridge is a 
replacement item and so is linked to a stream of rents. Hewlett Packard (HP) and Canon, for 
example, integrate the print-head with the ink cartridge into a single component, protected by 
patents, in order to minimise the risks of external firms reverse-engineering the ink cartridge 
as a stand-alone product component. As such, tight integration allows HP and Canon to 
optimise the product architecture and, at the same time, to appropriate rents from the 
replacement ink cartridge.  
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Integrated product architectures are usually very difficult to re-architect to new uses without 
re-engineering the entire product architecture or at least a significant proportion of it 
(Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996, 2013), because design changes to one product component often 
result in knock-on, and possibly unforeseen, design changes to other product components 
(Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996) which means that isolating product component level innovation 
is hindered, often requiring more difficult, expensive and time-consuming architectural 
innovation (Henderson & Clark, 1990) to untangle the inter-connectedness and web of 
complexity. As such, the design characteristics of integrated product architectures can act 
“…as a strong force against the system shifting to a more modular design” (Schilling, 
2000:316) due to ‘technical imbalances’ in integrated product designs (Murmann & Frenken, 
2006).  
As discussed, integrated product architectures are often used by sponsoring firms to 
maximise the appropriation of rents (Schilling, 1999, 2000). For example, the usual logic is 
that in many product markets with ‘new to the world’ products, firms often develop “product 
architectures that are idiosyncratic to the firm and that feature customised and highly 
interdependent components” (Argyres & Bigelow, 2010:853). Because of the ex-ante sunk 
cost investments required to design and develop integrated product architectures, 
appropriation from innovation (Teece, 1986) is a key concern for firms, in order to recoup the 
initial investment in the products’ design and development (Sanchez, 2008). However, if a 
firm can establish and protect its own, idiosyncratic and integrated product design as a 
‘dominant design’, a firm “…may be able to earn near-monopoly rents” and be in “a good 
position to shape the evolution of the industry” (Schilling, 1999:266).  
The sponsorship of an integrated product architecture is not without risks, however, as such 
products are often non-compatible with complementary product components and are often 
more expensive and time-consuming to develop and improve than more open or modular 
product designs (Schilling, 1999). Moreover, Schilling (1999:269) contends that integrated 
product architectures often have a “high risk of rejection under conditions of strong network 
externalities” as a firm would need to generate its own firm-specific externalities through 
branding and marketing in order to generate a sufficient installed user base around its product 
architecture.  
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For example, early versions of hand-held devices were largely integrated. The Palm hand-
held device was designed and manufactured by Palm who sold a bundled package of 
hardware, operating system and applications, but it was later rejected by the market under 
conditions of strong network externality effects. In contrast, however, Fixson and Park (2008) 
argue that Shimano, in the bicycle industry, with weaker network externalities, were able to 
significantly invest in marketing and branding to over-turn modular bicycle designs. In sum, 
Sanchez (2008:337) contends that the salient characteristics of an integrated product 
architecture is: “it’s (intended) ability to deliver optimised performance or cost according to 
a fixed set of performance and cost criteria; its use of integrated component designs and 
idiosyncratic interfaces that are intended to achieve optimised performance or cost; and, the 
second characteristic thereby makes it time-consuming and costly to accommodate changes 
in the performance or cost parameters to be delivered by the architecture”.  
The product development process that underpins an integrated product architecture often 
follows a traditional path with sequential staging. This is often the case because technological 
changes to integrated product designs are often localised in the sense that “changes are tried 
in one part, this defines further problems in other parts, which in turn may define problems in 
other parts” (Murmann & Frenken, 2006:937). In a sequential development approach, ”after 
designing the product concept, design and development tasks are sequenced so that 
technology and component development tasks with the greatest need for new knowledge and 
with the greatest impact on other component design and development tasks are undertaken 
first” (Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996:68). It then specifies the next level of product components 
and repeats until all product components are specified.  
Sequential development processes are often associated with breakdowns, delays and 
recursive information flows (Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996) and are likely to ‘lose information’ 
as development proceeds from one stage to the next, such that “technical interdependencies 
can be ‘designed into’ the architecture” (Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996:69). On the other hand, 
however, integrated product architectures often enhance knowledge-sharing and learning in a 
product development team as team members rely on each other’s expertise (Mikkola, 2003), 
as their knowledge becomes more and more specific to the product being designed (Schilling, 
2000).   
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2.1.3 Modular product architectures  
Modular products architectures are a feature common to many product markets, such as 
bicycles (Galvin & Morkel, 2001); semi-conductors (Funk, 2008), air-conditioning systems 
(Furlan, Cabigiosu & Camuffo, 2014) and stereo systems (Langlois & Robertson, 1992). The 
design characteristic that lies at the heart of modular product architectures is greater 
interdependence within product components than across different product components 
(Ulrich, 1995), known as ‘loose-coupling’ (Orton & Weick, 1990), as shown in figure 4.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Example of loose-coupling of two modular product components 
In perfect form, loose-coupling facilitates a one-to-one mapping between product functions 
and product components (Ulrich, 1995), and design changes to one product component 
require little or no modification to other product components, so long as there is adherence to 
a specified and stable interface. This means that modular designs also permit product 
components to be designed and produced independently by separate individuals, teams, 
divisions or firms (Sanchez, 2008), and in parallel (Parnas, 1972), which results in a potential 
reduction in development cycle time and an increase in speed to market (Sanchez & Collins, 
2001). For example, assume Figure 4 refers to a reusable razor system, comprising two 
loosely-coupled product components: component A is the handle and Component B is the 
detachable and replaceable blade. Component A and B can each be designed and developed 
in parallel, potentially by separate teams or firms, so long as each team or firm proceeds with 
reference to the interface specification. Furthermore, Component B can be subject to modular 
or incremental innovation without reference to Component A.  
 
Product component A 
(tight-coupling within) 
Product component B 
(tight-coupling within) 
Loose-
coupling 
across 
Interface 
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In a modular product architecture, there exists the potential to (1) standardise product 
components and/or (2) the interface specifications. Product component standardisation often 
results in re-use across multiple products so as to benefit from economies of substitution 
(Garud & Kumaraswamy, 1995; Ulrich, 1995). For example, many of the Apple software 
components are re-used across multiple devices. However, modular product components do 
not need to be standardised. Rather, the architectural blueprint or ‘design rules’ (Clark, 1985) 
dictates which parameters are ‘hidden’ inside the inner workings of a product component and 
which parameters are ‘visible’ to other components (Parnas, 1972). According to Baldwin & 
Clark (2000), what is often hidden and encapsulated within a product component is the 
knowledge and intellectual property (IP) relating to the design parameters of the product 
component, and what is often ‘visible’ are the design rules of the architecture and the 
interface specifications that “connect, interact or exchange resources in some way, by 
adhering to a standard interface” (Schilling, 2000:318). Therefore, according to Langlois 
(2012:5), product modularity is advocated as a useful design principle to encapsulate high 
levels of complexity or uniqueness inside a product component, especially when a system 
becomes unwieldy and interdependencies so far-reaching that integrated design efforts 
become almost impossible (Parnas, 1972).  
Interface standardisation is perhaps the key design characteristic of modular product 
architectures (Sanchez, 2008; Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996), as it keeps the interfaces between 
product components constant or frozen (for a time). It is a process that makes assets non-
specific (Schilling, 2000), and can take two generic forms: (1) interface specification may 
take place within the boundaries of a single firm who create firm-specific or ‘specialised 
interfaces’ (Fine, et al., 2005; Schilling, 2000), or (2) a specialised interface specification 
may permeate across firm boundaries, perhaps eventually to become an industry-standard. 
According to Tee (2011) and Christensen, et al., (2002), interfaces are often codified initially 
within firm boundaries, but they then often permeate across firm boundaries and become 
adopted by external suppliers.   
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An example that typifies this progression from specialised to industry standards is the classic 
story of IBMs modularisation of its computers in the 1970s (it also illustrates the risks of 
losing control of proprietary interfaces). IBM began to partition its product architecture into 
modular product components and created firm-specific interfaces to connect components 
together. Many of these were shared with external suppliers who then reverse-engineered and 
sold stand-alone product components to fit with the IBM architecture. Eventually, IBM lost 
control of the interfaces, and industry standards developed across much of the computer 
industry which opened the product market up to new entrants, imitation and intense 
competition.  
Despite the risks, standardised interfaces may often increase product component variety 
because component upgrades can be leveraged by easier substitution (Sanchez, 1995), so that 
firms benefit from economies of substitution (Garud & Kumaraswamy, 1995, Ulrich, 1995). 
In other words, modular design characteristics permit a far easier mixing and matching of 
product components to give a potentially large number of product variations (Sanchez & 
Mahoney, 1996; 2013; Schilling, 2000; Ulrich, 1995), or product families (Argyres & 
Bigelow, 2010) which may be a source of strategic advantage (Sanchez, 1995), or option 
value (Baldwin & Clark, 2000), by enabling a firm to respond more quickly to evolving and 
heterogeneous markets. Furthermore, product modularity may offer a route for firms to 
reduce the costs of differentiation based on product component design (Sanchez & Mahoney, 
1996), or a firm may choose to insource product components that offer a source of 
differentiation, and outsource non-core product components (Pil & Cohen, 2006). In other 
words, modular product architectures are dynamically-optimised, rather than statically-
optimised (Sanchez & Mahoney, 2013). 
The presence of industry standards also makes it easier for firms to access a wide range of 
complementary product components21 to plug and play (Sanchez, 2008) into the product 
architecture. For example, laptops or PCs from different manufacturers may operate in 
slightly different ways, however, they are all designed to permit standardised USBs to plug 
into the product and be decoded and read.  
 
                                                          
21
 Complementary product components are generally taken to be non-core product components that can 
connect to a product in order to enhance its benefit to consumers. For example, Apple invites App developers 
to contribute Apps to its range of devices.  
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Complementary product components may feasibly be developed within firm boundaries, 
however, interface standardisation and a plug and play design often extends product 
development across two or more firm boundaries and is particularly important in product 
markets where competitive advantage may depend upon the number or range of 
complementary products or services (Galvin & Rice, 2008; Sanchez, 2008; Schilling, 1999, 
2000).  
Product development teams, therefore, may find competitive benefits in sharing interface 
specifications with specialised providers of complementary product components (Sanchez & 
Collins, 2001). Interface standards, however, are not fixed and stable in perpetuity. They can 
be a contested domain, and often are supplanted by rival standards (ie, Garud, Jain & 
Kumaraswamy, 2002), or they may occasionally revert back to a private or proprietary form 
if strategic or performance considerations emerge (Fixson & Park, 2008). Ultimately, 
scholars such as West (2003, 2007) and Tee (2011) argue that strategic factors will play a 
moderating role in exactly how and if interface specifications are shared with external firms. 
Modular product architectures not only provide firms with significant network externalities – 
or ‘modular externalities’ (Sanchez, 2008) – but network externalities may be present on both 
the supply- and demand- side (Sanchez, 2008; Schilling, 2000). On the supply side, it may 
help mitigate both ex-ante and ex-post transaction hazards (Schilling, 1999, 2000), as the 
convergence of an intermediate market around stable, standardised interfaces can reduce asset 
specificity (Argyres & Bigelow, 2010), small numbers bargaining problems and the risk of 
ex-post transaction costs (Williamson, 1985, 1991). On the demand side, network 
externalities may also promote the convergence of a significant installed user base around a 
particular product design as a result of the wide availability of complementary product 
components (Galvin & Rice, 2008; Schilling, 1999) or a reduction in the risks of 
technological obsolescence that may be perceived by consumers (Schilling, 1999). 
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Moreover, the presence of potentially self-reinforcing network externalities may offer 
strategic benefits to firms who decide to ‘open-up’ and create incentives for cooperative 
product development activities based upon a common approach to interface specification. For 
example, Gawer (2014) cites the example of the Nintendo Wii to highlight how self-
reinforcing network effects may operate: the Nintendo Wii console has a large installed user 
base which increases the incentives for external firms to participate in designing Wii-
compatible complementary products which, in turn, attracts more end-users to the Wii 
console.   
The product development process that underpins a modular product design requires fully 
specifying product components and interfaces ex-ante before development begins (Sanchez & 
Mahoney, 1996). This means that a firm must possess knowledge about the architecture, its 
product components and how they connect together. However, as product development 
proceeds, and the blue-print of the architecture stabilises, innovation tends to turn to the 
product component level (Galvin & Morkel, 2001; Henderson & Clark, 1990) and subsequent 
incremental and modular innovation efforts may be focused on new market segments or 
heterogeneous consumer needs.  
Modular product architectures are often associated with partitioning product component, task, 
knowledge and firm boundaries (Colfer, 2007; Colfer & Baldwin, 2010). For example, 
Sanchez (2003:382) writes that “the standardising of component interfaces based upon the 
firms current architectural knowledge largely decouples architectural knowledge-based 
processes from the component-level knowledge used to develop specific component design 
during product development” such that manufacturers/assemblers of modular products can 
specialise in architectural knowledge and outsource product component design and 
development across firm boundaries (Sako, 2003). In other words, in product markets where 
systems integration may be important, according to Hobday, Davies & Prencipe (2005:1128), 
“the lead firm moves away from an in-depth control over component design and manufacture 
to the systems integration knowledge and skills needed to integrate the modules produced by 
others in the supply chain”.  
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According to Sanchez and Mahoney (1996:72), the partitioning of architectural and product 
component knowledge can enhance a firm’s ability to focus on architectural learning and 
capability development, rather than on lower-level product component knowledge, and that 
this may ultimately help a firm overcome the architectural challenges for incumbent firms as 
posed by Henderson and Clark (1990). Once architectural and product component level 
knowledge is partitioned, it can facilitate the division of labour, such that product 
components can be “designed and developed concurrently and autonomously by 
geographically-dispersed, loosely-coupled development groups (Sanchez & Mahoney, 
1996:70). In other words, modular product development activities can proceed independently 
and concurrently across a range of individuals, teams, groups, divisions, or even firms.  
2.1.4 Closed architectures 
Product architectures may be conceptualised as either integrated or modular, or along the 
dimension of being either open or closed (Sanchez, 2008; Sanchez, Galvin & Bach, 2013; 
Shibata, et al., 2005). A closed product architecture is one that is not able to be used by other 
firms in the industry, it is proprietary and a firm may choose to hide its intellectual property 
through formal mechanisms such as patents, trademarks, and copyright, or informal 
mechanisms such as secrecy, encryption, or complexity, or a combination of the two 
(Sanchez, et al., 2013). Boudreau (2010:1851) makes a similar observation when highlighting 
that “closed technologies are wholly-owned proprietary, vertically integrated and controlled 
by a single party”. Sanchez (2008:341) also suggests, however, that “a firm may have such 
advanced design or production knowledge about a component or its interfaces that other 
firms are simply unable to create equivalent components or use the firm’s interface 
specification in architecting their own components or products”. All of the reasons may 
make it near-impossible for other firms in a product market to gain knowledge about or 
access to a closed product architecture.  
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Sanchez, et al., (2013:2) coined the term ‘architectural specificity’ to describe closed 
systems, suggesting that it is a feature of product architectures that have “been strategically 
partitioned into kinds of components that are functionally different from those used in other 
firms’ architectures and/or that have adopted interface specifications for their components 
that are not compatible with the interface specifications used in other firms’ architectures”. 
As a consequence, firms who choose to sponsor closed product architectures may be unable 
to plug and play complementary product components from other external firms, owing to the 
specificity and idiosyncrasy of their designs. Sanchez (2008:342) highlights the main 
defining characteristics of closed product architectures as “proprietary, closed systems; they 
have significant design integration of optimised components; and, they are only understood 
by the specific firm and requires significant technical knowledge exchange and 
coordination”. 
Not all closed product architectures are integrated, however. For example, Takeishi (2002) 
and Takeishi and Fujimoto (2003) refer to the motor vehicle industry as a form of ‘closed 
modularisation’, Langlois (2002) distinguishes between forms of internal modularity and 
external modularity, and Chesbrough (2003) between internal modularity and market 
modularity. In other words, (1) internal modularity refers to product modularity within firm 
boundaries and (2) external or market modularity refers to product modularity across two or 
more firm boundaries. In his paper, Langlois (2002) also recounts the example of IBMs 
computer systems in the 1970s as a form of internal modularity, as IBM sought to keep its 
modular interfaces proprietary and to prevent external firms from supplying modular product 
components (it subsequently failed as has been well-documented).  
The idea of a closed and modular product architecture has been formalised in the stylised 
frameworks offered by Sanchez (2008) and Shibata, et al., (2005). A closed and modular 
product architecture should theoretically offer firms the potential to obtain rents from 
“configuring greater product variety, more rapid upgrading of components, or lower costs 
for common components used across product variations” (Sanchez, et al., 2013:30).  
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Firms with closed and modular designs, therefore, may be able to develop modular product 
components and firm-specific interface specifications via their own firm-specific knowledge 
and capabilities, but it is also a decision to forego network externalities and the potential for 
technical advance that may emerge with a diversity of contributions from external firms 
(Woodward & West, 2009). Baldwin and Clark (2000) also highlight that a closed and 
modular product architecture is also a decision to forego the option value of sourcing the best 
quality or lowest cost product components.  
2.1.5. Open architectures 
 
An open architecture is a type of product architecture with high levels of commonality 
(Sanchez, et al., 2013) and interface specifications that are standardised and permeate across 
the product market (Shibata, et al., 2005), unencumbered by intellectual property rights or 
other means of secrecy or protection. Boudreau (2010:1851) highlights that open 
technologies are “...neither wholly owned, nor controlled by a single party, thus accessible to 
all” and firms interested in developing complementary product components can often ‘plug 
and play’ into the product architecture (Sanchez, 2008; Sanchez, et al., 2013). Open product 
architectures are often used by more than one, and often many, firms. Industry standards are 
an important design feature of open product architectures and may be associated with core 
technologies, specified by government or industry groups such as the DVD standard 
developed by the DVD Forum, or with operational processes such as ISO standards 
(Schilling, 1999, 2000). Open innovation projects are often viewed as a form of ‘extreme’ 
open architecture (ie, Chesbrough, 2003; West, 2003).  
 
Sanchez (2008:342) argues that “because open-system architectures allow firms to access an 
architecture, they may create gains from trade, as well as significant positive network 
externalities, both for firms that participate in a product market based on an open 
architecture and for users or consumers of products and services leveraged from open-system 
architectures”. Open architectures, therefore, are often associated with the presence of 
significant demand- and supply-side network externalities and gains from trade and/or 
specialisation and can be found in many product markets where interoperability is essential, 
including personal computers and consumer electronics (Langlois & Robertson, 1992), and 
telecommunications (Galvin & Rice, 2008).  
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Perhaps the classic example of an open architecture is the Linux operating system. On the 
demand-side, any user can use Linux, and on the supply-side, any firm can assemble or 
bundle Linux with other hardware or software, and any firm can design and develop a Linux-
compatible complementary product, or contribute to the improvement of the operating 
system, subject to the open source standards. Sanchez (2008:342) summarises open 
architectures as: “open systems, with strategic partitioning and interfaces known and 
understood by many firms and available for use by any firm; they have one to one mapping 
into technically separate individual components, and allow component substitution; the 
interfaces between product and process have been technically frozen to create a technically 
stable environment; and, they are decoupled and can be developed by technically separate 
process components and firms” 
 
As shown in Figure 3, the integrated to modular and open to closed characteristics of product 
architectures would seem to indicate a stylised 2x2 product architecture typology comprised 
of closed and integrated, closed and modular, open and integrated and open and modular 
product architecture types. However, while such a stylised product architecture framework as 
formalised by Sanchez (2008) and Shibata, et al., (2005) may extend the original integrated 
to modular continuum proposed by Ulrich (1995), these contributions suffer from at least 
three limitations, (1) it is highly unlikely that an open and integrated product architecture 
exists in practice (ie, Shibata, et al., 2005:15) because “there are virtually no products for 
which the mapping relationship is complex and for which standard interfaces have been 
established...accordingly we may assume that as a rule, open architectures are [always]  
modular architectures”, (2) few product architectures are likely to exhibit the perfect 
characteristics of an ideal or stylised type (Schilling, 2000; Ulrich, 1995), and in practice 
many product architectures are often comprised of a blend of integrated and modular product 
components, and firm-specific or industry-wide interfaces (a few scholars have previously 
hinted at the notion of a semi-open product architecture, ie, Boudreau, 2010; 2012; West, 
2003), (3) the product architecture framework is ‘static’ and fails to capture the evolutionary 
nature of product architecture design across time.  
 
I now turn in section 2.1.6 to the notion of non-perfect product architectures – what I shall 
call hybrid product architectures in line with West (2003).  
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2.1.6 Hybrid architectures 
 
Despite the intuitive appeal of the open and closed, and modular and integral dimensions, few 
product architecture types are perfectly open or closed, or perfectly modular or integral 
(Schilling, 2000; Ulrich, 1995). In fact, many product architectures (at the product component 
level) are often a blend of both modular and integrated product components, as well as a 
blend of both specialised and industry standards. The notion of a hybrid product architecture 
seems entirely logical because the partitioning of a product architecture often has limits so 
that “some interdependencies remain across modules, yet many fewer than the 
interdependencies contained within module boundaries” (MacDuffie, 2013:11) and “few 
products, services or systems would be composed exclusively of modular or interdependent 
interfaces – suggesting that architectures that are entirely modular or entirely interdependent 
would be the rare extremes at opposite ends of a spectrum” (Christensen, et al., 2002:959). 
 
‘Non-perfect’ product architectures have been described as ‘semi-open’ (Boudreau, 2010) or 
‘hybrid’ (West, 2003) because products, as complex technological systems, are made up of 
multiple product components, and can often be ‘opened up’ one product component at a time 
(Boudreau, 2010). West (2003:20) identifies two types of hybrid strategy: (1) opening parts 
of the architecture by waiving control of the commodity layer, while retaining full control of 
other layers that may offer a source of potential differentiation along some lines, or (2) 
disclosing technology under restrictions so it cannot be easily copied by competitors. West 
(2003:20) hypothesises that the former strategy is likely to be advantageous to drive adoption 
and facilitate interoperability. However, as West suggests, without some approach to 
innovation, differentiation or some form of lock-in, incumbent firms will find it very difficult 
to appropriate rents unless there are advantages to be gained through marketing, customer 
service, or leveraging brand names. Boudreau (2010:1852) also suggests that product 
architectures can be often characterised as exhibiting a ‘degree of openness’, which may vary 
along a number of dimensions; for example, its “…treatment of property rights, contracts, 
and rules, as well as their procedural characteristics” and Gawer and Cusumano (2014:420) 
argue it may vary according to its “level of access to information on interfaces to link to the 
platform or utilise its capabilities, the types of rules governing use of the platform, or cost of 
access (as in patent or licensing fees)”. 
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Opening up an architecture to allow external firms to participate in its development is often 
characterised as a crucial decision because “…opening has the potential to build momentum 
behind a technology, but could leave its creator with little control or ability to appropriate 
value” (Boudreau, 2010:1849), the so-called ‘paradox of openness’ (Yacoub, 2015). 
Boudreau (2010:1852) posits that the paradox of openness can be conceptualised as a 
‘balance of power’ between the product architecture owner and external contracting parties.  
 
Boudreau (2010:1853) suggests that giving up control means sharing a firms’ architectural IP 
so that external firms can ensure the interoperability of their activities. By doing so, firms 
benefit from an increase in the diversity of complementary product components, providing 
external firms are motivated or willing to contribute. Again, a trade-off identified; simply 
granting access to a significantly large number of external firms, and fostering intense 
competition among firms in the intermediate market can reduce incentives for those firms, 
whereas opening up a product architecture to differentiated contributions may increase 
innovative efforts. On the reverse side of the coin, concentrating control in the hands of one 
firm may lead it to appropriate rents by squeezing suppliers’ ex-post. As a result, external 
firms may lack the incentive to invest in innovative activities. The key success factor, 
according to Gawer and Cusumano, 2014:421) is allowing “…interfaces to be sufficiently 
open to allow outside firms to plug in components as well as innovate on these compliments 
and make money from their investments”. 
 
The paradox of openness has been conceptualised in a number of similar ways in the extant 
literature. For example, Schilling (1999, 2000) conceptualises the paradox as ‘diffusion 
versus protection’ and points out “this creates a dilemma for the firm about whether to 
protect or diffuse its technology: although a firm might wish to protect its proprietary 
technologies in order to appropriate rents, product systems based on open standards might 
more rapidly accumulate an installed base and be compatible with a wider range of 
complementary goods” (Schilling, 2000:329).  
 
 
 
 
 
42 
 
Schilling (1999:269) suggests that in many cases diffusion may be a better strategy than 
protection, however warns that open systems are often “quickly commoditised, and may 
provide little appropriability of rents to their developers”. Protection, on the other hand, is 
considered a suitable strategy “only if there are few competitors, an existing range of 
complementary goods, and/or the technology has a great margin of improvement over other 
options”. Schilling (1999) considers the adoption of a modular product architecture as a way 
to trade-off ‘diffusion versus protection’. In her view, “modular product systems can utilise 
proprietary technology within components of the system, but use a standards-based interface 
to interact with other components or systems”.  In other words, by hiding IP within a product 
component boundary, subject to a standards-based interface, firms can benefit from both 
interoperability and rent appropriation. West (2003) conceptualises the trade-off in the same 
way as Schilling, but uses different terms - adoption versus appropriation. West reminds us 
that when a firm pursues a fully open product strategy it is likely to reduce rent appropriation 
as it opens up competition and lowers entry barriers. On the other hand, opening up a product 
architecture may encourage user adoption as it reduces consumers’ fears of being locked in to 
a single technology manufactured by a single firm (Katz & Shapiro, 1994). Several studies in 
fact have concluded that product designers should strive for the development of product 
architectures with near-decomposability but with an intermediate degree of product 
component interdependence in order to balance these strategic trade-offs (Boudreau, 2010; 
Ethiraj & Levinthal, 2004; Fleming & Sorenson, 2001; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2006). 
 
Hybrid product architectures may, therefore, be conceptualised as a product architecture that 
fosters intermediate integrated-modular and open-closed characteristics as a mechanism for 
firms to open up access to complementary product components, but without giving up full 
control (Boudreau, 2010). Boudreau (2010:1850) cites the example of Apple in its 
development of the iPhone, where Apple tightly-controlled the operating system, but allows 
thousands of external firms to develop software applications. This is, of course, a fine 
balancing act, the trick being to determine which product components to open up and which 
to retain proprietary control. These strategic decisions can lead to product architectures being 
further opened or closed as the trade-offs are evaluated and re-evaluated by firms across time. 
For example, Apple initially bundled Google Maps as part of its iPhone, but then replaced it 
with its own Apple Maps application as part of iPhone 5. Similarly, Netscape began life as a 
provider of a complementary product to Microsoft, who later enveloped the browser 
component within Internet Explorer.     
43 
 
 
I now turn to propose a stylised product architecture typology that aims to synthesise the 
various strands of the extant literature discussed, and builds upon prior conceptual and 
theoretical contributions. I propose a stylised product architecture typology consisting of 
closed and integrated, closed and modular, hybrid22 and open and modular product 
architectures in order to encompass the emerging literature on non-perfect product 
architectures. The product architecture typology I propose responds to the advice of 
Campagnolo and Camuffo (2010:260) in (1) specifying the unit of analysis, (2) measured 
along a continuum from integrated to modular, and (3) recognises that degrees of product 
modularity may change over time.  
 
2.1.7. Stylised product architecture design types 
 
Diagrammatically, I propose the following product architecture typology: 
 
Degree of openness  
 
Closed and integrated 
product architecture 
Closed and modular 
product architecture 
Hybrid product 
architecture 
Open and modular 
product architecture 
Designed and developed within a single firm Designed and developed across two or more firms 
  
Path of product architecture evolution 
 
Figure 5: Stylised product architecture typology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
22
 It is worth noting here that in the discussion chapter 5, I develop 3 types of stylised hybrid product 
architectures, under conditions of reintegration, that further contribute to the extant literature  
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In figure 5, I illustrate that the degree to which a product architecture is open increases from 
left to right. In other words, product architectures are likely to evolve from being closed and 
integrated to closed and modular within the boundary of a single firm. Next, closed and 
modular product architectures may evolve into hybrid product architectures as product 
component design extends across firm boundaries, and, finally, towards an open and modular 
product architecture as further product components are outsourced. In addition, the evolution 
of product architectures is assumed to be bi-directional, such that the reverse path towards 
(re)integration is feasible as .product components are re-absorbed within firm boundaries.  
 
I define a closed and integrated product architecture as a proprietary architecture. It is 
designed and used by one controlling firm and a high number of product components are 
tightly-coupled and integrated with each other. A low number of product components may be 
loosely-coupled and modular. The product architecture may be protected by either formal or 
informal mechanisms, or both, and interface standards are either idiosyncratic to the 
controlling firm or non-existent. Examples from the UK personal pensions sector include 
many final salary occupational pension schemes. In such schemes, product components are 
tightly-coupled and optimised to achieve a specific retirement outcome, usually based on a 
percentage of final or average salary. To achieve the outcome, member contributions are 
tightly-coupled to the outcome which, in turn, is tightly-coupled to the underlying investment 
components. Interface standards between product components are idiosyncratic or non-
existent. Occupational pension architectures can therefore be described as closed and 
integrated.  
 
A closed and modular product architecture is also a proprietary architecture, protected by 
either formal or informal mechanisms, or both. A high number of product components are 
loosely-coupled and modular. A low number of product components are tightly-coupled and 
integrated. A high number of interfaces have been specified by the controlling firm. A low 
number of interfaces have been adopted as the basis of market exchange with a low number 
of external suppliers.  
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Many UK personal pensions are architected as closed and modular. Stakeholder personal 
pensions, for example, are designed on proprietary mainframe IT systems, however a number 
of product components are a form of closed modularity. For example, many stakeholder 
pensions have a range of investment funds that can plug and play into the architecture, so 
long as they are proprietary and meet the specialised interface standards. In the wider UK 
financial services sector, closed and modular product designs can be found across many 
sectors such as retail banking and mortgages.         
 
A hybrid product architecture has elements that are proprietary and controlled by a single 
firm, and other elements that are controlled by two or more firms. It has an intermediate mix 
of tightly-coupled and integrated product components and loosely-coupled and modular 
product components, and an intermediate mix of firm-specific and industry-wide standards. 
In the UK personal pensions sector, such designs are common in unit-linked personal 
pensions. These hybrid designs are proprietary and incorporate a wide range of investment 
funds that can plug and play from a wide range of external firms. Interfaces, however, are 
specialised but each firm shares their own specifications with external firms as a basis for 
market exchange and co-development practices. Some industry standards are imposed by the 
regulator or negotiated via industry standard-setting organisations (SSOs).  
 
An open and modular product architecture does not have one controlling firm, and is 
typically a non-proprietary architecture, used by more than one, or many, firms, 
unencumbered by formal or informal protective mechanisms. A high number of product 
components are loosely-coupled and modular, interacting and connected through a high 
number of industry standards. A low number of tightly-coupled and integrated product 
components or firm-specific interfaces may be present. Significantly open and modular 
product architectures can be found in the investments and retirement sector, encompassing a 
range of plug and play product components. For example, self-invested personal pensions 
(SIPPs) are often licensed from a small number of core systems architects, designed and 
administered on licensed platforms, with an almost limitless range of investment components 
from thousands of external firms. Industry standards exist for many product or process 
component interfaces.        
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I now turn to discuss prior empirical studies that have examined architectural co-evolution, 
followed by the supply-side processes that may be associated with such architectural co-
evolution.   
 
2.1.8 Paths of architectural co-evolution 
 
The evolution of product architectures can be traced back to Simon’s (1962:468) seminal 
work on hierarchy and systems. As technological systems, product architectures are rarely 
static in nature and may often evolve over time (Christensen, et al., 2002; Fine, 1998; Fixson 
& Park, 2008; Schilling, 2000; Shibata, et al., 2005) “in response to changes in their context, 
or to changes in their underlying components in the pursuit of better fitness” (Schilling, 
200:314-5).  
 
Product architectures are often assumed to follow an evolutionary path towards increasing 
modularity. In other words, product architectures may often be designed initially as closed 
and integrated, and progress through various iterations of design changes until they exhibit 
more or less open and modular characteristics (ie, Sanchez, 2008; Shibata, et al., 2005). 
Empirically, this phenomenon has been examined in a number of product market settings, 
such as stereos (Langlois & Robertson, 1992), numeric controllers (Shibata, et al., 2005) 
motor vehicles (Argyres & Bigelow, 2010) computers (Baldwin & Clark, 2000), mortgage 
banking (Jacobides, 2005) software (MacCormack, et al., 2012) semi-conductors (Funk, 
2008) and bicycles (Galvin & Morkel, 2001). Shibata et al., (2005) suggest that in most cases 
the evolution of product architecture shifts from one of “complex, non-standard interfaces, 
through simple company-wide standard interfaces and ultimately to industry-wide 
standards” (2005:15).  
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In a similar vein, the dominant logic in explaining shifts in firm and industry architecture is 
conceptualised as a set of ‘centrifugal forces’ (Jacobides, et al., 2006) that push towards 
disintegration and ‘modular organisations’ especially in more mature industries. Schilling and 
Steensma (2001:1149) also highlight the dominant logic of disintegration, whereby “the role 
of a tightly-integrated hierarchy is supplanted by loosely-coupled networks of organisational 
actors”. In other words, analogous to the dominant logic of shifts in product architecture 
towards modularity, many scholars have also argued that firm and industry architecture tends 
to follow a path towards a loosely-coupled organisational form and disintegrated product 
markets populated by highly-specialised firms.  
 
However, a number of authors have hinted at a reverse path towards integrated product 
designs. For example, Shibata, et al., (2005:27) points out that “returning to a product system 
that has a complex mapping of function to structure and a complex interface….is 
conceivable” and Schilling (2000:312) also suggests that software packages and bicycles as 
examples where “sets of components that were once easily mixed and matched may 
sometimes be easily bundled into a single integrated package that does not allow (or that 
discourages) substitution of other components”. Moreover, MacDuffie (2013:12) contends 
that reverse swings are possible when “technological change or customer demands for new 
functionality can redefine module boundaries [which]  may increase interdependencies across 
modules, and can reverse maturation processes that lead to dominant designs”. Empirically, 
Christensen, et al., (2002:972) highlight the role of technology and argue that increasing 
integration is associated with a ‘performance gap’ in product markets. In other words, firms 
continually improve products to a point where they overshoot the demands of users such that 
“disruptive technologies – simpler, more convenient products that initially do not perform 
well enough to be used in mainstream markets – can take root in undemanding tiers of the 
market and then improve at such a rapid rate that they squarely address mainstream market 
needs in the future” (Christensen, et al., 2002:961).   
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An alternative explanation is offered by Cacciatori and Jacobides (2005:1854) who examine 
the building and construction industry and observe that specialisation of productive 
capabilities eventually leads to cracks in the overall system at the aggregate level which 
causes pressure for reintegration, compounded by the presence of exogenous shocks. As it 
becomes evident that the existing specialised productive capabilities in a value chain are 
insufficient to meet the demands of users, firms respond by offering new products or services. 
However, Cacciartori and Jacobides (2005:1867) argue that firms often pursue a form of 
reintegration that preserves its original advantage. In other words, “when threatened with the 
spectre of commoditisation, or intensified competition, firms will pursue aggressive strategies 
of reintegration to protect their profitability” such that “this provides them with new sources 
of revenue and allows them to enter higher margin parts of the industry, using their existing 
capabilities as the ‘thin end of the wedge’; they use their scope and capabilities as their entry 
point to integrated service provision which is expected to be more profitable than their 
existing business…”.   
 
In the Swiss watch industry, Jacobides and Winter (2005:405) argue that “…the cycle 
pushing towards specialisation get reversed when new and superior capabilities arise from 
knowledge bases that are misaligned with the existing vertical structure of the industry”. 
New productive capabilities emerge in a product market as a consequence of a technological 
innovation, in this context one based on miniaturisation and micro-electronics. As a 
consequence, the existing vertical structure of the product market was unable to effectively 
respond which favoured vertically integrated firms Japanese firms. The ensuing selection 
process then forced out the co-specialised structures of the incumbent Swiss manufacturers.   
 
Finally, Schilling and Steensma (2001) argue that firm and industry architectures may resist 
or reverse the shift towards a more modular form. This may occur where a firm architecture 
has performance advantages or cost savings from integrating particular activities. Schilling 
and Steensma (2001) also draw upon the arguments of TCE to highlight that in the presence 
of asset specificity, transaction costs may overload the productive system which leads to a 
disincentive to shift towards a more loosely-coupled form. As such, the shift towards a 
loosely-coupled firm architecture is not a given; rather, it is a trade-off between “the gains 
achievable through greater flexibility and the performance advantages of integration” 
(Schilling and Steensma, 2001:1163).  
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Despite these contributions, Fixson & Park (2008:1312) highlight that few empirical studies 
have examined architectural co-evolution in complex supply networks, and therefore do not 
distinguish between horizontal and/or vertical structures, or moreover, how industry 
structures evolve across time.  In this research study, I aim to contribute to the gap identified 
by Fixson & Park and explain how and why product markets reintegrate horizontally and 
vertically across time, but to go further and connect such processes with changes in product 
architecture. As highlighted, the extant literature on reintegration has tended to focus on 
either endogenous processes at firm level or exogenous processes at the industry level. I aim 
to use empirical data to propose more nuanced stylised types of hybrid product architecture, 
under conditions of reintegration.  Few (if any) prior studies have done so.  
2.1.9 Processes influencing architectural co-evolution 
To consider how product architectures, and associated firm and industry architectures may 
co-evolve, I now turn to ‘modularisation processes’. As MacDuffie (2013:9-10) asserts, “a 
more process-based view of modularity is needed to understand the now-commonplace 
observation that coordination and communication intensive activities can precede emergence 
of modular properties and standardised interfaces” and observes that “modularity-as-
property and modularisation-as-process are so intertwined, so embedded in dynamics of 
reciprocal feedback that examination of one without the other is inevitably incomplete….”.  
The most striking observation from my review of the extant literature is the sheer breadth of 
theoretical perspectives that have been used to explain processes involved in architectural co-
evolution. Theoretical explanations have been categorised by some scholars as either internal 
or environmental (ie, Suarez, 2004) or as supply-side and demand-side (ie Adner & 
Levinthal, 2001). However, the extant literature has primarily focused on supply-side 
explanations for examining co-evolutions in product and/or industry architecture, and the 
explanations are diverse and varied, including transaction costs (ie, Klein, Crawford & 
Alchian, 1978; Williamson, 1975), the exercising of real options (ie, Leiblein & Miller, 2003; 
Schilling & Steensma, 2002), the role of economic property rights (ie, Langlois, 2002; 2006), 
the role of knowledge (ie, Kogut & Zander, 1992; Monteverde, 1995, Tee, 2011), the role of 
resources (ie, Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984), the notion of comparative advantage 
(Jacobides, 2008; Jacobides & Hitt, 2005; Jacobides & Winter, 2005), competitive intensity 
(ie, Schilling, 2000); and technological evolution patterns (ie Dosi, 1982; Utterback & 
Abernathy, 1978; Schilling, 2000).  
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In this section of the literature review, my objective is to examine the dominant theoretical 
perspectives that permeate much of the work in the field. Upon reviewing the theoretical 
basis of prior contributions to the literature, the fields of transaction cost economics, 
productive capabilities and knowledge-based perspectives permeate much of the extant 
literature in high-ranking, peer-reviewed journals, such as Strategic Management Journal, 
Research Policy, and Academy of Management Journal. The scope of my discussion will, 
therefore, focus on these dominant theoretical perspectives.  
 
2.1.9.1 Transaction cost economics 
According to Sanchez, et al., (2013) transaction cost economics (TCE) frames the problem of 
economic organising as a problem of contracting and examines why firms choose to make 
rather than buy (Williamson, 1985). While TCE is often associated with the choice of an 
efficient governance mode, it is an important perspective in the context of product 
architecture, as well as industry evolution as its main premise is that “efficient organisation 
necessitates matching transactions which require higher levels of coordination with 
organisational governance forms which provide the necessary levels of coordination in a 
cost-efficient manner” (Leiblein, 2003:939). In effect, its prediction is that of ‘discriminating 
alignment’ (Leiblein, 2003:940). TCE generally assumes that markets are more efficient than 
hierarchies, so long as the transaction costs of contracting do not exceed the costs of 
vertically integrating the activity with firm boundaries. In other words, firms look to 
minimise production costs, but also associated transaction costs (Williamson, 1985). 
TCE distinguishes between ex-ante and ex-post transactions costs. Ex-ante transaction costs 
are associated with the “costs of drafting, negotiating and safeguarding an agreement” 
(Williamson, 1985:20) and with ‘small numbers bargaining’ problems (Williamson, 1975, 
1979), whereas ex-post transaction costs include the costs associated with monitoring 
performance and enforcing the behaviour of parties (Williamson, 1985) as economic actors 
are subject to the “frailties of motive” (Simon, 1982:303), the potential for hold-up, and with 
challenges in measurement and coordination problems (Leiblein, 2003). Ex-post small 
numbers bargaining problems may also arise in the presence of specialised investments. 
Small numbers bargaining can increase transaction costs as “when there are few suppliers 
available for a resource, the supplier, aware that the firm has few alternatives, can exploit 
the buyer’s dependence” (Schilling & Steensma, 2002:389).  
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Both ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs are associated with three dimensions of economic 
transactions: (1) uncertainty, (2) frequency and, (3) asset specificity (Carter & Hodgson, 
2006; Williamson, 1979:239).  
Uncertainty increases the number of potential contingencies in a contract, and increases the 
ex-ante costs of writing the contract and ex-post costs of enforcing any claims upon it 
(Williamson, 1985). Therefore, additional ex-ante costs of drafting an accurate contract are 
incurred, and despite the best efforts of both parties the contract will inevitably contain a 
degree of ‘incompleteness’ (Baldwin, 2008; Langlois, 2003, Leiblein & Miller, 2003), which 
may lead to ex-post costs arising from adapting contractual arrangements that may require 
further negotiations or ‘hold ups’ if transaction partners engage in opportunistic behaviour. 
Incompleteness often arises as firms “neither have perfect information nor possibly foresee 
all future contingencies” (Wolter & Veloso, 2008:588). According to Sanchez, et al., (2013), 
the frequency of transactions acts as a kind of multiplier on ex- post transactions costs 
associated with each separate contract the firm writes. In other words, a low frequency of 
transactions with an external firm can increase ex-post transaction costs, and a high frequency 
of transactions may help mitigate ex-post transaction costs. Finally, asset specificity is 
associated with the creation of ‘quasi-rents’ which may be subject to hold-up or ex-post 
opportunistic behaviour (Klein, Crawford & Alchian, 1978). When asset specificity and 
uncertainty combine, transaction hazards are most likely to occur (Leiblein, 2003) and 
therefore vertical integration may prevent unnecessary haggling, and it helps harmonise risk 
perceptions and expectations (Williamson, 1971).   
Transaction costs are not limited to transactions in the intermediate market. For example, 
organising production activities within firm boundaries can create costs associated with 
depreciation, agency, co-ordination and shirking (Jacobides, 2005). As a result, firm 
boundary decisions are often associated with the relative trade-off between bureaucratic, 
production and transaction costs compared within- and across firm boundaries (Williamson, 
1985). Jacobides (2008:310-11) further elaborates by arguing that transaction costs should be 
conceptualised as the ‘net’ transaction costs of using the market; in other words, transaction 
costs (TC) less bureaucratic costs (B).  
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How firms’ architectural choices affect ex ante and ex post transaction costs is a recent 
concern in the transaction costs economics literature (Bach &  Galvin, 2011; Baldwin, 2008; 
Langlois, 2006; Sanchez, et al., 2013). In discussing the effects of increasing product 
modularity on transaction costs, Baldwin (2008:156) distinguishes between modular product 
component boundaries which have ‘thin-crossing points’ with low transaction costs, and the 
interior of product components which have ‘thick-crossing points’, and hence high 
transaction costs. Baldwin further distinguishes between so-called types of ‘mundane 
transaction costs’ that can be traded-off and incurred ex-ante in order to reduce ex-post 
transaction costs, and characterises the costs of creating modular product architectures as an 
ex-ante mundane transaction cost. Furthermore, Langlois (2006) characterises the creation of 
industry standards as a type of mundane transaction cost. 
Sanchez, et al., (2013) further apply Baldwin’s (2008) notion of mundane transaction costs to 
a firm’s choice of architecture; in their view, it depends on the relative attractiveness of 
incurring ex-ante versus ex-post transaction costs related to the creation and use of a given 
architecture. Choosing a closed architecture may give a firm strategic benefits resulting from 
exclusive control and use of its architecture, but it is also a decision to incur full development 
costs resulting in potentially high ex-ante mundane transaction costs and a ‘normal’ level of 
ex-post opportunism transaction costs (Baldwin, 2008). Ex-ante mundane transaction costs 
may include the costs involved in design, development, and establishing IPR, and ex-post 
transaction costs would be ‘normal’ by reference to the costs of protecting and defending its 
intellectual property rights (Sanchez, et al., 2013). On the other hand, where a firm incurs ex-
ante transaction costs in creating and/or using an open architecture, it may benefit from lower 
levels of ex-post transaction costs, as well as reduced ex-ante costs in relation to future 
product variants and upgrades (Sanchez, et al., 2013). However, where firms engage in an 
existing open and modular product architecture, it is therefore likely that both ex-ante and ex-
post transaction costs may be reduced, such as via sharing ex-ante development costs among 
product market participants.  
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A further important contribution to the TCE literature is that transaction costs are dynamic 
and transient (Jacobides, 2005; Jacobides & Winter, 2005; Langlois, 1992; 2003; 2006). 
Jacobides and Winter (2005:402) observe that firms try to “manipulate and shape the 
transactional environment to their advantage”. For example, new production processes or 
the specification of interface standards may help to reduce TC that “enables specialisation, 
thus reshaping its institutional context for the next period”. Falling transaction costs, 
therefore, tends to produce a shift in the direction of more modular product architectures and 
more specialised product markets. However, on the reverse side of the coin, there is often a 
contrary push back towards integration, increasing transaction costs, as tasks become 
“increasingly routine, and transfers increasingly standardised, it sometimes begins to pay 
not to subdivide tasks further but rather to integrate tasks…” (Langlois, 2006:1403).  
Ultimately, Sanchez, et al., (2013) suggest that a firm’s choice of architecture is likely to be 
associated with its ability to appropriate rents from its product development activities. Gains 
from specialisation are often available to firm’s who specialise in a particular activity, and 
gains from trade are realised by firms who trade with specialist firms by obtaining lower-cost 
and/or higher-quality product components (Jacobides, 2005). The pressure for or against 
decomposition of a product architecture into modular product components is associated with 
the respective gains achievable such that “the balance between the gains achievable through 
recombination and the gains achievable through specificity determines the pressure for or 
against the decomposition of the system” (Schilling, 2000:317-8). Schilling continues “as a 
product is a nested hierarchy, each product component is a system of other components…and 
should gains from recombinability win out, the system will be decomposed into further fine-
grained components, until the system reaches a level composed of relatively homogenous 
inputs or demands”. On the reverse side of the coin, if gains from integration win out, the 
system may migrate towards integration “if the system is part of a larger system, and if there 
are strong gains to be achieved through making this component specific to a particular 
combination, it might become more tightly integrated with another even larger system” and 
thus “the trajectory of systems is bi-directional….towards or away from increasing 
modularity”.  
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When a product architecture is closed, firm’s often believe that it can succeed in the product 
market by using its own specialised productive capabilities to design and develop products 
(Sanchez, et al., 2013). As a consequence, in such circumstances a firm is likely to use 
significant vertical integration as a means to capture gains from integration, although it may 
use outsourcing where it believes it does not have a comparable advantage.  
Open architectures offer opportunities for firms to specialise in specific types of product 
components who hold a comparative advantage in designing and/or producing specific kinds 
of product components (Jacobides, 2005). Sanchez, et al., (2013) suggest that both product 
component suppliers and assembler firms can benefit from both gains from specialisation and 
gains from trade when this occurs. For example, manufacturer/assembler firms may realise 
gains from trade in a number of ways. For example, a firm may source lower-cost product 
components from specialist firms owing to the economies of scale advantages the specialist 
firm has, or a firm may source higher-quality product components that may earn it a price-
premium for the final, assembled product (Sanchez, et al., 2013). 
In sum, the modular structure of a product architecture and its associated task network is not 
fixed; as Baldwin (2008:156) argues, new modularisations can occur and new product 
component boundaries can have significant implications for firm and industry structure. In 
other words, dynamism in the transaction cost environment and its implications for respective 
gains from trade and/or specialisation versus gains from integration can often push a product 
architecture, and associated firm boundaries, both towards and away from modularity and 
specialisation as new innovations and modularisations occur.  
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2.1.9.2 Productive capabilities perspective  
The resource-based view is an important theoretical perspective in the strategic management 
literature and can be traced back to the work of Penrose (1959) and seminal contributions by 
Wernerfelt (1984) and Barney (1991). The resource-based view is concerned with resources; 
their tacit-ness and how hard they are to imitate and this may impact upon a firm’s 
competitive advantage and its sustainability. The ‘view’ has also been utilised as an approach 
to analyse firm boundaries (ie, Connor & Pralahad, 1996; Poppo & Zenger, 1998) predicting 
that the acquisition of hard-to-imitate resources will lead to vertical integration (Leiblein & 
Miller, 2003; Schilling & Steensma, 2002).  
The capabilities perspective also has a long tradition in the firm boundaries literature, 
captured in the notion of ‘comparative advantage’ (Jacobides, 2008; Jacobides & Hitt, 2005). 
Whereas the resource-based view focused on resources, and a firm’s attempts to gather and 
exploit unique assets in the pursuit of competitive advantage (Affuah, 2001; Leiblein & 
Miller, 2003), the notion of comparative advantage highlights the role of heterogeneous 
capability distribution along a value chain. According to Jacobides and Hitt (2005), 
heterogeneous productive capabilities arise “as a result of a path-dependent learning process 
in which there is abundant opportunity for various contingencies to shape the way of doing 
things that ultimately emerges, even if all firms have access to homogenous resources” 
(Jacobides, 2005). In other words, a firm’s productive capabilities are path-dependent (Bach 
& Galvin, 2011) and arise from prior investments in knowledge, and the strategic choices 
previously taken that impact future opportunities (Jacobides & Hitt, 2005). Subsequent 
variations in productive capabilities have the effect of creating specialised knowledge bases 
that may influence product market specialisation and the gains from trade that are 
appropriable (Jacobides, 2005). Hence, firms do not need a competitive advantage, but rather 
a comparative advantage, relative to other firms, in order to appropriate gains from trade 
and/or specialisation (Jacobides, 2005; 2008).       
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The basic logic, therefore, of comparative advantage is that productive capability 
heterogeneity along a value chain provides the rationale for specialisation and ‘make-or-buy’ 
decisions. It would appear logical to assume that firms will choose to specialise in activities 
where they hold a comparable advantage, and use external firms where they do not, 
transaction costs permitting (Jacobides, 2008; Jacobides & Hitt, 2005). In other words, for 
specialisation to occur, “…the gains from trade must simply outweigh the cost of using the 
market….” (Jacobides & Hitt, 2005:1213).  
As hinted at in the previous section, whereas the transaction costs tradition has illuminated 
the role of the aggregate sum of production costs and transaction costs in determining 
architectural choices, the productive capabilities tradition has foreground the role of 
heterogeneous capability distribution in a value chain. According to Jacobides and Hitt 
(2005:1212), “...once we allow for differences in the productive abilities of different firms, 
the relevant choice is between the firm, with its internal cost levels, vs the price and 
transaction costs of interacting with another firm”. Transaction costs do, therefore play a 
role. However, according to Jacobides and Winter (2005:398) “…their role is akin to that of 
a sales tax or a tariff levied on international trade” and they hypothesise that where 
“productive capability asymmetries are high, such ‘taxes’ might not be sufficient to curb 
vertical specialisation” and conversely “even if the level of the TC tax is low, if the gains 
from trade are even smaller…then there will be no reason for vertical specialisation to 
emerge”.   
Jacobides and Winter (2005:400), moreover, suggest that heterogeneity in productive 
capabilities can be conceptualised as an evolutionary process; based upon product market 
selection forces, such as competition, the dynamic level of transaction costs; and, the 
emergence of new productive capabilities, as new forms of knowledge become relevant. 
Firstly, (1) the forces of product market selection tend to reinforce the existing institutional 
structure, such that when specialised firms have superior productive capabilities, selection 
tends to push for greater specialisation. On the reverse side of the coin, where integrated 
firms have superior capabilities, selection forces further integration. Second, (2) transaction 
costs are dynamic and transient and subject to managerial manipulation, either through 
specialisation or technological imitation.  
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Thirdly, (3) changes in vertical scope, such as increased integration or specialisation, 
necessarily affect the knowledge accumulation and productive capability development 
processes, especially as knowledge accumulation and capability development tends to occur 
more quickly in specialised firms. Ultimately, this may lead to increases in gains from trade 
and/or specialisation, providing increasingly specialised knowledge bases do not become a 
core rigidity. According to Jacobides and Winter (2005:405), these evolutionary forces 
suggest a drift towards ever-increasing specialisation in a product market.  
However, the authors point to an evolutionary drift in the reverse direction. Specifically, they 
argue, “the cycle pushing towards specialisation gets reversed when new and superior 
capabilities arise from knowledge bases that are misaligned with the existing vertical 
structure of the industry. This sets in motion a process that may eventually make vertical 
integration typical, endogenously increasing TC along the way” (Jacobides & Winter, 
2005:402). Jacobides and Winter (2005) also cite Williamson (1983) in arguing that 
integration is more likely whenever asset-specific investments are called for, which is often 
the case as new technologies, associated with new knowledge and productive capabilities, 
favouring existing integrated firms.  
Cacciatori and Jacobides (2005:1864) examine a case of reintegration in the building and 
construction industry and assert that “knowledge bases shape and, crucially, constrain the 
trajectories of capability development”. In other words “the vertical division of labour 
creates ‘trajectories’ that define and prescribe the way in which knowledge and competency 
will evolve over time”. Furthermore, the authors highlight that, in their setting at least, 
changes in the productive capability development trajectory led to the worsening of some 
important elements to the coherence of the overall system which increased pressures for 
reintegration, compounded by exogenous shocks.  
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Cacciatori and Jacobides (2005), moreover, suggest that it is often the aggregate performance 
of the vertical architecture of a product market that may sustain it, or push the system back 
towards re-integration. When the vertically-specialised structure is subject to demand 
changes or exogenous shocks, it is possible that the aggregate performance of the vertical 
architecture becomes mismatched and the pressures for reintegration emerge. Furthermore, 
firms may begin to reintegrate when “threatened with the spectre of commoditisation, or 
intensified competition [and]  firms will pursue aggressive strategies of reintegration to 
protect their profitability” using their existing productive capabilities and scope as the thin 
edge of a wedge to integrated provision (Cacciatori & Jacobides, 2005:1867).  
In sum, the central argument of the productive capabilities perspective is that capabilities are 
path-dependent and tend to become more specialised over time as firms internalise those 
activities in which they hold a comparative advantage, and outsource those activities in which 
they do not. The heterogeneity of productive capabilities distributed along a value chain will, 
therefore, become less correlated as productive capability development tends to follow a 
particular trajectory. The presence of heterogeneity along a value chain reveals gains from 
trade and/or specialisation from transacting with external, specialised firms, transaction costs 
permitting. However, this self-reinforcing process is, again, not without its limits. First, far-
reaching productive capability heterogeneity can lead to ‘gaps’ appearing in the overall 
product system which may cause a push towards reintegration as new superior knowledge 
bases emerge that are misaligned with the existing specialised vertical structure, increasing 
transaction costs and thereby reducing the extent of gains from trade and/or specialisation. 
Second, the threat of imitation and commoditisation inherent in modular product markets can 
cause a shift back towards reintegration in order to capture gains from integration. And, 
thirdly, exogenous shocks to a product market can cause technical discontinuities which may 
lead to increased asset specificity and existing knowledge and capabilities being misaligned. 
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2.1.9.3. Knowledge-based view 
According to Williamson (1985), there are four types of specificity: (1) site asset specificity, 
(2) physical asset specificity, (3) dedicated asset specificity and (4) human asset specificity. 
TCE usually advocates that asset specificity is associated with the delineation of firm 
boundary decisions. However, the knowledge-based view of the firm posits that ‘firm-
specificity’ (or ‘human asset’ specificity) is a key determinant in firm boundary choices. The 
key principle of the knowledge-based view is that firms generate and exploit knowledge 
(Kogut & Zander, 1992), and that firm boundary decisions will be based upon the relative 
efficiency of coordination of complementary activities (Connor & Pralahad, 1996; Kogut & 
Zander, 1992). Within firm boundaries, firm specificity generates a shared language, shared 
knowledge and routines, and enhances coordination efforts (Kogut & Zander, 1992). 
Investments in firm-specific routines, language and skills are critical to firm performance 
(Barney, 1991) and productive capability development.  
Where the knowledge-based view significantly departs from TCE is that specificity, rather 
than damaging governance efficiency, actually increases it (Monteverde, 1995, Nickerson & 
Zenger, 2004). According to Monteverde (1995:1628-9), as an activity becomes more firm-
specific, it increasingly develops a ‘common organisational communication code’ and 
provides ‘one single organisation-specific dialect’ which enables the dissemination and 
codification of knowledge within the firm. Thus, according to Poppo & Zenger, 1998:857), 
“…relative to markets, firms simply possess advantages in generating firm-specific language 
and routines that efficiently yield valuable capabilities. In order words, a firm’s routines and 
productive capabilities are based on knowledge, which is distributed across individuals and 
can be assembled in various ways (Connor & Pralahad, 1996), without the problems of 
information asymmetry and opportunism (Wolter & Veloso, 2008).  
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When intensive knowledge-based transactions are attempted in the intermediate market, 
however, they are often over-burdened with transaction costs. This is because, as described in 
the work of Conner and Pralahad (1996), knowledge is often firm-specific and tacit, that is, 
un-coded and embedded in firm routines and language. As a consequence of its tacit-ness, it 
is often difficult to write-down, duplicate or transfer, and individuals seldom find it easy to 
describe his or her know-how to others, increasing information costs (Schilling & Steensma, 
2002) and creating information asymmetries across firm boundaries (Jacobides & Hitt, 2005). 
The advantage of knowledge tacit-ness, on the other hand, is that it more easily transferred 
within firm boundaries and cannot be easily appropriated by competitors (Teece, 1986). 
Therefore, despite the possible advantages of collaborating with external firms, the 
knowledge-based view posits that increased knowledge specificity permits a firm to make 
more efficient use of its firm-specific language, knowledge and routines, and hence is likely 
to result in product development within firm boundaries. In other words, while the 
knowledge-based view departs from TCE in its theoretical underpinnings, its prediction is the 
same; firms will internalise activities in the presence of specificity.  
However, too much firm-specific knowledge is not without its risks, especially under 
conditions of technological uncertainty (Wolter & Veloso, 2008). For example, Poppo and 
Zenger (1998) studied the information services sector and highlighted that in dynamic or fast-
changing product markets, internal routines and shared language and knowledge can easily 
become a core rigidity that negatively affects firm performance, as “unique language, while 
efficient, may quickly become the wrong language” and “groups of individuals governed by 
markets are more likely to directly benefit from the formation of new knowledge” (Poppo & 
Zenger, 1998:873). In other words, technological change can render existing firm knowledge 
and capabilities obsolete (Henderson & Clark, 1990) if the skills and knowledge required do 
not build upon existing ones. In addition, Baldwin (2008) notes that whenever a firm’s 
routines, capabilities or competencies change this may cause its knowledge boundaries to 
shift, and so the scope of its knowledge will change over time as required by its changing 
activities. As a consequence, vertical integration may become an inflexibility that hinders a 
firm in acquiring new knowledge and innovative potential (Affuah, 2001, Wolter & Voleno, 
2008). Integrated firms may, under conditions of technological uncertainty, miss out on 
innovative ideas as a result of vertical integration (Langlois & Robertson, 1989).  
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Furthermore, external firms in the intermediate market may have superior, specialised 
productive capabilities and “this heterogeneity of available technological trajectories may 
confer evolutionary advantages to disintegrated firms” (Wolter & Volenso, 2008:591).  
The prediction of the knowledge-based view is, therefore, different to TCE; whereas TCE 
may infer that technological uncertainty increases transaction costs, and hence promotes 
internalisation, the knowledge-based view posits that technological uncertainty enhances the 
benefits of acquiring access to external sources of knowledge that are available in the 
intermediate market, but there is a trade-off against the need to protect valuable knowledge.   
Wolter and Volenso (2008) helpfully explore the effects of Henderson and Clark’s (1990) 
innovation typology of incremental innovations, modular innovations, architectural 
innovations, and radical innovations on the degree of vertical integration in a product market. 
The authors contend that incremental innovation is unlikely to affect the degree of integration 
as transaction costs and existing knowledge is largely undisturbed. However, for modular 
innovations the degree of vertical integration will decrease as the need for new productive 
capabilities and falling transaction costs offsets the additional coordination needs. Finally, 
architectural and radical innovations may result in increased vertical integration owing to 
higher transaction costs and coordination needs. The impact of this work is that it highlights 
the fact that the type of product innovation, whether incremental, modular, architectural or 
radical, has profound implications for product market structure.         
Product modularity requires knowledge to be codified and articulated. Decomposition of a 
product architecture into sub-tasks is conceptualised as a key mechanism in making 
knowledge less tacit. According to Ulrich (1995), product partitioning reduces cognitive 
complexity (Ulrich, 1995) and it is often a gradual and recursive process (von Hippel, 1990). 
Once knowledge is explicated, it can then be codified in the form of manuals, databases, and 
other systems and shared with other product development teams within the firm, and/or with 
other external firms, facilitating the creation of an efficient intermediate market (Jacobides, 
2005).  
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The codification of knowledge is often likely to happen initially within firm boundaries, 
before permeating across firm boundaries. For example, Hoetker (2006) cites Putterman 
(1995) in arguing that “communication routines and a common language for discussing 
technical issues arise more quickly within the firm because intra-firm communication is 
normally more frequent and intense than with outsiders”. Tee (2011) also argues that 
knowledge is articulated within firm boundaries initially, as a form of ‘intra-firm’ modularity 
(Chuma, 2006). However, MacDuffie (2006) highlights the inherent difficulty of maintaining 
transactions within firm boundaries once product modularity has emerged.  
The notions I have discussed are similar to the idea of structured or unstructured technical 
dialogue described initially by Monteverde (1995) and later by Christensen, et al., (2002). To 
structure technical dialogue, Christensen, et al., (2002) argue that an activity must be able to 
be specified and measured and the parties must be able to understand the interdependencies 
between the specific activity and the architecture, thereby reducing transaction costs. 
Furthermore, Christensen, et al., (2002:959) assert that for transactions to occur across firm 
boundaries, three conditions of ‘modularity’ must be met; (1) specifiability, (2) measurability, 
and (3) predictability, as without these conditions present, the potential for an efficient 
intermediate market to exist is limited. Once the conditions are met, a product component and 
its interface is modular, across which structured dialogue can then happen. Unstructured 
technical dialogue, associated with high transaction costs, in contrast, continues to occur at 
the boundary of interdependent product components.    
Jacobibes (2005) suggests similar conditions for an efficient, functioning intermediate 
market. The first condition is that coordination must be simplified and that interactions along 
a value chain must be minimised and production modularised (Baldwin & Clark, 2003). 
Without simplified coordination, Jacobides (2005) argues, it remains impossible to engage 
with external firms in an intermediate market. Complex coordination, on the other hand, 
necessitates the use of a firm and its formalised authority mechanisms (Langlois, 2003). The 
second step is that information-exchange between parties must become standardised so that 
information asymmetries are reduced. Jacobides (2005:482) suggests that intermediate 
markets become more efficient when there is an ability to “specify what would be transacted 
across firm boundaries regardless of the presence of…transactional hazards”. 
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In other words, the specification of standard templates is viewed as critical for market 
procurement (Baldwin & Clark, 2003, Tee, 2011). Specification often makes explicit what 
was previously tacit, and standardised methods of exchanging information replace each 
firm’s own shorthand and particular ways of describing things. As Jacobides (2005:482) 
states, “if information on what is desired is unclear or difficult to articulate, outside 
procurement arrangements cannot be set up, as desired items cannot be identified ex-ante”.  
Jacobides (2005:483) also highlights a further possibility that simplified coordination and 
standardised information exchanges can also lead to ‘inter-organisational partitioning’. Inter-
organisational partitioning leads a firm to create autonomous sub-units which may ultimately 
lead to market-based exchanges. Gains from trade, according to Jacobides (2005), motivate 
this process, and when coupled with the emergence of ‘internal shadow prices’ that govern 
inter-organisational relationships, this can push organisational units to consider make or buy 
decisions, forcing transactions with external firms where gains from trade are appropriable.        
The modularisation processes associated with the simplification and exchange of knowledge 
may underpin the formation of modular product designs and ‘modular’ industries as an 
emergent phenomenon (Boisot & Sanchez, 2010). As Langlois and Robertson (1995) assert, 
the emergence of new intermediate markets therefore requires modes of interaction which 
enable newly specialised buyers and sellers to interact through a market interface. If this 
occurs, firms may ‘go modular’, forcing other firms to follow or be selected out (Sanchez & 
Mahoney, 2013). This firm-level evolutionary perspective emphasises that new product and 
firm architectures often emerge in a product market as a consequence of endogenous 
managerial action that may lead to a self-reinforcing mechanism whereby the incentives to 
adopt modular designs increase (Sanchez & Mahoney, 2013).   
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Fixson and Park (2008), however, in their case study of re-integration in the bicycle industry, 
present the opposite view. They suggest that designers seek value in fully integrated designs 
because they can be better than modular designs along some dimension. The authors argue 
architectural knowledge or a broad scope of product component knowledge permits 
reintegration. According to Fixson and Park (2008:1310), “knowledge across several 
segments appears to have been a necessary ingredient for maintaining competitiveness in the 
wake of [a]  architectural shift”. Broader product component scope, they contend, can help 
firms avoid the modularity trap (Chesborough & Kusunoki, 2001). In other words, a broad 
scope of knowledge, a la Brusoni, et al., (2001), may assist firms in identifying new 
architectural innovations.  
In sum, knowledge plays a key role in the modularisation process. Firms are often 
conceptualised as knowledge exploitation entities, however too much firm-specific 
knowledge can lead to information asymmetries, increasing transaction costs, and it may 
ultimately also lead to the risk of core rigidities. Joined with the productive capabilities 
perspective, it also suggests that, over time, firms may be out-fought by value chains with 
highly-specialised knowledge and productive capabilities putting the firm at a comparative 
disadvantage in relation to more specialised participants. Partitioning a product architecture is 
a key modularisation process that pushes a firm to ‘structure’ its technical dialogue in the 
form of standard templates or specifications, initially within firm boundaries and then 
eventually across firm boundaries. As a firm decides to use standardised templates and 
specifications as the basis for market exchange, ex-post transaction costs may fall and gains 
from trade and/or specialisation may become appropriable. However, discontinuities, perhaps 
triggered by exogenous or technological shocks may render existing knowledge and 
productive capabilities obsolete which may act as force back towards integration, increasing 
information asymmetries and tacit-ness, with increasing ex-post transaction costs. Or, as 
gains from trade and/or specialisation reach their limits, designers may seek value from 
appropriating the architectural or broad scope of product component knowledge that 
underpins a new, discontinuous integrated design.  
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Section summary 
The supply-side processes that may underpin architectural co-evolution is linked to the 
intended contribution associated with RQ1 – “What supply-side processes are associated with 
the co-evolution of architectures?’. Our understanding of how such processes combine in 
different ways over time to propel architectures either towards or away from product 
modularity and industry specialisation is not empirically well-advanced. In this research 
study, I aim to examine whether and how such processes combine. Furthermore, prior work 
assumes such processes act at a systemic level, but how such processes act upon decisions at 
the product component level to evolve product components towards being more modular or 
more integrated is less well-understood.  
2.1.10 Summary 
In section 2.1 of this chapter, I have addressed the concepts of modularity as a design 
principle and as a process. Firstly, I drew extensively upon the modularity literature to 
propose that product architectures can be conceptualised along two continuums: as integrated 
or modular and as open or closed. I argued that the 2x2 matrices proposed by Sanchez (2008) 
and Shibata, et al., (2005) had weaknesses and failed to reflect the evolvability of product 
architectures. In turn, I embed the notion of a hybrid product architecture and formalised a 
stylised product architecture typology. Lastly, I discussed how prior work has conceptualised 
architectural co-evolution by examining the literatures of transaction cost economics, and the 
productive capabilities and knowledge-based perspectives.  
The aim has to been to argue that architectures are not static, and co-evolve in response to a 
number of processes that combine to reshape architectures over time. These combined forces 
are often overlooked in static empirical studies and can only be uncovered by examining the 
processes, and their interaction, across time.  
I have orientated the literature review on architectural co-evolution towards two significant 
gaps in the literature, (1) connecting product architecture types to industry reintegration to 
propose more nuanced stylised hybrid product architectures types and (2) to examine how 
supply side modularisation processes combine across time to propel architectures towards or 
away from product modularity and industry specialisation. Moreover, I examine how these 
processes combine at the product component level within a given product architecture.    
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I now turn to the second section of the literature review and examine the theoretical origins of 
architectural correspondence, the hypothesised correspondence between product component, 
task, knowledge and firm boundaries. I then examine prior empirical work and discuss recent 
contingent perspectives.  
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2.2 Architectural correspondence   
2.2.1 Introduction 
The notion that firms should be designed to reflect the nature of the tasks they perform has a 
long tradition (Galbraith, 1977; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). To the extent that different 
product architectures require different types of tasks to be performed, either within- or across 
firm boundaries, it is conceivable that the architecture of firms and products should reflect 
‘discriminating alignment’ (Leiblein, 2003), in which the governance structure of a 
transaction is matched with the underlying characteristics of the transaction (Williamson, 
1996). Langlois and Robertson (1992) recognised how modular product designs may affect 
industry structure and in their 2003 article “The Vanishing Hand: the Changing Dynamics of 
Industrial Capitalism” arguing that “by allowing specialist producers…to concentrate…on 
particular components, a modular system thus enlists the division of labour in the service of 
innovation”. Sanchez and Mahoney (1996:64), however, were one of the first scholars to 
formalise a broad proposition suggesting a relationship between product architecture and firm 
architecture.  For example, “product designs composed of tightly-coupled components will 
generally require development processes carried out in a tightly-coupled organisation 
structure coordinated by a managerial authority hierarchy, an organisation design typically 
achieved within a single firm”, and, in the case of a modular product architecture, “the tasks 
within a multi-divisional firm are intentionally designed to require low levels of coordination 
so that they can be carried out by an organisational structure of quasi-independent divisions 
functioning as loosely-coupled sub-systems”.  
Subsequently, labelled the ‘mirroring hypothesis’ by Colfer (2007) and formalised by Colfer 
and Baldwin (2010), architectural correspondence suggests that the architecture of a firm may 
often correspond to the architecture of the product it designs. With intuitive appeal, empirical 
research has flourished in recent years, such as aircraft engines (Brusoni, et al., 2001; Sosa, 
Eppinger & Rowles, 2004), computer notebooks (Hoetker, 2006); bicycles (Fixson & Park, 
2008; Galvin & Morkel, 2001); software (MacCormack, et al., 2012), semiconductors (Funk, 
2008); motor vehicles (ie, MacDuffie, 2013; Sako, 2003), and air-conditioning systems 
(Cabigiosu & Camuffo, 2012; Furlan, Cabigiosu & Camoffo, 2014).  
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2.2.2. Theoretical foundations  
Despite being criticised as being technologically-deterministic (Sako, 2003), the general idea 
of architectural correspondence is that the architecture of a firm corresponds to the product 
architecture it designs to the extent that an integrated firm is necessary for developing an 
integrated product architecture, whereas a modular firm is necessary for developing a 
modular product architecture (Colfer, 2007; Colfer & Baldwin, 2010; Fine, et al., 2005, 
Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996). In other words, ‘products design organisations’ (Sanchez & 
Mahoney, 1996).  
While the mirroring hypothesis examines the architectural correspondence between one 
structural layer of a system and another, there are different targets for correspondence. Colfer 
(2007:5-6) identifies four types of architectural structure that are amenable: (1) the product; 
(2) the product development firm; (3) the division of labour and (4) the division of 
knowledge. In her essay, Colfer suggests that the target for modularisation is not always the 
same as it depends upon the structural layer under examination. For example, (1) in the case 
of the product architecture, the target for modularisation is the interdependencies between 
product components, (2) in the case of the firm, the target is the information-sharing and 
communication patterns between the organisational actors who develop the product (such as 
individuals, teams, firms), (3) in the case of the division of labour, the target is the technical 
product interdependencies among the product development tasks of different firms, and, (4) 
in the case of the division of knowledge, the target is the technical interdependencies among 
the information/skill sets required to perform the development tasks (Colfer, 2007:6).  
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In sum, Colfer (2007) suggests that we can talk of a ‘within-firm’ mirroring – the extent of 
architectural correspondence between the product and the product development firm – and an 
‘across-firm’ mirroring – the extent of architectural correspondence between the product and 
the division of labour and/or division of knowledge across firms. In more specific terms, I 
elaborate further that correspondence is hypothesised to be present when the partitioning of 
product component, task and knowledge boundaries correspond within one firm (in the case 
of within-firm correspondence) or across two or more firms (in the case of an across-firm 
correspondence)23. In other words, an across-firm correspondence encompasses the additional 
partition of firm boundaries, as shown in Figure 6.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Within- and across-firm correspondence   
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 Colfer (2007) and Colfer and Baldwin (2010) had assumed a simple integral-modular continuum in making 
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In order to examine the hypothesised correspondence between product component, task, 
knowledge and firm boundaries, many scholars have used a proxy measure. Colfer and 
Baldwin (2010:6) argue that an ‘ideal test’ for architectural correspondence is one that 
analyses how product architectures may relate to other layers and would seek to examine 
organisational ties such as (1) firm co-membership, (2) geographical co-location, or (3) 
communication and information-sharing patterns, suggesting that it is then possible to see 
whether “a technical dependency was correlated with the presence (or absence) of a given 
type of organisational tie”. Colfer and Baldwin (2010) argue that the type of organisational 
tie used as a proxy for correspondence is not uniform across empirical studies – one possible 
explanation of the inconsistent results.  
In this research study, I highlight that the lack of uniformity in how correspondence or non-
correspondence is assessed in prior work can lead to mixed results, and correspondence and 
non-correspondence at the same time. In order to overcome the limitations of conflicting 
results, I aim to propose a ‘weak test’ and a ‘strong test’ of correspondence that may provide 
much-needed uniformity in future scholarly work. 
In the within-firm literature, individuals or teams within the boundary of a single firm share 
co-membership of the same firm and therefore an appropriate organisational tie is often (1) 
information-sharing and communication patterns, or (2) co-location or geographical 
proximity (Colfer & Baldwin, 2010). In the across-firm literature, product development 
activities take place across two or more separate firms, and product development teams lack 
firm co-membership. As such, across-firm correspondence has usually focused on 
communication and information-sharing patterns.  
Despite a range of possible organisational ties to assess the degree to which correspondence 
is present or absent, communication and information-sharing patterns associated with product 
component, task, knowledge and firm boundaries is foregrounded in many prior studies. Its 
centrality can be traced back to the ideas of Parnas (1971; 1972) who stressed the potential 
benefits of ‘information-hiding’. Parnas’s (1972) observation was that high levels of 
information-sharing can overwhelm a product development project, and it would be more 
efficient to hide or encapsulate information within a product component boundary so that it 
cannot affect other parts of the system.  
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Under Parnas’s (1972:1056) approach, every product component “is characterised by its 
knowledge of a design decision which it hides from all others. Its interfaces or definition was 
chosen to reveal as little as possible about its inner-workings”. The advantages of 
information-hiding may therefore extend to the reduction of development time through 
concurrency of product development tasks (Gomes & Joglekar, 2008:445). Baldwin 
(2008:166) eloquently describes why transactions between actors cause information to be 
hidden, “an economical transfer of a good from its producer to a user constrains the 
surrounding transfers of information quite dramatically. The user cannot know everything 
about how the thing was made: if that information were necessary, the user would have to 
produce the thing himself, or at least watch every step of production. The efficiency of the 
division of labour would then collapse. By the same token, the producer cannot know 
everything about how the thing will be used, for then she would have to be the user, or watch 
every user’s action. Thus, fundamental to the efficient division of labour is substantial 
“information hiding”. In other words, product development actors need to have high levels of 
knowledge about their own domains, but little knowledge about each other’s”.  
In terms of integrated product designs, the usual logic is that there is unlikely to be a clear 
correspondence of product component, task and knowledge boundaries and, as such, high-
levels of information-sharing would be required to progress its design and development. 
Turning to the alternative organisational tie of geographical proximity v. dispersion, it is 
likely that under such circumstances the product development team would need to be co-
located and therefore tasks encompassed within a single firm boundary. Whereas, in the case 
of modular product designs, the usual logic suggests that a clear correspondence of product 
component, task, and knowledge boundaries is possible and, as such, high-levels of 
information-hiding between product component teams (ie, low levels of information-sharing) 
are beneficial. Turning once more to the alternative organisational tie of geographical 
proximity v. dispersion, it is likely that under such circumstances the product development 
teams would be geographically-dispersed and therefore product development tasks spread 
across two or more different firms.  
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However, it is important to distinguish between ex-ante and ex-post information-sharing 
needs (Cabigiosu & Camuffo, 2012). Ex-ante information-sharing is often required to 
partition product component boundaries and negotiate interface standards which then permits 
low-levels of ex-post information-sharing, as product development proceeds according to the 
agreed standards. In Sanchez and Mahoney’s (1996) terms, ex-ante information-sharing to 
agree standards acts as an embedded coordination mechanism ex-post. In contrast, non-
correspondence occurs where high-levels of ex-post information-sharing may remain 
necessary for co-development or to resolve unexpected design issues. In other words, high 
levels of ex-post information-sharing may persist for a number of reasons, despite the 
presence of modular product components and interface standards. For instance, (1) firms 
often need to keep access to product component knowledge even where product component 
design is outsourced (Brusoni, et al, 2001; Zirpoli & Camuffo, 2009), or (2) firms may wish 
to engage in information-sharing and knowledge integration in order to develop or maintain 
systems integration capabilities (Brusoni, et al., 2001).  
2.2.3. Within-firm correspondence 
Within-firm correspondence describes the degree to which product component, task and 
knowledge boundaries correspond within the boundaries of a single firm (Colfer & Baldwin, 
2010). Sanchez and Mahoney (1996:65) were the first scholars to formalise within-firm 
correspondence and asserted that “…processes for developing tightly-coupled component 
designs require intensive managerial co-ordination, since the change in the design of one 
component is likely to require extensive compensating changes in the designs of many inter-
related components. Thus, product designs composed of tightly-coupled components will 
generally require development processes carried out in a tightly-coupled organisation 
structure coordinated by a managerial authority hierarchy, an organisation design typically 
achieved within a single firm”. In other words, “since developers must communicate to 
address the interdependence between their efforts, there should be an isomorphic 
relationship between the organisation’s communication (and information processing) 
structure and the architecture of the product under development”.  
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In the case of integrated product development, the fundamental problem is characterised as 
one of co-ordination and communication (Colfer, 2007:7) due to unintended information 
asymmetries and information-processing problems (March & Simon, 1958) as a high number 
of interactions and interdependencies between tasks increases the demand for information. 
The notion of a relationship between product component interdependencies and high levels of 
information-sharing is also hinted at in the earlier works of Galbraith (1973), who argued that 
task interdependence requires a greater requirement for information-sharing between design 
teams.  
Within-firm correspondence has found broad conceptual and empirical support in the 
literature (ie, Henderson & Clark, 1990; Sosa, et al., 2004). In a recent literature review of 
empirical studies, Colfer and Baldwin (2010) find that it received support in 77% (or 17 
studies) of the 22 ‘within-firm’ studies examined with 23% (or 5 studies) not supportive. 
Incidences of non-correspondence were classified into two types. Type 1 (numbering 4) 
exceptions were cases where a co-located product development team within a single firm 
designed a modular architecture made up of largely independent components (ie, 
MacCormack, et al., 2012). The sole Type 2 exception was in the software design industry, 
where integrated product design was undertaken by geographically- dispersed developers 
(Srikanth & Puranam, 2007, 2008). However, Argyres (1999) examined the development of 
the B2 stealth bomber as another example of non-correspondence where an integrated 
product was developed by a group of firms. Argyres found that the exacting technical 
requirements of ‘stealth’ had the effect that no-one single firm held all the capabilities and 
knowledge to develop the product independently, and hence high-levels of information-
sharing was used across multiple firms by establishing a set of standardised rules, procedures 
and systems; in other words, according to Colfer (2007:21), “the group did not simplify or 
standardise the product’s architecture, but rather, how it communicated about that 
architecture”.  
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2.2.4. Across-firm correspondence  
Modularity as a design principle has been suggested as a mechanism that facilitates task 
partitioning (Baldwin & Clark, 2000) and knowledge partitioning (Sanchez & Mahoney, 
1996). An emerging theme in the literature is the extension of within-firm correspondence to 
encompass product development activities across two or more firm boundaries, whereby “the 
technical architecture, division of labour and division of knowledge will ‘mirror’ one another 
in the sense that the network structure of one corresponds to the structure of the others” 
(Colfer & Baldwin, 2010: 13). Sanchez and Mahoney (1996:65) asserted that “in essence, the 
standardised component interfaces in a modular product architecture provide a form of 
embedded coordination that greatly reduces the need for overt exercise of managerial 
authority to achieve coordination of development processes, thereby making possible the 
concurrent and autonomous development of components by loosely-coupled organisation 
structures” In sum, an across-firm correspondence contends that the product component, 
task, knowledge and firm boundaries correspond, and therefore low-levels of ex-post 
information sharing and geographical dispersion will be likely observed.   
Colfer and Baldwin (2010) found that 74% (46 cases) offer support for an across-firm 
correspondence within the sample of 62 empirical studies and 26% (16 cases) do not. Where 
it was supported, it largely consisted of specialised industries developing modular products, 
including stereo systems and computers (Langlois & Robertson, 1992), bicycles (Galvin & 
Morkel, 2001), semiconductors (Funk, 2008), and mortgage banking products (Jacobides, 
2005). The cases not supportive were all examples of independent and specialised firms 
developing an integrated product.  
Where across-firm studies received only partial or mixed support, these consisted of cases of, 
on the one hand, where product component and task boundaries correspond, but exhibited a 
non-correspondence with firm boundaries. In other words, forms of closed modularity, where 
modular product development tasks were partitioned but did not move across firm 
boundaries24 (Hoetker, 2006; Jacobides & Billinger, 2006; Parmiagiani & Mitchell, 2009), 
which suggests that a firm may create modular product architectures, but still keep all 
organisational units under one corporate umbrella.  
                                                          
24
 Such closed modular examples may be re-considered to correspond under my framework. Colfer and 
Baldwin (2010) consider these examples as ͚partial͛ support due to their assuŵptioŶ that ŵodular produĐt 
architectures are always associated with movements of tasks out of hierarchy   
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On the other hand, the second type of mixed results is where product component, task and 
firm boundaries correspond, but knowledge boundaries exhibit non-correspondence, and 
firms rely on high levels of information and knowledge-sharing to resolve architectural issues 
or coordinate their efforts (ie, Brusoni & Prencipe, 2006; Brusoni, et al., 2001).  
2.2.5 Contingent perspectives on architectural correspondences 
Much of the conceptual and empirical research concerning architectural correspondence has 
focused upon whether the mirroring hypothesis holds, and only recently has it turned its focus 
to the contingent conditions under which it may hold (ie, Cabigiosu & Camuffo, 2012, 
Furlan, et al., 2014). This is important, however, because as Sako (2003:230) highlights, 
“there is no simple deterministic link between the type of product architecture and 
organisation architecture”. Some initial empirical work that examines the conditions under 
which correspondence may hold have primarily focused on how product complexity (ie, 
Brusoni, et al, 2001; Cabigiosu, Zirpoli & Camuffo, 2013; MacDuffie, 2013; Zirpoli & 
Camoffo, 2009) and the rate of product component change (Cabigiosu & Camuffo, 2012; 
Furlan, et al., 2014) may lead to a non-correspondence of knowledge boundaries, and hence, 
high-levels of ex-post information-sharing. I will now turn to a discussion of prior empirical 
work that examines these contingencies. 
In modular product architecture design, the usual logic is that product component, task, 
knowledge and firm boundaries can be partitioned ex-ante, leading to low-levels of ex-post 
information-sharing. Sanchez (2003:382) writes that “the standardising of component 
interfaces based upon the firms current architectural knowledge largely decouples 
architectural knowledge-based processes from the component-level knowledge used to 
develop specific component design during product development” and, as such, the contention 
is that manufacturers/assemblers of modular products can specialise in architectural 
knowledge and outsource product component design (and the knowledge underpinning it) 
across firm boundaries.  
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However, according to Henderson and Clark (1990:2-11), successful product development 
requires both product component knowledge, knowledge about each of the core design 
concepts, and architectural knowledge, knowledge about the way in which the components 
are integrated and link together. The relative importance of each type depends upon the 
stability of the product architecture; architectural knowledge is preferred when discontinuities 
occur or in dynamic environments, and product component knowledge is preferred in more 
stable phases of incremental or modular innovation. Therefore, maintaining access to a 
broader knowledge boundary than task boundary may help firms overcome strategic issues 
arising from architectural innovation. In other words, successful product development may 
necessitate a non-correspondence of knowledge boundaries.     
A similar line of enquiry is followed by Galvin and Rice (2008:5) who suggest that firm’s 
need both architectural and product component level knowledge combined in a kind of 
‘information structure’ that acts as an “agglomeration of technical knowledge that includes 
both component-level and architectural-level knowledge”. Information structures are bundles 
of architectural and product component knowledge that corresponds to product functions and 
acts as  a unit of analysis to help firms to decide which bundles of architectural and product 
component knowledge to protect within firm boundaries, and which can be diffused via open 
standards (Galvin & Rice, 2008:6). In their study of the mobile telephone industry, the 
authors argue that the product architecture consists of three information structures: (1) air 
interface protocol, (2) connectivity and (3) internal workings. For example, the internal 
workings information structure must contain architectural knowledge of how it relates to the 
other information structures, but also product component knowledge related to the menu 
structure, data storage and circuitry.    
These contributions have important implications for the notion of architectural 
correspondence and its theoretical assertion that knowledge boundaries will correspond to 
product component and task boundaries. If firms require both architectural and product 
component knowledge in the form of information structures that correspond to product 
functions, it seems logical to assume that product component and task boundaries may 
correspond, but that knowledge boundaries will not.  
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Unsurprisingly the largest body of empirical work on the non-correspondence of knowledge 
boundaries comes from scholars who have challenged the assumption that product 
component and task partitioning is a good map for the division of knowledge (Brusoni & 
Prencipe, 2001; Brusoni, et al., 2001; Sosa, et al., 2004; Zirpoli & Becker, 2007; Zirpoli & 
Camuffo, 2009). Zirpoli and Camoffo (2009), for instance, studied air-conditioning systems 
in the motor vehicle industry and noted that product component and task boundaries 
correspond. However, they noted a knowledge-task boundary overlap in both 
manufacturer/assembler firms and suppliers, and that firms’ strategy (vis a vis value 
creation), knowledge and capability determined task allocation more so than product 
component boundaries. Zirpoli and Becker (2007) also argue that product component 
boundaries are often an inadequate map for task and knowledge partitioning, and highlight a 
number of reasons why this thesis may have limits, (1) product architectures are rarely fully 
decomposable and, as such, product component knowledge needs to be retained and 
assimilated by a manufacturer/assembler firm in order to minimise any remaining product 
component interdependencies, (2) dynamic product market environments often necessitate 
new partitioning schemes which may also require a manufacturer/assembler firm to retain 
product component level knowledge, and (3) technological newness raises uncertainty which 
also may necessitate a manufacturer/assembler firm to keep product component knowledge 
within firm boundaries. Cabigiosu, Zirpoli and Camuffo (2013:672) offer a slightly different 
perspective. In their study of air-conditioning systems they found that where the 
manufacturer/assembler firm held high-levels of product component knowledge, it was able 
to successfully partition the product and task boundaries. However, where the 
manufacturer/assembler firm had insufficient product component know-how, it nurtured co-
development practices with external suppliers and engaged in high-levels of ex-ante and ex-
post information-sharing to acquire product component knowledge.  
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Brusoni and Prencipe (2001) and Brusoni et al., (2001) studied the aircraft engine and 
chemical engineering industries and found that it can be difficult for a group of firms to 
develop a modular product architecture without a ‘systems integrator’ or ‘lead firm’ who can 
orchestrate the involvement and activities of others. Accordingly, modular product design is 
associated with the correspondence of product component, task and firm boundaries, but not 
with the partitioning of knowledge boundaries as “systems integrators know more than they 
do” (Brusoni & Prencipe, 2001:202). In other words, the “decisions to outsource 
technological knowledge differ from decisions to outsource component production….” 
(Brusoni, et al., 2001:608).  
The non-correspondence of knowledge and task boundaries, according to the authors, arises 
from the fact that underlying product components evolve and change at different and uneven 
speeds which creates ‘imbalances’ in the technical architecture that necessitates keeping 
product component knowledge in-house, even when the product component design and/or 
production is outsourced. Systems integration is conceptualised as a kind of ‘third-way’ 
governance mode between vertical integration and market contracting that may help firms 
solve the apparent knowledge puzzle. Systems integrators are conceptualised as loosely-
coupled firm structures that lead and coordinate a group of external firms, while maintaining 
in-house architectural knowledge, and a systems integration core capability in order to 
orchestrate the activity of others. However, the notion of a systems integrator is more than 
simply an ‘orchestrator’, it is a firm who has a core expertise in knowledge integration in 
order to improve existing product architectures or create new architectural types (Brusoni, et 
al., 2001:957).  
Systems integration capabilities, however, may not be appropriate in every product market 
context. For example, Ceci, Masini and Precipe (2014:4) argue that systems integration 
capabilities are contingent upon the particular product design solution and distinguish 
between design modes optimised for (1) breadth, (2) customisation, or (3) modularity. In the 
case of product design modes characterised by breadth and customisation, systems integration 
capabilities were found to be complementary, whereas, under conditions of product 
modularity this seems to defy the complementary effect.  
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The main argument is that varying breadth and/or the level of customisation is a dynamic, ex-
post integration mechanism and in such circumstances dynamic systems integration 
capabilities are of value. Whereas, product modularity is conceptualised as an ex-ante 
integration mechanism where firms require ex-ante systems integration capabilities to define 
the modular product architecture, but that then the ex-ante modular partitions make further 
dynamic systems integration capabilities redundant.  
Many of these contingent studies are situated in industries characterised by a high degree of 
product complexity (ie, motor vehicles, aircraft engines) and complexity may hinder the 
degree to which a successful product component, task, and knowledge partitioning can be 
accomplished. Luo, Whitney, Baldwin and Magee (2011:28), also argue that modular 
partitioning is difficult to sustain in complex environments. However, even when the product 
architecture is characterised as ‘simple’, modular partitioning may also be difficult to sustain. 
For instance, when underlying product components are subject to fast rates of technological 
change or product markets are characterised as ‘dynamic’. Langlois (2002:25) observed that 
modularisation can often be more difficult in dynamic product market settings because “the 
problem of defining boundaries of encapsulation becomes even more challenging in a 
dynamic setting”; in other words, in dynamic contexts modular partitioning is limited.  
Furlan, et al., (2014) examined the air-conditioning industry and noted that non-
correspondence can occur in the presence of dynamic product component level change. 
Drawing upon a range of theoretical perspectives, the authors suggest that product component 
change increases information asymmetry and asset specificity and this leads to more frequent 
information-sharing, regardless of the degree of product component modularity. In addition, 
firms retained access to product component knowledge in order to keep up with fast rate of 
technological change.  
These contributions suggest that the extent to which product component, task and knowledge 
boundaries are partitioned is a strategic choice; correspondence may be beneficial in stable 
and/or modular product market settings (Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996) or detrimental in more 
complex or dynamic settings (Chesborough & Kusunoki, 2001).  
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In complex or dynamic settings, MacDuffie (2008:42), for example, concludes that firms 
developing complex products should “experiment and move activities back and forth across 
organisational boundaries” and this helps firms “…move towards greater product 
modularity where it increases positive outcomes and avoids negative outcomes – and 
otherwise to embrace persistent product integrality”. In other words, the key puzzle for firms 
is how to “…reconcile specialisation in the production domain while remaining integrated in 
the knowledge domain” (Brusoni, et al., 2001:609).  
In sum, in the case of simple product architectures with stable product component 
technologies, the extant literature suggests that ex-ante partitioning of product component, 
task, knowledge and firm boundaries in order to benefit from lower-levels of ex-post 
information-sharing may be an appropriate governance mode. In other words, architectural 
correspondence may be beneficial. However, on the other hand, when product architectures 
are complex, or subject to fast rates of product component change, firms maintain a broader 
knowledge boundary than task boundary and maintain high-levels of information-sharing ex-
post.  
 
Architectural correspondence has an intuitive appeal, however recent contingent perspectives 
have called into question the construct. Many of the instances of non-correspondence relate to 
knowledge boundaries, under conditions of product complexity and/or fast rates of product 
component change (even where the product architecture is stable). However, a weakness of 
many prior studies is the static and cross-sectional nature of their mode of enquiry which may 
lead to inconsistent results. Moreover, with many product markets characterised as ‘complex’ 
or ‘dynamic’, the strong support in the extant literature for correspondence appears perhaps 
rather puzzling.  
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However, few empirical studies have examined correspondence and non-correspondence at 
the same time. What contingencies determine correspondence and non-correspondence? This 
research study aims to identify further contingencies that may mist the mirror and contribute 
to the literature by moving beyond the intuitive appeal that ‘complexity’ mists the mirror.  
Moreover, few, if any, empirical studies have examined correspondence longitudinally or 
retrospectively across time. Baldwin (2008:180), however, hints at such a phenomenon by 
observing that “the modular structure of the task network at a particular point in time results 
from the interplay of firms’ strategies, their knowledge and the physical constraints of 
specific technologies”. Furlan, et al., (2014:790) have also hinted at how correspondence 
may change over time dependent upon the rate of technological change, however highlight 
that “one aspect that most empirical studies do not address is the co-evolution of product and 
industry architectures”. In addition, Furlan, et al,. (2014:804) contend that future research 
“will require the investigation of other, more dynamic industries characterised by radical 
and architectural changes, the adoption of a longitudinal perspective, and innovative 
measures of modularity”. Put succinctly, Fixson and Park (2008:1298) suggest that 
correspondence between changes in product architecture and changes in industry architecture 
“demands a detailed understanding of the change processes themselves that occur within the 
technical domain and industry domain. This, in turn, requires a longitudinal research 
design”. 
This research study responds to those calls. 
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3. Research Methodology, Design and Methods 
 
This chapter provides a detailed account of the research design and processes that underpin 
the research study. I begin with a summary of my subtle realist philosophical position, a 
discussion of the qualitative research methodology and the methods enacted. Of particular 
importance to the discussion is the framing of a ‘subtle realist’ epistemology combined with 
the use of matrix and thematic analysis (template analysis) across time which underpins the 
data analysis phase of this research study. The rationale of employing interviews as the data 
collection instrument is explained, as well as the criteria used to enhance the quality of the 
research study. I end the chapter with a summary of how I considered researcher positionality 
and a section on ethical considerations.   
 
3.1 Research question and objectives 
 
The two over-arching research questions are: 
  RQ1: What supply-side processes are associated with the co-evolution of architectures?  RQ2: Are the design characteristics of product architecture associated with the design 
characteristics of firm and/or industry architecture? 
 
To answer the research questions, the following process was adopted: 
 
1. To review and synthesise a range of extant theoretical and empirical literatures across the 
domains of industrial economics, innovation and strategic management  
2. To design and apply a research methodology and associated methods to explore what 
supply-side processes are associated with the co-evolution of architectures, and whether shifts 
in the design characteristics of product architecture are associated with shifts in the design 
characteristics of firm and/or industry architecture   
3. To synthesise and position the findings within the existing literature in order to advance the 
current body of knowledge  
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A visual representation of the study follows: 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Outline of the research methodology  
 
3.2. Philosophical approach  
 
It is of crucial importance when undertaking research to make explicit and justify the 
philosophical stance which underpins what it means to be in the world (ontology) and how 
you know what you know (epistemology).  
 
3.2.1 Ontological and epistemological perspectives 
 
Ontology has been described as the claims a particular type of social enquiry makes about the 
nature of social reality (Blakie, 1993), whereas Crotty (1998) argues that ontology is the 
study of ‘being’ and Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Jackson (2012) state that ontology is the 
philosophical assumptions about the nature of reality.  
 
 
 
1 
•Philosophical orientation - subtle realism (Hammersley, 1992) 
2 
•Methodology - Qualitative study 
3 
•Sample - purposive  
4 
•Data collection - semi-structured interviews 
5 
•Logic of enquiry - deductive and inductive (retroductive) 
6 
•Data analysis - matrix and template analysis (Miles & Huberman, 1994; and King, 
1998; 2004) 
7 
•Quality criteria - construct validity;  member validation; expert panel 
8 
•Results - cross-case analysis  
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Ontological perspectives are usually described on a continuum from realist to relativist. A 
realist ontology assumes that there is a ‘real’ world out there that exists independently of us, 
and that the real world has real objects and structures. A realist ontological frame “seeks to 
generate knowledge that captures and reflects as truthfully as possible something that is 
happening in the real world” (Willig, 2013:15). It is often accompanied by a set of 
underpinning assumptions such as the existence of a set of social processes which exist 
independently of us, and that there is a relationship between our view of the world and the 
world ‘out there’. Often, realist ontology is associated with the ‘natural’ sciences and 
quantitative research methodologies that assume that cause-and-effect relationships can be 
revealed by scientific data collection and analysis.  
 
In contrast, a relativist ontological perspective rejects the assumption that reality is external 
and objective and posits that reality is socially-constructed and meanings are assigned 
through our own specific social frames of references, open to a range of interpretations 
(Easterby-Smith, et al., 2012). ‘Truth’, therefore, is described as neither purely objective nor 
subjective (Crotty, 1998) but is constructed through social interactions, the assumption being 
that there are multiple realities and that all knowledge is context-dependent (Madill, Jordan & 
Shirley, 2000). In fact, Collins (1983), quoted in Easterby-Smith, et al., (2012:20), says that 
“what counts for the truth can vary from place to place and from time to time”. Often, 
qualitative research has its foundations grounded in a relativist ontological perspective (King 
& Horrocks, 2010).  
 
In ontology, the issue of the existence of a ‘reality’ and whether we can access it unmediated 
is highly contested. Whether there is one ‘reality’ that can be uncovered or revealed, or 
multiple socially-constructed realities, and how these beliefs align with different ontological 
perspectives, continues to be open to debate.  
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Epistemology is often characterised as “how we know what we know” and as a “means of 
establishing what counts as knowledge” (King & Horrocks, 2010:8). Epistemological 
concerns are central to any methodological approach and its ‘epistemological integrity’ 
(Marshall & Rossman, 2006). Two main approaches to epistemology are characterised in the 
literature. One main approach is positivism. King and Horrocks (2010:11-12) define 
positivism (or ‘naturalism’) as an approach which “assumes an ontological view that human 
beings are part of nature and can be studied in the same way as other objects in the physical 
world”. The underlying aim of research in the positivist tradition is to generate objective 
knowledge, a correspondence between ‘truth’ and ‘reality’. In other words, a positivist 
approach aims to develop patterns, laws or principles that can be rationalized and 
generalized. Positivism has been described as nomothetic (Easton, 2010; King & Horrocks, 
2010) which ultimately leads to positivists believing they can make causal claims. Research 
in a positivist tradition is therefore often quantitative and works best with large data sets as it 
tries to uncover ‘reality’ through statistical techniques and replication. However, there are 
variations within the positivist perspective. For example, a post-positivist may argue that an 
absolute reality cannot be fully understood and may only be approximated (ie, Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2000).   
 
Positivism and post-positivism are in contrast to an epistemological tradition of 
interpretivism, which King and Horrocks (2010:12) suggest is a “bridge between 
representations of particular phenomena – what we claim is occurring – and the actual 
world out there”. The interpretivist tradition assumes that objectivity is illusory as knowledge 
always requires interpretation that is influenced by the social world. In general terms, 
interpretivists deny that there is an unmediated access to what is real and reject the idea of 
causality. Interpretivism is often associated with the collection of qualitative data. The aim of 
qualitative research is (often) not to try to uncover patterns, laws or principles, but to study 
beliefs, behaviour or attitudes which may be influenced by historical experiences or a range 
of social and personal factors (Easterby-Smith, et al., 2012) that are in a constant state of 
flux. This means that knowledge is always temporary and contextual (Madill, et al., 2000).  
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Between these two polar epistemological opposites, a combination of both paradigms may be 
argued by some scholars on a pragmatic basis (ie, Duncan & Nicol, 2004; Murphy, Dingwall, 
Greatbach, Parker, & Watson, 1998). One such pragmatic approach is subtle realism 
(Hammersley, 1992) to which I now turn.   
 
3.2.2 Subtle realist commitments 
 
The polarization of philosophical perspectives, and ultimately of methodology, has been 
subjected to extensive critique (ie, Kirk & Miller, 1986; Murphy, et al., 1998). Proposed by 
ethnographer Martyn Hammersley (1992), a subtle realist approach is an example of a so-
called ‘third-way’ philosophical stance (Murphy, et al., 1998). Hammersley (1993) argues 
that adopting a naïve realist or naïve interpretivist approach is problematic. On the one hand, 
there is no basis which is beyond all reasonable doubt to check the correspondence between 
an account of reality and reality itself – the ‘criterion problem’, and on the other hand, 
Hammersley (1992) begs the question that if the job of social science is to produce multiple 
accounts on the basis of a similar research experience, what value can it have? Hammersley 
(1992) adopts a position that neither naïve realism nor naïve interpretivism offer a sound 
philosophical basis for the social sciences.  
 
This research study adopts a ‘subtle realist’ perspective as proposed by Hammersley (1992). 
Subtle realism rejects the ‘naïve realist’ perspective that maintains a correspondence theory 
of truth. Subtle realism concedes that it is impossible to have certainty about knowledge 
claims as researchers inhabit the social and cultural world (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995), 
and, as such, researchers can never be absolutely certain about, or stand apart from, the 
validity of any knowledge claim. However, Hammersley (1992) argues that it is possible to 
be reasonably confident about them, and knowledge claims will usually be based around 
judgements of their plausibility or credibility. Subtle realism argues that there are knowable, 
independent phenomena, but it departs from naïve realism by acknowledging that knowledge 
relies on social and cultural assumptions. It is always possible that cultural or social factors 
may play a role in either leading us towards or away from the truth (Hammersley, 1992). 
Subtle realists, then, aim to represent reality, rather than reproduce it (Hammersley, 1992). 
This approach, Hammersley argues, allows us to accommodate some elements of an 
interpretivist approach, without abandoning a commitment to a knowable truth.  
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Following on from this distinction, subtle realism suggests that reality can be represented 
from a range of perspectives, which may be treated as either true or false. Murphy, et al., 
(1998:69) point out that within a subtle realist approach there is the possibility of “multiple, 
non-competing valid descriptions and explanations of the same phenomena, however, it 
excludes the possibility of multiple, competing valid descriptions or explanations of the same 
phenomena”. Subtle realism, then, offers a middle position between the polar extremes of 
naïve realism and naïve interpretivism, but importantly “subtle realism is distinct…in its 
rejection of the notion that knowledge must be defined as beliefs whose validity is known with 
certainty” (Hammersley, 1992:52). Subtle realism accepts that phenomena can be 
represented from multiple perspectives, which is not the same as saying that there are 
multiple realities. Murphy, et al., (1998:70) conclude that subtle realism is “an alternative to 
the ontological and epistemological dichotomies”. Although Hammersley (1992) was writing 
in the context of ethnography, Seale (2002:107) points out that it is “capable of application 
to others forms of qualitative research”, and Hammersley (1992:53) also suggests that subtle 
realism is a useful perspective from which to elicit accounts to “provide us with information 
about events that we could not ourselves witness (for example that happened in the past or in 
settings to which we do not have access)”. In terms of its application in research settings, 
Murphy, et al., (1998), Duncan & Nicol (2004), and Lewis (2015) commented upon the value 
and usefulness of the approach in health care and social research. 
 
A subtle realist perspective is, of course, not without its critics. In general terms, the 
combination of epistemological perspectives is highlighted as unsustainable by scholars such 
as Hill Bailey (1997), quoted in Duncan and Nicol (2004). Furthermore, Seale (1999) argues 
that subtle realism has no true ontological basis, an observation elaborated upon by Banfield 
(2004). Banfield argues that subtle realist is ‘ontologically-shy’ because it fails to explain why 
we understand certain descriptions or representations as more valid than others and becomes 
“a kind of smorgasboard approach to the production of theory”. Moreover, Banfield 
describes subtle realism as a flat ontology which collapses ontology and epistemology to the 
extent that all knowledge claims are treated equally. Ultimately, however, Banfield proposes a 
critical realist perspective in order to overcome, what he suggest as, subtle realism collapsing 
posivitism and interpretivism and structure and agency, and ignorance of a Marxist view of 
history.    
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Banfield also raises concerns with the problem of relevance. Hammersley’s idea of an 
adequate explanation of a phenomenon is one that “depends on the particular purposes for 
which and context in which the explanation is being developed” (Hammersley, 1992:39), 
which according to Banfield, offers nothing but “ambiguity with endless possibilities for the 
epistemological shopper who is free to select abstractions and generate explanations of the 
social world to fit fashionable or practical purposes” (Banfield, 2004:57). In other words, 
according to Banfield, subtle realism is ‘conflationist’ and vague.    
 
Despite these criticisms, I believe that my subtle realist commitments are appropriate for this 
research study. For one, the research study has been structured so as to illicit knowledge 
claims that we can be reasonably confident about. As such, I believe that it is possible to 
“combine a commitment to the social construction of reality with a concern for truth as a 
regulatory ideal, through studying the different constructions people make of reality, without 
accepting that particulars beliefs are true” (Murphy, et al., 1998:69). Moreover, the aim of 
the research study is neither to adopt a critical Marxist perspective nor to generate 
‘fashionable’ explanations, but rather than to generate multiple, valid descriptions and 
explanations of events and processes across time.  
 
There are a number of reasons for adopting a subtle realist perspective in this research study. 
Firstly, one of the fundamental implications of subtle realism is that it is well-suited as a 
potential companion for research that focuses on phenomena in context using techniques such 
as ethnography or semi-structured interviews (Hammersley, 1992). Therefore, a subtle realist 
approach is well-suited to studying complex relationships and heterogeneous knowledge 
claims. Secondly, a subtle realist approach is well-suited to a longitudinal or retrospective 
research study across time, as the history of events lead to the possibility of heterogeneous 
knowledge claims. Thirdly, I intend the research outputs to be relevant to practitioners and 
policy-makers alike. In my opinion, practitioners and policy-makers are unlikely to consider 
an interpretivist research study as credible due to its ontological and epistemological 
commitments to competing multiple realities.  
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Fourthly, I have had a prior professional involvement in the research setting which may exert 
a level of unintentional influence on the research; therefore, a naïve realist perspective 
associated with the notion of objectivity would be problematic (a discussion of researcher 
positionality is discussed in Section 3.7). Overall, I have sought to achieve ‘epistemological 
integrity’ (Marshall & Rossman, 2006) throughout the research design.  
 
Section 3.4 illuminates my decisions in terms of sampling, data collection, data analysis 
methods, quality criteria and how they resonate with a subtle realist perspective. Firstly, 
however, I turn to the logic of enquiry. 
  
3.3 The logic of enquiry – deduction and induction (retroduction)   
 
The logic of enquiry for any research study is often concerned with deduction or induction, or 
in other words the place that theory takes in the research design. Deduction begins with a 
theory, operationalises concepts and is concerned with gathering data to test the theory. This 
type of enquiry is most closely aligned to quantitative methodologies, with the use of 
statistical analysis techniques and the hypothetico-deductive method (Murphy, et al., 1998). 
In contrast, in an inductive study a researcher rejects the imposition of a priori theory upon 
the data, and posits that hypothesis should be built from the ground up – as is often said it 
should ‘emerge’ from the data (ie, Glaser & Strauss, 1967). One of the primary distinctions 
between inductive and deductive enquiry centres on theory generation versus theory testing, 
since induction is grounded in the data, whereas the former seeks to examine observed 
behaviour with reference to existing theory. As with many concepts with dichotomous 
positions, the inductive-deductive continuum represents an over-simplification as much 
research represents characteristics of both induction and deduction (Hammersley, 1992; 
Strauss & Corbin, 2008). 
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The notion that qualitative research is often closely associated with an inductive enquiry 
method, where the researcher brings to the table no pre-conceived ideas, theories or 
frameworks, has also been challenged (ie, Miles & Huberman, 1994). They argue that any 
researcher always has some preconceived orientating ideas, as without an a priori orientation 
it is almost impossible to embark upon research. Consequently, it is common for some initial 
theorising to be done prior to the data collection, and consequently very few studies are 
purely inductive in nature. Miles and Huberman (1994) suggest that, in many instances, a 
more ‘structured’ or ‘tight’ research design is preferable as it helps bring clarity and focus to 
a research study, but there is always the present risk of over-imposing a priori concerns on 
the research setting.  
  
The logic of enquiry process adopted in this research study closely follows the recommended 
approach set out by Yin (2014). In the first instance, a draft set of research questions were 
developed based upon the field of enquiry and professional knowledge of the research setting. 
The draft research questions were then refined in light of an extensive literature review. From 
the literature review and gap analysis, I then deductively created a product architecture 
typology that served to structure the data collection and data analysis phases. Miles and 
Huberman (1994) also argue that if the aim of research is to describe or analyse a pattern of 
relationships, then it is imperative that there exists a set of analytical categories, deductively 
generated in order to guide what aspects of the data to attend to. From there, during data 
analysis, I used an iterative process of moving back and forth between theory and data, 
because, according to Emerson (1983) the movement backwards and forwards between 
theory and data is characteristic of qualitative research and a retroductive logic of enquiry 
(Easton, 2010). This research study has run along these lines.  
 
How the research design has been operationalised is now discussed in section 3.4.    
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3.4 Research Design  
 
3.4.1 Sampling approach  
 
In qualitative studies, King and Horrocks (2010:29) suggest that respondents are usually 
those able to “throw some light on meaningful differences in experience” or who “represent a 
variety of positions in relation to the research topic”. This kind of sampling is often referred 
to as ‘purposive’ sampling. In this research study purposive sampling was used to initially 
identify suitable respondents.  
 
The total purposive sample was generated in two parts.   
 
First, (1) I generated a purposive sample from my own professional contacts via social media 
platforms, such as Linked-In. Twenty-four potential respondents were contacted by email and 
sixteen agreed to participate in the research study. Eight did not respond. However, I was 
aware that this type of purposive sampling could generate some unwanted bias in the sample. 
For instance, the age, professional experience and firm-membership profile of the sample 
may be similar to my own professional profile when employed in the industry. For example, 
the sixteen respondents who replied had a professional experience ‘skew’: in other words, the 
longevity of their professional experience roughly matched my own, and covered the period 
from the very late-90’s to 2014 (in other words, I generated a sample that ‘looked like me’). 
As I wished to explore the retrospective longitudinal period between 1984 and 2014, this 
presented a problem. In addition, the sample contained respondents that were all known to me 
in a professional capacity which could limit the study’s ‘plausability’ and ‘credibility’. As 
such, (2) the sixteen respondents were all invited to recommend further potential respondents. 
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The sample suggested a further thirty-six potential respondents, with differing ages, firm 
backgrounds and professional experience. As the objective was to acquire additional 
respondents with continuous professional experience dating back to 1980s, I decided to only 
approach potential respondents with continuous professional experience dating back to 1984 
(or even earlier). Twenty-six of the thirty-six potential candidates were identified as potential 
respondents (via desk research using LinkedIn and Google), and fifteen of the twenty-six 
agreed to participate in the research study, thereby making a total purposive sample of thirty-
one. This is shown in Table 2.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: The construction of the total sample 
 
There are advantages and disadvantages with the sampling approach outlined. King and 
Horrocks (2010) argue that respondents may suggest other respondents who share a similar 
viewpoint. However, I believe that this risk was minimal, as I selected from within the 
additional twenty-six potential respondents to identify those who had dissimilar 
characteristics.  
 
The screening process for part one of the sample was, therefore, as follows:   
  employed in the UK personal pensions product market for any period between 1984 and 
2014  employed in a senior product development or strategic management role 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Purposive sample Contacted Accepted 
Phase 1 24 16 
Phase 2 26 15 
 
50 31 
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To ensure ‘dissimilar’ characteristics in the remainder of the sample, the screening process for 
the second part was tightened as follows:  
  continuously employed in the UK personal pensions product market between 1984 and 
2014  employed in a senior product development or strategic management role 
 
The total purposive sample of thirty-one was considered appropriate for this research study 
for a number of reasons. First, initially I had estimated a total sample of between twenty-five 
and forty as being adequate to illicit a number of different explanations across multiple time 
periods. As the interviews and creation of the total sample ran alongside each other, I had 
thirty-one interviews scheduled by the time I interviewed the twenty-fifth respondent. No 
new alternative explanations of the phenomenon were recorded beyond interview_25 and, 
therefore, I decided not to extend the total sample size beyond thirty-one. Second, I believe 
that the breadth of respondents in terms of professional experience and firm background 
enhances plausibility, credibility and internal validity of the research study (Yin, 2014). 
Third, the total population of potential respondents that meet the screening criteria is unlikely 
to exceed seventy or thereabouts. Therefore, the purposive sample of thirty-one (with 
nineteen having a 30-year professional track record), represents a sizeable proportion of the 
total population available. To illustrate this, a LinkedIn search of the UK personal pensions 
product market, filtered with ‘product development’ yields one-hundred and seventy-three 
possible key personnel. However, many of the matches will not have continuous professional 
experience dating back to the 1980s.      
 
In Table 3, I show how the purposive sampling approach was successful in locating suitable 
respondents. In the end, nineteen of the thirty-one respondents had continuous professional 
experience dating back to 1984 or earlier.  
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Table 3: The length of continuous professional experience of interview respondents  
 
In addition, the purposive sample was spread across respondents employed by six different 
firms and four job role types and interviews were conducted between 2 October 2014 and 16 
December 2014. Interview respondent backgrounds are shown in appendix 1.  
 
A pilot study was conducted between 2 October 2014 and 10 October 2014 in order to 
facilitate an early draft of data analysis (see section 3.5.2.1). To construct the pilot sample, I 
decided to simply use the first three interviews that were scheduled and this generated a pilot 
sample as shown in Table 4:   
 
Respondent 
Reference 
Organisation 
Reference 
Job Title Experience 
commenced 
Interviewee_1 Firm_1 Head of Product 
Development 
1980s 
Interviewee_2 Firm_2 Head of Product 
Development 
Noughties 
Interviewee_3 Firm_3 Director of Product 
Development 
1990s 
 
Table 4: Pilot sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Professional experience commencing in  
Purposive 
sample  1980s 1990s Noughties 
2010 
onwards 
Total 
Phase 1 4 8 4 0 16 
Phase 2 15 0 0 0 15 
Total 19 8 4 0 31 
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3.4.2 Interview methods 
 
3.4.2.1 Recruitment process 
 
Potential respondents were informed of the research study, its purpose and benefits with an 
invitation email. The covering email highlighted the research purpose and importance of the 
study and stressed the confidentiality and anonymity of participating individuals and their 
respective organisations. Participants were promised an executive summary of the final 
report. Personal contact details were given for further enquiries on the research, and the 
ethical procedures were stated and agreed. A similar covering email was used for all 
subsequent email reminders targeting non-responders. The process adopted is shown in Table 
5.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Respondent recruitment process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Communication Purpose When Responses 
Email notification of study 
to purposive sample (phase 
1) 
To inform potential 
respondents of the study, its 
purpose and benefits 
30/9/14 13 
1st Reminder to purposive 
sample (phase 1) 
To inform potential 
respondents of the study, its 
purpose and benefits 
12/10/14 2 
2nd Reminder to purposive 
sample (phase 1) 
To inform potential 
respondents of the study, its 
purpose and benefits 
1/11/14 1 
Email notifications to 
purposive sample ([phase 2) 
To inform potential 
respondents of the study, its 
purpose and benefits 
Between 5/10/14 and 
1/12/15  
15 
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3.4.2.2 Interview schedule 
 
Qualitative interviewers often use an interview guide instead of a set of structured questions 
(King & Horrocks, 2010). The interview guide can be based upon a number of inputs and 
extant literature or theoretical frameworks are such common inputs. This research study 
closely followed the advice of King and Horrocks (2010) as I decided to use a minimalist 
interview schedule that remained flexible enough to allow respondents to share their own 
experiences and different perspectives, which opens up the possibility that the interaction 
could lead off in unexpected, but interesting, directions. The interview schedule is shown as 
Appendix 2.  
 
As suggested by King and Horrocks (2010), I made significant attempts to reflexively 
consider how my own interview practice developed over the course of the research study. For 
example, the data collection and data analysis phases occurred in parallel and this meant that 
in later interviews I was able to orientate the follow-up questions to more deeply explore 
explanations and experiences that offered a different or new perspective to what had come 
before in earlier interviews. Changing the follow-up questions posed across interviews, and 
remaining aware of your own interview practice, is an advised approach as it allows 
respondents to share relevant aspects of their experience (Easterby-Smith, et al., 2012; King 
& Horrocks, 2010) and remains sympathetic to the subtle realist frame of accounting for 
different perspectives.  
 
3.4.3 Data collection  
 
All 31 interviews were 1 to 1 in-depth interviews, and audio recorded on an i-Phone audio 
recorder. I transcribed interviews 1-3 (pilot interviews). Interviews 4-6 were professionally-
transcribed. However, I immediately felt that not being immersed in the transcription process 
was an issue (Langdridge, 2004) and the accuracy of the transcription was less than 
anticipated due to the use of industry-lingo. As a consequence, I transcribed interviews 7-31.   
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The audio files were transcribed in full, word for word (verbatim), and were tidied-up as part 
of the transcription process. Some interview features such as pauses, hesitation and coughing 
were not transcribed as these are not relevant to this research study. The average duration of 
the interviews was sixty minutes, with the shortest being forty-two minutes and the longest 
being eighty-four minutes. The interviews took place at a location specified by the respondent 
– twenty-one took place in a private meeting room or office in the respondents’ place of 
work, and ten took place in a quiet area of a public environment such as a café or restaurant. 
However, recording quality for transcription was temporarily lost on one or two occasions 
due to background noise, although I don’t believe this has had a material effect on the data. It 
is worth noting that all respondents were keen to be interviewed and seemed to enjoy the 
experience, most offering more time than they had initially indicated. 
 
3.4.3.1 Interview structure part 1 – establishing a product timeline   
 
The structure of the interview was divided into two distinct parts, part 1 and part 2. 
 
In part 1, my aim was to establish construct validity (Yin, 2014) for the product architecture 
typology and to invite respondents to create a product architecture timeline.  
 
However, before I progress to describe in detail the process I followed, I will briefly review 
how other scholars have approached the issue of product architecture construct validity. The 
approach adopted in the empirical literature differs, of course, to the degree to which the 
authors embed a positivist or interpretivist paradigm. According to Fixson (2005), however, 
constructs of product modularity have often encompassed a range of mathematical models, 
engineering-based approaches, or conceptual perspectives.  
 
In general, mathematical models aim to simplify the product architecture into an overall 
‘average assessment’ of its degree of product modularity. For example, the product 
architecture is often taken as a given and it, along with its main associative variables of 
interest, are conceptualised as a range of dependent and independent variables (ie, Argyres & 
Bigelow, 2007; Park & Ro, 2013). Other scholars have used a proxy measure for ‘product 
architecture’, such as design interfaces strength (Sosa, et al., 2004).  
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Another set of measures come from an engineering background. These are often constructed 
as a set of indices that aim to compare product architectures along various dimensions of 
interest, often based on qualitative inputs. Fixson (2005:350), for example, cites a number of 
empirical studies that have developed indices based on degrees of coupling and component 
compatibility. In addition, Cabigiosu and Camuffo (2012) and Furlan, et al., (2014), develop 
indices that measure product component modularity based upon the relationship between 
product functions and interfaces and Mikkola (2003, 2006) develops indices based on the 
number and type of product components, the degree of coupling and a substitutability factor.  
Each of these types of indices aims to measure the overall degree of product modularity.   
 
An alternative approach to indices is to present the information in the form of a design 
structure matrix (DSM) based upon the work of Steward (1981), whereby the rows and 
columns of the matrix represent a functional interaction between two hierarchal levels of 
interest. For example, Fixson (2005) and Fixson & Park (2008) develop a DSM based upon 
function-component allocation schemes and their relationship to interface standardisation, 
strength and reversibility. The DSM approach has also been used to compare the degree of 
correspondence between architectural layers by collecting data at different layers of the 
hierarchy, plotting in multiple DSMs, and contrasting the results. For example, Colfer and 
Baldwin (2010) highlight the use of comparing a product DSM and a labour-knowledge DSM 
and suggest that this is an ‘ideal test’ of architectural correspondence.   
 
Empirically, DSMs have been used by in several architectural correspondence or ‘mirroring’ 
studies, such as McCormack, et al., (2012) in the software industry, Sosa, et al., (2004) in the 
aircraft engine industry, Gomes and Joglekar (2008) in software development, and Furlan, et 
al., (2014) in air-conditioning systems. While DSMs are a popular approach in the extant 
literature, they often rely upon qualitative inputs to classify the type and number of product 
components, as well as the degree to which a product component is substitutable, or whether 
an interface is standardised and open (Fixson & Park, 2008).  Given the retrospective nature 
of this research study, a DSM method was not considered appropriate due to access to 
reliable input information over the entire period.  
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A third set of measures, called ‘conceptual’ measures, has been suggested by Fixson (2005) 
and have tended to focus at the level of either the product architecture, product components, 
or interfaces. Conceptual measures tend to appear in qualitative studies, and take two distinct 
forms: (1) the product architecture is either ‘assumed’; or (2) the product architecture is 
assessed by reference to secondary data sources and subsequently member-checked 
(Horrocks & King, 2010) prior to qualitative data collection. For example, Zirpoli and 
Camuffo (2009) interviewed twelve managers across two comparative projects following a 
review of company data. The product architecture was assumed to be modular, although this 
assumption was corroborated with some of the respondents prior to interviewing. Whereas 
Henderson and Clark (1990) interviewed over one-hundred managers in the photo-
lithiographgic industry and the authors constructed a product and industry history, which was 
then member-checked ex-post.   
 
In their ground-breaking work on systems integration in the aircraft and chemical engineering 
industries, Brusoni and Prencipe (2001) and Brusoni, et al., (2001) developed a mixed 
method approach examining secondary sources such as product-level and patent data in order 
to create an ‘average assessment’ of a product development project. Following member-
checking, interviews then were held with forty-five key personnel across two industries. 
Cabigiosu, Zirpoli and Camuffo (2013) took a different approach by asking key personnel to 
rank the degree of modularity in a given set of product components. This ranking approach 
was also adopted by Furlan, et al., (2014) and the authors then used the ranking information 
to create a DSM.  
 
Other conceptual approaches have been used. For example, Shibata, et al., (2005) examined 
secondary sources in order to write a product and technical history of the numeric-controllers 
product. This was then member-checked prior to the qualitative data collection phase. 
MacDuffie (2013), on the other hand, took the opposite approach, and interviewed a number 
of managers across a number of firms in the motor vehicle industry to develop ideas of how 
product modularity had developed.   
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Measures of industry architecture are also wide and varied. For example, in quantitative 
studies scholars have often used established definitions in the literature to define survey 
constructs (Schilling & Steensma, 2001; 2002) and some scholars have examined secondary 
data sources (Brusoni & Prencipe, 2001; Brusoni, et al., 2001) in order to characterise the 
industry structure. In studies such as Jacobides and Hitt (2005), firms in an industry were 
either characterised as simply ‘vertically integrated’, ‘fully specialised’, or ‘mixed mode’, 
based upon secondary sources or, in the case of Argyres and Bigelow (2010), industry 
structure was conceptualised as an independent variable: vertical integration yes or no. 
Alternatively, Fixson and Park (2008:1303) use a set of indices which they refer to as a 
‘vertical integration measure’ based upon firm concentration and market share. In qualitative 
studies, inductive approaches to characterising industry architecture are more common. For 
example, Cacciatori and Jacobides (2005) pursued an inductive approach, interviewing sixty 
key personnel and embellishing it with secondary sources, such as trade journals and industry 
surveys, and Jacobides (2005) utilised a mixed method approach to inductively determine 
how the mortgage banking industry had become more specialised.        
 
Retrospective longitudinal studies are also a feature of the extant literature. For example, 
Zirpoli and Becker (2007) examined the motor vehicle industry over a 10-year period, 
Cacciatori and Jacobides (2005) examined the building and construction industry from the 
late 1800s to around the 1970s, Brusoni and Prencipe (2006) and Brusoni, et al., (2001) 
examined the aircraft and chemical engineering industries over a retrospective 12-year period 
between 1985 and 1997, Jacobides (2005) and Jacobides and Winter (2005) studied the US 
mortgage industry between 1981 and 1989 and the Swiss Watch industry between 1980 and 
1992, Henderson and Clark (1990) examined the photo-lithiographic industry between 1962 
and 1986, Hoetker (2006) examined computer notebooks between 1992 and 1998, MacDuffie 
(2013) examined a number of firms in the motor vehicle industry between the 1970s and 
early 2000s, Shibata, et al., (2005) studied numeric controllers between 1962 and 1997, and 
Fixson and Park (2008) examined the bicycle industry between 1980 and 1990.   
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With the idea of retrospective longitudinal studies established in the extant literature, I chose 
to adopt a ‘conceptual’ approach to the product architecture construct, and while slightly 
different to the approaches discussed above, it shares similar characteristics to the process 
employed by Brusoni and Prencipe (2001), Brusoni, et al., (2001), and Cabigiosu, et al., 
(2013). Rather than using secondary sources such as product data or trade journals to develop 
‘product architecture’ constructs, I developed a stylised product architecture typology, 
grounded in the extant literature (as discussed in 2.1.8) and checked its construct validity ex-
ante with respondents. In line with the assumption that products design organisations 
(Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996), the product architecture typology provided a deductive 
structure to the data collection phase and subsequent data analysis phases. However, an 
inductive logic was used to derive any themes related to the firm and industry level units of 
analysis.  
 
Part 1 of the interview proceeded as follows: (1) each respondent was invited to read and 
review the key characteristics of the four stylised product architecture types, derived from the 
typology. The descriptions that were given to respondents are shown in appendix 3. All 
respondents confirmed that the theoretical descriptions had considerable resonance with the 
actual product types available in the product market and saw no difficulty in relating the 
descriptions to the actual products that existed in the product market. Next, (2) respondents 
were invited to make any amendments or alterations to the descriptions, however none of the 
respondents deemed this necessary. Next, (3) respondents were asked to create a ‘product 
timeline’, an idea borrowed from the idea of a ‘lifeline’ that is often used in biographical 
research, where each respondent depicts key phases or events in their life in a chronological 
sequence (Brannen & Nilsen, 2011). Lastly, (4) the product timeline was noted and recorded 
as an aide memoir before proceeding to part 2 of the interview. An example output of a 
product timeline is shown below in Figure 8: 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Example ‘product timeline’ 
1984-1992 
CI 
1992-1995 
CM 
1995-2002 
OM 
2002-2014 
CM 
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The three pilot interviews, however, drew my attention to a few areas where the process 
described could be improved, and the feedback I received was incorporated into all other 
twenty-eight interviews that followed. First, one pilot respondent highlighted that I had used 
a naming convention of product architecture 1, product architecture 2, product architecture 3, 
and product architecture 4, perhaps leading some respondents to a false assumption that one 
product architecture type naturally follows another, and that there may be a ‘right’ answer. To 
remedy this, I revised the naming conventions to closed and integrated (CI), closed and 
modular (CM), hybrid (H), and open and modular (OM) and I frequently changed their order 
as they appear in appendix 3 to further minimise this risk. Another pilot respondent suggested 
that future respondents may perhaps infer that all four of the product architecture types 
should be used to create the product timeline, or that a product architecture type can only be 
used once, as opposed to multiple times. To overcome this, I offered a verbal instruction to 
all respondents prior to beginning the part 1 of the interview, confirming that a product 
architecture description could be used in the timeline as many or as few times as appropriate, 
or not at all.   
 
As Yin (2014:154) states, chronological sequences are a major strength of case study style 
research and are useful, not just as descriptive devices, but as analytical devices that enable 
the examination of cause and effect relationships because they cannot be “temporally 
inverted”. Yin also suggests that ‘longitudinal’ studies often explore a theory of interest and 
how its underlying processes change over time. Yin suggests these can often be across 
specified time periods and “reflect the theoretical propositions posed by the study” noting 
that “the desired time intervals would presumably reflect the anticipated stages at which the 
changes should reveal themselves, and the processes being observed should again reflect the 
theoretical propositions posed by the case study” (Yin, 2014:53). According to Yin 
(2014:45), construct validity can be achieved if the constructs use multiple sources of 
evidence, establish a chain of evidence and have key informants review the draft. As such, I 
believe that the process I adopted has underpinned the construct validity of the product 
architecture typology as a foundation for the inductive phase of the interview, and the 
discussions that followed in part 2 of the interview.         
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3.4.3.2 Interview Structure Part 2 
 
The product timeline created in part 1 of the interview served as a structure for part 2 of the 
interview. The product timeline and interview schedule served as an aide memoir enabling 
me to ask open questions directed towards particular time periods or events that were 
meaningful to each respondent.  
 
For example, where a respondent had created a product timeline for, say, 1984 to 2014, I was 
able to direct questions to discreet blocks of time in the respondents’ timeline, such as ‘what 
was going on in this time period? Furthermore, I was able to direct questions to particular 
transition points from one product architecture type to another, such as ‘what led to this 
change?’ However, rather than rigidly sticking to the interview schedule, I often followed up 
with a number of probing questions to more deeply explore any different explanations that 
offered a new insight. Yin (2014:154) reminds us the advantage of approach like this is 
“history is likely to cover many different types of variables”.  
 
3.5 Data Analysis – Thematic (Template) Analysis and Matrix Approaches   
   
Data analysis methods using textual data are often categorised into those methods that are 
epistemologically-committed such as IPA, or those that are generic methods (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006). This research study is concerned with the latter. Thematic analysis is one 
approach to data analysis which is often framed as a ‘realist’ method (Braun & Clarke, 
2006:78) however it is a method that can be used independent of philosophical stance. 
Thematic analysis provides a “common-sense way to refer to patterns in the data that reveal 
something of interest regarding the research topic at hand” (King & Horrocks, 2010:159) 
and involves identifying recurring and distinct ‘themes’ in the data, usually themes of 
concern to users of the research. Ultimately, identifying themes means looking for similarities 
and differences across the entire data set and organising the themes in terms of how they 
relate to each other. This often results in hierarchal as well as linked relationships with main 
themes, sub-themes and so on. The thematic analysis process usually has three stages of 
coding: descriptive, interpretative and over-arching themes (King & Horrocks, 2010). The 
process of coding involves a number of iterations of reading and revisiting the data and 
highlighting data extracts either manually or with the use of computer software. 
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Template analysis is a distinct and flexible type of thematic analysis, first described by 
Crabtree and Miller (1992), later developed by King (1998, 2004) and as a method has gained 
traction in management studies, psychology, sociology and healthcare (ie, as discussed in 
Lewis, 2015; Waring & Wainwright, 2008). It is a method that can be used with many 
different philosophical positions (King, 2004: 256-7), and Brooks and King (2012:2) suggest 
that it lends itself to a ‘subtle realist’ approach because “such an approach can thus makes 
claims as to the validity of a representation arising from the research, while recognising that 
other perspectives on the phenomenon are possible”. It differs from other types of thematic 
analysis in that an initial template, perhaps based on some initial interviews or pilot data, is 
applied to the data and revised as the research develops until the template captures a better 
picture of the data. As King and Horrocks (2010:166) point out, the “reiteration of applying, 
revising and then reapplying the template continues until the analyst feels it is clear and 
thorough enough to serve as a basis for building an account of the findings”. This reiteration 
between the template and the data, and the data and the template, I believe, lends itself to the 
iterative deductive-inductive enquiry logic used in this research study.           
 
Another feature of template analysis is the flexibility it offers. Unlike Braun and Clarke’s 
(2006) blueprint for conducting thematic analysis, there are no limits to the number of levels 
of hierarchal coding. Importantly for a subtle realist, template analysis does not differentiate 
between descriptive and interpretative coding, believing that themes are descriptively 
grounded in the data, but acknowledging that data description cannot be untouched by human 
interpretation (King & Horrocks, 2010).  
 
Template analysis has been used in this research study for a number of reasons: (1) it is 
useful “when the aim is to compare the perspectives of different groups…within a specific 
context” (King, 2004:257), (2) it is a method that lends itself to cross-case thematic analysis 
(King, 2004:258), (3) it lends itself to a subtle realist stance which is interested in valid 
representations of the ‘reality’ of respondents while acknowledging the interpretive role of 
the researcher (King, 2004:256), (4) it lends itself to a retroductive moving back and forth 
between themes and data (King & Horrocks, 2010:166), (5) it permits parallel coding (King, 
2004:258); and (6) it is often associated with the use of a priori theorising and coding (but 
this is not a requirement) (King, 2004:257).  
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3.5.1 Matrix analysis 
 
Template analysis is often used as a method in research studies located between the inductive 
and deductive approaches to enquiry logic. The a priori themes can often relate to important 
theoretical concepts that inform the research design. In this research study, I decided not to 
use a priori codes in the sense envisaged by King (1998; 2004). Rather, I followed an 
approach suggested by King and Horrocks (2010) in combining an a priori matrix and 
deductive template analysis method.  
 
I created an initial a priori matrix and then thematically coded the interview data to cells in 
the matrix. Therefore, the themes were inductively derived from the interview data but coded 
to an a priori matrix, which served as a structuring device to analyse the data. The use of an a 
priori matrix to structure (rather than code) the data is similar to the matrix approach 
pioneered by Miles and Huberman (1994) where data is tabulated to different units of 
analysis so as to facilitate comparisons and connections both between and across different 
levels of data. The initial a priori matrix structure I created reflects the units of analysis of 
interest to the research questions, and a fourth cell – ‘mirroring’ – aims to capture the degree 
of correspondence between the architectural layers. This is shown in Table 6.     
 
Table 6: Initial a priori matrix 
 
King and Horrocks (2010:173) suggest that matrix-based approaches tend to be used in 
research projects of this size, for example, with thirty hours or more of textual data, whereby 
the matrix is “usually defined based on a priori concerns – sometimes these are theoretical 
but more often pragmatic”. King and Horrocks (2010), moreover, suggest that a researcher 
should always allow for the matrix to be modified as a research study progresses. 
  
 
Mirroring 
•Themes 
Product level 
•Themes 
Firm-level 
•Themes 
Industry level 
•Themes 
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The initial matrix shown in Table 6 was modified in response to the product timelines created 
by respondents in part 1 of the interview. To do this, I synthesised the thirty-one individual 
product timelines into a ‘consensus’ or ‘best fit’. Naturally, across the total sample there was 
some divergence in the product timelines which emerged due to factors such as individual 
firm strategies, or respondent ability to re-collect dates with perfect accuracy (this is 
discussed in section 3.6), however, there was a strong convergence across the total sample. 
This is shown in appendix 4.  
 
The synthesised product timeline shown in appendix 4 illustrates five sub-periods that were 
meaningful to respondents which I have labelled as follows:    
   “The mid to late-1980s”  “The early to mid-1990s”  “The mid 90s to mid-noughties”  “Mid-noughties to 2012”  “2012-2014” 
 
Moreover, product architecture types could be mapped onto the 5 sub-periods as follows: 
  “The mid to late-1980s” – closed and integrated   “The early to mid-1990s” – closed and modular   “The mid 90s to mid-noughties” – hybrid   “Mid-noughties to 2012” – open and modular   “2012-2014” – hybrid  
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Next, I then incorporated the synthesis into the matrix, as shown in Table 7.   
 
Time period Mid to late-
1980s 
Early to mid-
1990’s 
Mid-1990s to 
mid-noughties 
Mid noughties 
to 2012 
2012-2014 
Product type Closed and 
integrated 
Closed and 
Modular 
 
Hybrid 
 
Open and 
modular 
 
Hybrid 
 
 
Product themes Template 
Organisational 
themes Template 
Industry themes Template 
Mirroring Template 
 
Table 7: Final matrix  
 
The final matrix illuminates how the product architecture descriptions were mapped to the 
actual product architecture in the product market at given periods of time.  
 
The method I used combines the advantages of matrix analysis, to structure and tighten the 
data collection and analysis phases, with an inductive approach to template analysis. The 
method also allows themes to be coded to different time periods and different units of 
analysis. In the data analysis phase, I was able to generate multiple templates that can then be 
compared and contrasted. As King and Horrocks (2010:173) conclude, “in some studies, the 
optimum analytical study can involve a combination of matrix and template approaches”, by 
carrying out a matrix approach to uncover broad areas of interest, and then followed by a 
more finer-grained template analysis on elements of rich interest (ie, King, et al., 2007). As 
described, this research study has run along these lines.  
 
Figure 9 provides a summary of the matrix and template analysis approach used in this 
research study:  
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Figure 9: The data analysis process  
 
Next, I will discuss how the template analysis method was operationalised.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Initial matrix 
categories 
Data set of 
31 
interviews 
Final matrix 
produced 
Initial 
template  
Revising the 
template 
Final 
template 
Interpreting 
themes  
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3.5.2 Template analysis 
 
3.5.2.1 Initial template 
 
In line with King (2004), an initial template was developed after the three pilot interviews 
within the framework of the matrix. An initial template should not contain too many themes, 
for fear of blinkering the analysis that follows (Brooks & King, 2014), or too few codes for 
this may lead to a lack of direction. I decided to create an initial template after the three pilot 
interviews because it helped ensure that the process I was adopting had resonance with 
respondents, and was yielding meaningful themes that could be coded in the way I had 
anticipated. As a novel approach25, I felt that it was important to have an early indication that 
the method could be successfully operationalised before proceeding too far into the data 
collection process.     
 
An example of how the data has been coded is shown in Table 8.  The example relates to the 
time period “mid to late-80s”. The column titled ‘level’ refers to the architectural layer, in 
this case ‘product’, the column titled “theme” refers to how the theme was named, the 
column titled ‘meaning’ refers to the definition of the theme, and the column titled ‘textual 
data’ is the verbatim textual data from one of the transcripts. The textual data highlighted in 
yellow shows the relevant verbatim quotations. As shown in the example to follow, I have 
used, where possible, theoretical constructs derived from the extant literature as themes, such 
as “component interdependence”.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
25
 Combining matrix and template analysis is a relatively new approach in the literature. King, et al., (2007) is a 
notable exception 
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Level Theme Meaning Textual data 
Product Component 
interdependence 
Components of the 
products are linked and 
cannot be easily separated  
“what you had was the pricing, the commission 
structure.  It was all intertwined, interlinked” 
Firm Integrated fund 
management 
Fund management as an 
activity was done in-house 
“Well my impression is they were much more 
vertically integrated. I mean the investment houses 
were by and large in-house” 
 
 
Industry Introduction of personal 
pensions 
The Finance Act 1988 that 
deregulated personal 
pensions  
“Then in 1988 we had the introduction of personal 
pensions.  We had the Government advert “Breaking 
the Chains”.    
Mirroring 
(example of 
parallel 
coding) 
Team co-location 
Multi-disciplinary teams 
Product development team 
located together 
Product development 
teams made up of cross-
functional expertise 
Product development was done by multi-disciplinary 
teams within the firm so you'd have an actuary; you'd 
have a marketing person; you'd have an IT person; 
you'd have a finance person.  And they were all sitting 
in the same building. 
 
 
 
Table 8: Example of coding textual data to themes  
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The initial templates generated following the three pilot interviews are shown below in 
Tables 9 to 18.    
 
Product Firm Industry 
Component 
interdependence 
Gains from integration Deregulation 
Integrated fund 
management 
 Changes in distribution 
structure 
Fund unitisation  Unit-linked entrepreneurs 
Integrated advice   
Product complexity   
 
Table 9: Initial template product, firm and industry themes: mid to late-1980s  
 
 
Mirroring 
Team co-location 
Multi-disciplinary teams 
Sequential development 
process 
 
 
Table 10: Initial template mirroring themes: mid to late-1980s  
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Product Firm Industry 
Component 
interdependence 
Gains from integration Emergence of IFAS 
Component independence Gains from trade Direct sales regulation 
Fund components Capabilities Unit-linked entrepreneurs 
Product complexity  Industry consolidation 
  Pensions mis-selling 
 
Table 11: Initial template product, firm and industry themes: early to mid-1990s  
 
 
 
Mirroring 
Team co-location 
Multi-disciplinary teams 
Sequential development 
process 
Component structure 
mapping 
 
 
Table 12: Initial template mirroring themes: early to mid-1990s  
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Product Firm Industry 
Component 
interdependence 
Gains from integration Industry consolidation 
Component independence Gains from trade Horizontal integration 
Platforms Capabilities IFA channel 
SIPP architecture  Pensions mis-selling 
Drawdown   
Product complexity   
Stakeholder pensions   
Standards   
 
Table 13: Initial template product, firm and industry themes: mid-1990s to mid-noughties 
 
 
 
Mirroring 
Team co-location 
Component structure 
mapping 
Geographical dispersion 
 
Table 14: Initial template mirroring themes: mid-1990s to mid-noughties  
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Product Firm Industry 
Component 
interdependence 
Gains from integration Australian influence 
Component independence Gains from trade Horizontal integration 
Platforms Capabilities D2C channel emergence 
Product complexity Governance 
inseparability 
Industry consolidation 
Standards   
 
 
Table 15: Initial template product, firm and industry themes: mid-noughties to 2012 
 
 
Mirroring 
Team co-location 
Component structure 
mapping 
Geographical dispersion 
SBUs 
Integrator roles 
 
Table 16: Initial template mirroring themes: mid-noughties to 2012  
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2012-2014  
Product Firm Industry  
Component 
interdependence 
Gains from integration Industry consolidation  
Component independence Gains from trade Horizontal integration  
Hybridity Capabilities   
Guided architecture Governance 
inseparability 
  
    
 
Table 17: Initial template product, firm and industry themes: 2012 to 2014 
 
 
 
Mirroring 
Team co-location 
Component structure 
mapping 
Geographical dispersion 
SBUs 
Integrator roles 
 
 
Table 18: Initial template mirroring themes: 2012 to 2014  
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The initial templates illustrate how I thematically coded interview data according to the time 
period and unit of analysis. For the purposes of the initial templates, textual data was only 
coded to one hierarchal level to avoid putting too much structure around the themes that may 
blinker further data analysis (King & Horrocks, 2010). At this point, it should also be noted 
that data analysis software NVivo 10 was used to aid with organising and coding the data set. 
King (2004) suggests that hierarchical coding within template analysis is well-suited to 
computer-assisted analysis. I also found that Nvivo 10 was a useful tool to organise the 
templates within the matrix structure. NVivo does not analyse the data or make any 
interpretation of the data analysis on its own, however its organising capabilities made NVivo 
very useful when comparing themes to data, and reiteration through the data on a number of 
occasions led to various codes being inserted, deleted, combined, and order changes within 
the hierarchy (King, 2004). Using Nvivo made this process a lot simpler and more efficient. 
An argument against the use of software such as NVivo comes from researchers from an 
interpretivist or social constructionist stance who may be wary of the ‘structure’ that NVivo 
adds to the data analysis process, however I did not feel the use of NVivo conflicted with my 
subtle realist commitments.   
 
3.5.2.2 Revising the initial template  
 
The next stage of the process is to revise the templates as through the course of the data 
collection process weaknesses in the initial template may become evident. I transcribed and 
thematically coded the data as I went along, revising the templates as ‘live documents’. King 
(2004) identifies four types of template revision, which I highlight with examples from this 
research study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
117 
 
The first type of template revision is the insertion of a new code – new codes can be inserted 
into the template as a new higher order code, or as a new sub-code. An example of a new 
higher-order code would be the insertion of the “firm boundary determinants”. This is a 
higher-order code that falls within firm-level factors and encompasses a number of second-
order codes that affect firm boundary decisions. As an example of the insertion of a new sub-
code, ‘fund modules’, ‘fee modules’ are sub-codes of the initial higher-order code of 
‘component independence’. Secondly, a researcher can delete a code. In this study, no codes 
from the initial template were deleted because they were recurring themes throughout, 
however King (2004) suggests that deletion is usually associated with a code that turns out 
not to be useful, or a code that is subsumed into other codes due to an overlap. Thirdly, codes 
can change scope as they may be either too narrow or too broad. In this study, the initial 
template had a firm-level code entitled ‘gains from integration’. This code was retained as a 
second-order code, but its definition was too broad. Two separate aspects of gains from 
integration were present in the data; integration gains arising from superior rents, and 
integration gains arising from superior productive capabilities. While linked, these two third-
order codes were created that fine-tuned the definition of ‘gains from integration’. Changing 
higher-order classification is the fourth type of revision. A lower-order code may be linked to 
a different higher-order code. In this study, this type of revision was not used.  
 
As revisions were made to the template, prior interviews were re-examined in order to review 
the data set in light of the revised templates. As King (2004:263) notes, this process can 
continue ad infinitum, and it is difficult to know when to stop. No template is ever considered 
final, however, I reviewed all interview transcripts frequently in light of the changing 
template.  
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The final templates are shown below in Tables 19 to 28 as follows:    
 
Product Firm Industry 
1. Component 
interdependence 
1. Firm boundary 
determinants 
1. Product market factors 
1.1 Integrated fund 
components 
1.1 Gains from 
integration  
1.1. Market stability 
1.2 Integrated advice 1.2 Governance 
inseparability 
1.2. Here come the unit-
linkers 
1.3 Integrated IT 
mainframes 
1.3 Knowledge 
specificity 
2. Deregulation 
2. Optimised 1.4 Absence of 
intermediate markets 
2.1 PEPs 
3. Emerging fund 
components 
1.5 Gains from trade 2.2 Tax incentives 
3.1 Reduced charges 
interdependence 
1.5.1 Capabilities 2.3 SERPS 
  2.4 PP regulation 
  2.5 FSA Act 1986 
 
Table 19: Final template product, firm and industry themes: mid to late-1980s   
 
 
Mirroring 
1. Within-firm 
1.1 Actuarial-led 
1.2 Co-location 
1.3 Communication 
problems 
1.4 Emerging component 
structure 
 
 
Table 20: Final template mirroring themes: mid to late-1980s   
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Product Firm Industry 
1. Component 
interdependence 
1. Firm boundary 
determinants 
1. Regulation 
2. Component 
independence 
1.1 Gains from 
integration  
1.1 Pensions mis-selling 
2.1 Fund component 1.1.1 Rents 2. Industry structure 
2.2 Charges component 1.1.2 Capabilities 2.1 Unit-linked rate of 
adoption 
2.3 Advice component 1.2 Gains from trade 2.2 Traditional provider 
consolidation 
2.4 IT components  1.2.1 Rents 3. Changes in distribution 
structure 
3. Specialised interfaces 1.2.2 Capabilities 3.1 Direct sales regulation 
 2. Simplified information 
exchange 
3.2 Pace of 
intermediation 
  3.3 Demand for 
component variety 
 
Table 21: Final template product, firm and industry themes: early to mid-1990s 
 
 
Mirroring 
1. Within-firm 
1.1 Component structure 
1.2 Geographical 
dispersion 
1.3 Systems integration 
1.4 Co-location 
 
 
Table 22: Final template mirroring themes: early to mid-1990s  
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Product Firm Industry 
1. Stakeholder pensions 1. Firm boundary 
determinants 
1. Regulation 
2. Intermediate SIPP 1.1 Gains from 
integration  
1.1 PEPs and growth of 
ISAs 
3. Unit-linked pensions 1.1.1 Rents 1.2 Charges disclosure 
4. Product platform 
aggregation 
1.1.2 Capabilities 1.3 Pensions mis-selling 
5. Component 
interdependence 
1.1.3 Control 1.4 Stakeholder 
6. Component 
independence 
1.2 Gains from trade 1.5 Tax changes for 
incumbents 
6.1 Charges module 1.2.1 Rents 2. Industry structure 
6.2 IT module 1.2.2 Capabilities 2.1 Vertical integration 
6.3 Fund module 1.3 Iintermediate markets 2.2 Horizontal integration 
7. Specialised interfaces  2.3 New entrepreneurial 
entrants 
8. Open architecture & 
SIPP 
 3. Changes in distribution 
structure 
8.1 Drawdown  3.1 Networks 
9. D2C channel  3.2 Commission wars 
10. Industry interfaces  3.3 Intermediation growth 
  3.4 Bancassurance ties 
 
Table 23: Final template product, firm and industry themes: mid-1990s to mid-noughties 
 
Mirroring 
1. Within-firm and across 
firm 
1.1 Component structure 
1.2 Geographical 
dispersion 
1.3 Systems integration 
1.4 Co-location 
1.5 Communication 
patterns 
 
Table 24: Final template mirroring themes: mid-1990s to mid-noughties 
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Product Firm Industry 
1. Component 
interdependence 
1. Firm boundary 
determinants 
1. Regulation 
2. Specialised interfaces 1.1 Gains from 
integration  
1.1 RDR 
3. Component 
independence 
1.1.1 Rents 1.2 A-day 
3.1 Fund modules 1.1.2 Capabilities 2. Industry structure 
3.2 Charges modules 1.1.3 Control 2.1 Vertical integration 
3.3 Drawdown module 1.3 Gains from trade 2.2 Horizontal integration 
3.4 Self-investment 
module 
1.3.1 Rents 2.3 Entry of low cost 
TPAs 
3.5 Tools modules 1.3.2 Capabilities 3. D2C channel 
3.6 Fees modules 1.4 Intermediate market 3.1 Guided investment 
solutions 
4. Product aggregation 
platforms 
1.5 Governance 
inseparability 
3.2 Orphan clients 
5. Product outcome 
homogeneity   
 3.3 Cost of advice 
6. Industry interfaces  4. Distribution 
  4.1 Simplified investment 
proposition 
  4.2 Movement to high-net 
worth 
  4.3 Need for operational 
efficiency 
  4.4 Professionalism 
 
Table 25: Final template product, firm and industry themes: mid-noughties to 2012 
 
Mirroring 
1. Within-firm and across 
firm 
1.1 Component structure 
1.2 Geographical 
dispersion 
1.3 Platform/Systems 
integration 
1.4 Co-location 
1.5 Communication 
patterns 
 
Table 26: Final template mirroring themes: mid-noughties to 2012 
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Product Firm Industry 
1. Component 
independence 
1. Firm boundary 
determinants 
1. Shifting value chain 
dynamics 
1.1 Charges module 1.1 Gains from 
integration  
1.1 TPA consolidation 
1.2 Funds module 1.1.1 Rents 1.2 Value shifting to 
advice 
2. Industry standards 1.1.2 Capabilities 1.3 Squeeze on fund 
management 
3. Component 
interdependence 
1.1.3 Control 1.4 Squeeze on product 
providers 
3.1 Advice modules 1.3 Gains from trade 1.5 Emergence of power 
blocks 
3.2 Tools modules 1.3.1.Rents 2. Regulation 
3.3 Funds modules 1.3.2 Capabilities 2.1 Auto-enrolment 
4 Specialised standards  2.2 RDR 
5. Vertical specificity  3. Industry structure 
6. Guided modularity  3.1 Vertical integration 
7. D2C channel  3.2 Horizontal integration 
7.1 Advice modules   
7.2 Funds modules   
7.3 Tools modules   
 
Table 27: Final template product, firm and industry themes: 2012 to 2014 
 
Mirroring 
1. Within-firm and across 
firm 
1.1 Component structure 
1.2 Geographical 
dispersion 
1.3 Autonomous SBU 
1.4 Co-location 
1.5 Communication 
patterns 
 
Table 28: Final template mirroring themes: 2012 to 2014 
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3.5.2.3 Interpreting the template 
 
King (2004) offers four suggested approaches to interpreting the templates. Without a process 
of interpretation, template analysis achieves very little, as interpretation is a step in the 
process that should attempt to do justice to the richness of the data set. The first approach to 
interpretation is the listing and counting of codes. King suggests that the counting of codes 
can often be useful in some studies, however, as King (2004:266) warns “the frequency of 
codes per se can never tell us anything meaningful about textual data”. As the aim of the 
study is to represent similarities and differences in accounts of phenomena over time, I have 
not adopted a listing and counting approach to interpretation.  
 
The second and third approaches are selectivity and openness, where a researcher attempts to 
interpret every code with equal detail. I have heeded this advice however my aim is to build a 
narrative around the themes that are of central importance in building an understanding of 
events, and inevitably this may mean less of an emphasis on themes that are considered less 
central or peripheral to the narrative. The fourth approach is to explore the relationships 
between themes. The relationships may reveal some ‘integrative themes’ which permeate 
much of the template, possibly within a particular time period, or across all time periods in 
the study. This is the primary approach to interpretation that is adopted in this research study, 
and I will use a range of templates to explore relationships across time periods and across 
different architectural levels. The aim is to identify common ‘integrative themes’ across 
different time periods that may help us understand the phenomena in a richer detail. There is 
also the potential to use a multiple case-study approach (Yin, 2014) and explore the 
similarities and differences across different organisations. This may offer an opportunity to 
extend the research at a later point, as highlighted in chapter 6.  
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3.5.2.4 Writing-up 
 
King (2004) suggests that in writing up a research study there are three common approaches: 
  A set of individual case studies, followed by a discussion of the similarities and 
differences   Structured around the main themes, with illustrative examples drawn from the textual 
data  Thematic presentation, using a different case study to illustrate each of the main themes 
 
I am drawing upon the advice of King (2004:268) in that he observes that an account 
structured around the main themes, with illustrative examples ”tends to be the approach 
which most readily produces a clear and succinct thematic discussion”.  
 
The section that follows examines issues of quality and how retrospective longitudinal 
research may be judged.  
 
3.6 Issues of Quality 
 
This section has two aims. First, I discuss quality as it relates to retrospective longitudinal 
research designs. Second, I discuss how I have used member-checking and expert panels to 
further enhance research credibility and plausibility (Hammersley, 1992).   
 
Although retrospective longitudinal research designs have been used in a number of 
disciplines such as psychology, sociology, and organisational and management studies 
(Snelgrove & Havitz, 2010), and is typical of the style of research found in peer-reviewed 
journals such as Academy of Management Journal (Cox & Hassard, 2007), some criticism 
has been directed towards the validity and trustworthiness of retrospective and longitudinal 
research designs.  
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This section aims to comment upon the appropriateness of a retrospective longitudinal 
research design in light of the study’s research aims and objectives. It is worth, however, 
recalling my subtle realist commitments. This sub-section focuses on the steps I have taken to 
enhance the plausibility and credibility of this research study. It has not been my aim to 
eliminate bias or somehow get to a single ‘truth’ in line with positivist commitments, rather 
to reflexively consider how issues around memory and recall may influence the findings, as 
well as how to improve the quality of the research.             
 
One of the most frequent criticisms of retrospective longitudinal studies is the fallibility of 
respondent memory and recall (Cox & Hassard, 2007; Nisbett & Ross, 1980). However, 
Snelgrove and Havitz (2010) argue that memory fallibility can be reduced if respondents are 
asked to recall information about ‘critical incidents’ rather than general information, and I 
have used this approach in the interview setting. The interview process was divided into two 
parts: in part 1, respondents were asked to match product architecture types to time periods in 
order to construct a product timeline. The product architecture types acted as a ‘specific cue’ 
(Snelgrove & Havitz, 2010) to improve recall from long-term memory. The resulting product 
timeline can be conceptualised as a series of critical incidents that were then discussed in part 
2 of the interview. The criticality or distinctiveness of past events has a positive impact on 
recall; quoted in Snelgrove and Havitz (2010:340), Yarrow et al., (1970:71) suggest if 
respondents are able to “recall specific events, they will have been extreme or unusual events 
in their experience”.            
 
Another common criticism of retrospective longitudinal accounts is that respondents may 
reconstruct history, perhaps with intention or unconsciously. For example, respondents may 
attempt to project a socially-desirable image or orientate past decisions within a light of 
rationality, and such attributional bias may be problematic in strategic management contexts 
because of the social commitment to the work-place. In addition to the use of critical 
incidents and specific cues to reduce reconstruction bias, a technique I used was to ask 
respondents to only respond to a question within their own direct professional experience and 
not to elicit a response if they were uncertain or could not remember.  
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This approach draws upon the research of Koriat and Goldsmith (1994) where such 
techniques were associated higher accuracy. A second technique was to construct the 
purposive sample with multiple respondents for each job role, organisational background and 
across time periods (Cox & Hassard, 2007), and Miller, et al., (1997:201) suggests that if 
such guidelines are followed “scholars could be truly comfortable with the idea that 
retrospective reports are not fiction”. An alternative approach I rejected was to seek 
methodological triangulation and combine data from mixed methods. The reasons for this are 
both pragmatic and methodological. For example, the availability of secondary data or 
published sources across the 30-year time period is limited, particularly the further back in 
time you go. To illustrate this point, until the mid to late-90s product specifications did not 
exist in many firms. From a methodological perspective, quantitative-orientated methods 
would be inappropriate for this research study as the total population of potential respondents 
is estimated to be less than 70 or thereabouts and therefore statistical inference would be 
highly problematic.   
 
Nonetheless, retrospective longitudinal research can remain problematic. For example, it 
remains possible that interviewees, intentionally or unconsciously, may be lying, telling only 
part of the ‘truth’, or because they wish to conceal particular mechanisms. It is also possible 
that respondents are simply unaware of particular aspects of their social world (Gardner, 
2001). However,De Meuse, et al, (2001) justify a retrospective longitudinal research design 
in the field of human resources management as appropriate because “to track employee 
perceptions of the psychological contract over 50 years in a truly longitudinal fashion would 
have been virtually impossible. Consequently, a retrospective methodology was utilised in 
this study. The authors recognise that there are problems associated with this 
approach……Despite justifiable concerns about the accuracy of retrospective designs, this 
study supports the contention of researchers who assert that these designs can be useful in 
identifying patterns indicative of dynamic processes”. I adopt a similar perspective.  
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To chart the co-evolution and correspondence of architectures over a period of 30 years 
would have been virtually impossible by any other approach. Consequently, a retrospective 
longitudinal methodology was utilised. Recognising that biographical knowledge remains 
fuzzy and ambiguous, however, means the retrospective designs “should not be used as an 
excuse for lack of rigour in interrogating these data” (Gardner, 2001:198). With this in mind, 
I now turn to discuss issues of research quality.   
 
There is often no general agreement about what constitutes ‘good’ research or what quality 
criteria to use (Hammersley, 2007), however, as Madill, et al., (2000:2) argue “it is still 
entirely appropriate that qualitative research be open to scrutiny and that the credibility of 
findings rest on more than the authority of the researcher”. Given the heterogeneity of 
methods in qualitative research, it is important that any criteria to assess quality are 
contingent upon the epistemological tradition, what Johnson, et al., (2006) referred to as a 
“contingent criteriology”. Some scholars within a radical constructionist tradition may resist 
any attempts to judge the quality of research (Madill, et al., 2000). However, within a ‘realist’ 
tradition, some scholars have suggested that the notions of objectivity and reliability are 
possible to transfer from a positivist tradition (ie, Miles & Huberman, 1994), while yet others 
have proposed alternative quality criteria (ie, Hammersley, 1992; King & Horrocks, 2010; 
Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Madill, et al., 2000). There are, therefore, a number of criteria that 
can potentially be adopted to assess the quality of qualitative research, contingent upon the 
philosophical tradition of the research and its design. In this research study, in addition to the 
steps I have outlined in respect of the retrospective longitudinal design, I will now outline the 
steps and procedures adopted in terms of member-checking and the use of expert panels 
(Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006; King & Horrocks, 2010). 
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3.6.1 Member-checking 
 
In order to strengthen the face validity of the research (Paton, 2002), before I progressed to 
the main sample, each of the three pilot interviewees was emailed the following for review:  
  Interview transcript  Matrix  Initial template  Example of coded interview transcript   
  
Feedback suggested that a small number of ‘theoretical’ themes were unclear to respondents 
and therefore some themes were renamed to reflect industry-lingo. 
 
Following each interview, all thirty-one respondents were emailed the transcriptions of the 
interviews. The covering email asked respondents to make amendments to the transcript if 
they deemed it appropriate. Twenty-six of the thirty-one respondents confirmed by email that 
the transcript was an accurate reflection of the interview. Five respondents did not reply. As 
such, interview transcripts were member-checked by twenty-six respondents prior to data 
analysis.   
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3.6.2 Expert panel 
 
In line with Hammersley (2008), it is important to test the validity of one’s own 
interpretations, and so I decided to use an expert panel to review my data analysis ex-post, 
heeding the advice of King and Horrocks (2010:163) that “external views are generally 
required to give a process credibility”. The aim of the process was to assess the plausibility 
and credibility of the matrix and final templates. I selected two persons for the panel, based 
upon their relevant professional experience in the product market covering the period 
between 1984 and 2014 and presence in the trade media as ‘opinion leaders’ and ‘experts’. 
One person had participated in the pilot study (interviewee_1) and the second person had not 
participated, but knew its background and context. A meeting was held in Edinburgh on April 
3rd 2015.   
 
The expert panel were invited to review and discuss: 
  Synthesis of the thirty-one product timelines   The description of the themes, and examples of how verbatim quotations had been coded 
to a theme  The final matrix and templates 
 
The expert panel agreed that the synthesis I had identified was plausible and credible. There 
were no comments in respect of the sample coding I had given them to review. The final 
matrix and templates raised some discussion, such as whether it would be appropriate to sub-
divide the sub-period “mid-90s to mid-noughties” into two further sub-periods of “late-90s” 
and “early-noughties” as the time period encompasses a significant architectural change 
around year 2000, however it was agreed that the benefits of doing so would be less than the 
additional complexity that it may bring to the research. On the whole, the two experts both 
felt that the final matrix and templates were a credible representation of the co-evolution and 
correspondence of architectures in the product market.  
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3.7 Positionality 
 
Researcher positionality is an important consideration in this research study as I was 
employed in three different organisations in the product market between 2000 and 2011 as a 
product architect. Merton (1972) identified two opposite views on positionality, namely (1) 
the outsider doctrine and (2) insider doctrine. The outsider doctrine values research conducted 
by researchers from outside their own communities, where notions of objectivity and 
neutrality are often sought after. The insider doctrine, by contrast, suggests that to understand 
a situation a researcher must be a part of it, and therefore that insider researchers are often in 
a unique position to understand the experiences and perspectives of groups which they are 
members of. Insider research is often associated with advantages related to the engagement of 
respondents and their willingness to share experiences and perspectives (Kerswetter, 2012), 
relational intimacy and a superior understanding of a group’s culture (Breen, 2007).  
 
Taylor (2011) also highlights a number of advantages including the deeper levels of 
researcher understanding through prior knowledge, knowing the lingo of respondents, easier 
access to and selection of respondents, and quicker establishment of rapport and trust. Taylor 
balances her argument with some disadvantages, such as researcher positioning in relation to 
the quality of the data collected and problems arising the insider position, such as bias and 
blindness to the obvious (Chavez, 2008). Breen (2007) also discusses the complication 
inherent in insider research as a loss of objectivity, especially in terms of making assumptions 
based upon the researchers’ own prior knowledge. Much work, however, assumes that being 
an insider, or at least being perceived as an insider, “is an advantageous position in which to 
be since this gives the researcher a privileged position from which to understands processes, 
histories and events as they unfold” (Herod, 1999:320)   
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However, Herod (1999), and others, note that a crude dichotomy between inside and outside 
research isn’t quite so analytically simple and is in practice rather more “messy”. As Chavez 
(2008), Kerswetter (2012), and others argue, often few researchers can be characterised as 
either complete insiders or complete outsiders, and occupy somewhere in the ‘space between’ 
(Dwyer & Buckle, 2009), which often means that researchers will have a responsibility to 
make explicit where they are positioned within the space and how this may effect research 
design and outcomes. The distinction between insider and outsider perspectives can often 
correspond to different and contrasting epistemological positions. For example, interpretivist 
epistemologies may often be associated with insider research, and outsider research can often 
be associated with more positivist epistemologies (Chavez, 2008). However, there are 
undoubtedly strengths and weaknesses to both types of positionality and perhaps a 
positionality that draws on the strengths and minimises the weaknesses of both may be 
considered the most appropriate. As such, Herod (1999) suggests that a researcher can 
manipulate his or her positionality so that, at times, the researcher can create distance, and at 
other times play down such distances in order to ‘manage’ the so-called positionality gap 
(Moss, 1995).  
 
In this research study, I heeded the advice that the outsider-insider dichotomy is too simplistic 
and adopted an “in the middle” positionality (Breen, 2007), neither fully inside, nor fully 
outside in order to attend to both the advantages and complications of adopting one or the 
other. However, I also believed that a static positionality ‘in the middle’ was also problematic, 
and so decided to manipulate my positionality depending upon the extent to which each 
respondent may perceive my insiderness or outsiderness, a strategy referred to  by Kanuha 
(2000:443) as “researching at the hyphen of insider-outsider”.  
 
What now follows is an account of how I enacted a dynamic ‘in the middle’ positionality in 
the context of the research question, data collection and data analysis phases of the research 
design.   
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3.7.1. Positionality and research practice 
 
I was employed within a product development and strategic management role for three 
organisations in the personal pensions product market between 2000 and 2011. In the months 
following employment as an academic, I began to reflect upon my experience as a 
practitioner in the context of the strategic management literature. What had piqued interest 
was that the extant literature on architectural co-evolution and correspondence did not seem 
to adequately represent what seemed to have happened, or was happening, in the product 
market under enquiry. In other words, my prior ‘insider’ knowledge could not be fully 
reconciled with the academic literature within the strategic management field. Out of this 
interest, and discussion with potential supervisors, I began to review the literature for further 
information on the subject, which motivated me to explore the topic as a thesis. For these 
reasons, I became interested in a retrospective, longitudinal study of the UK personal 
pensions product market. This approach is characteristic of positionality in the middle, in so 
far as my prior insider knowledge of the product market influenced and guided the literature 
search and research questions. However, in contrast, the literature review was undertaken at a 
critical distance from the context. Finally, through a process of iteration, I settled upon some 
research questions.           
 
Insiders can often face challenges in the data collection phase of a research project – and 
especially during the interview setting - such as conflict between the interview format and the 
conversational style of insider relationships, the legitimisation of insiderness, bias 
interviewing, and how the researchers’ identity may affect respondent accounts (ie, Chavez, 
2008, Kerswetter, 2012). In this research study, I was aware of the advantages, but also the 
challenges, of an ‘in the middle’ positionality at all stages of the data collection and data 
analysis phases. For example, in gaining access to respondents, I made my academic and 
prior ‘insider’ status clear to potential respondents, because often academics are not seen as 
important and worthy of the commitment of time.  
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My perceived ‘insider’ status was considerably helpful in securing access to and commitment 
from respondents. Often, practitioners in the product market context are reluctant to discuss 
experiences or perspectives with ‘outsiders’ because of the intricacies of the product market 
are often believed to be too complex or idiosyncratic for ‘outsiders’ to properly understand or 
comprehend. Furthermore, as the research project is currently very topical to what is 
happening in the product market, the research project was seen by respondents as instantly 
‘legitimate’, and respondents were on the whole extremely happy to be involved. In order to 
manipulate the insider-outsider dichotomy, I omitted any overt references to academic ‘lingo’ 
in correspondence that I felt may alienate respondents, such as references to ‘Dr’, ‘PhD’, or 
‘doctorate’, other than that required by ethical standards. It was felt that this would more 
quickly engender trust and relational intimacy.  
 
Insider researchers often rely upon respondents with whom they are familiar (Breen, 2007), 
and this is one reason why the total sample included two parts. The first part of the sample 
was generated from professional contacts, via social media platforms such as LinkedIn. 
Therefore, I considered it advantageous to ensure that the second part of the sample contained 
respondents that not only met the screening criteria, but who were not known to me 
personally or professionally. As a consequence, the total sample consisted of some 
respondents who may perceive me as an ‘insider’, and some who may consider my role as an 
‘outsider’, as shown in Figure 10.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Insider – outsider: balancing the purposive sample  
 
 
Towards Insider 
Towards outsider 
Part 1 of sample 
Part 2 of sample 
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During the interviews, I explained to all respondents the extent of my prior knowledge of the 
product market and re-confirmed the purpose of the research study. To maintain a critical 
distance, I reminded respondents that I had no direct knowledge of the product market since 
2011. Furthermore, I would only use my existing knowledge of the product market between 
2000 and 2011 to orientate follow-up questions or probe for clarification, but, importantly, 
respondents should assume no prior knowledge on my part so as to make sure the ‘obvious’ 
was included in respondent accounts. As Asselin (2003) reminds us, it is best for an insider 
researcher to assume he or she knows nothing about the phenomenon being studied.  
 
There is also the risk that the interview may be shaped and guided by my prior experience, 
and not the experiences and perspectives of the respondents. This risk was an influence in my 
decision to adopt a minimalist interview schedule so as to allow respondents to share their 
own experiences and perspectives without too much structure. Following DeLyser (2001) and 
Chavez (2008), a researchers’ request to assume no prior knowledge seems for the most part 
to have worked in eliciting rich detail in respondent accounts and in avoiding comments such 
as “you know what I mean” and frustration whereby the respondent often assumes the 
researcher already knows the answer to the question (DeLyser, 2001).  
 
I was also aware of subjective influences that I may have on the reliability of respondent 
accounts. It is known that interview respondents may react defensively or try to impress the 
interviewer (Van Heurten, 2004) with the ‘right’ answer. Using decision-making as a 
theoretical context, Van Heutgen (2004:211) points out that “respondents may have difficulty 
remembering the process, and be unaware of what really influenced their decisions. They 
then may reconstruct what actually occurred according to what they usually do or are 
supposed to do. They will rationalise what is frequently an irrational process by creating 
logical stories or saying what they think the interviewer wants to hear”. Cited in Van 
Heutgen (2004), Merton (1946) recommended that such types of bias can be overcome by 
keeping direction to a minimum. Furthermore, other tactics such as building a basis of trust, 
the use of probing questions, triangulating the data across numerous respondents or with the 
extant literature can help overcome these issues. This advice was heeded in this research 
study, as discussed.       
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Kanuha (2000:444) asserts that where a researcher is known as being a ‘native’, the potential 
benefits of access to privileged information needs to be balanced if the researcher wishes to 
avoid blind spots pervading the data analysis phase and that “for each of the ways that being 
an insider researcher enhances the depth and breadth of understanding to a population that 
may not be accessible to a normative scientist, questions about objectivity, reflexivity and 
authenticity of a research project are raised”. In addition, Asselin (2003) points out that one 
of the risks of being an insider in the data analysis phase of a research project is that the 
researcher may suffer role confusion whereby the data is analysed from a different 
perspective from that intended, and that the data analysis proceeds with an emphasis on 
shared factors and that discrepant factors are de-emphasised (Dwyer & Buckle, 2009).  
 
To overcome these sources of positionality bias, I was aware of the need to encourage 
alternative explanations in order to avoid blind spots and open up my own subjectivity to 
scrutiny and rigour. As discussed, I have used member validation and expert panels in the 
data analysis phases in order to imbue ‘confidence’ in the findings. These steps, together with 
access to respondent accounts unlikely to be available to outsiders, are posited to improve the 
plausibility and credibility of the research findings. Nonetheless, there are possible unknown 
impacts that my insidership/outsidership may have had on the data collection and data 
analysis processes.    
 
In summary, there are obvious advantages and disadvantages of being an insider or outsider 
in the research process. I have highlighted how questions of positionality have influenced 
aspects of the research design and process. DeLyser (2001:442) reminds us that “in every 
research project we navigate complex and multi-faceted insider/outsider issues”. In this 
research study, I have positioned myself as neither a complete insider or complete outsider, 
and tried to maximise the potential advantages, and minimise the potential disadvantages of 
both, occupying a dynamic space ‘in the middle’ of the continuum, following the advice of 
Acker (2000) in her suggestion that we attempt to find a way to be both. By reflexively 
manipulating positionality, I hope to have been able to elicit rich respondent experiences and 
perspectives, and to minimise potential sources of positionality bias. As Dwyer and Buckle 
(2009:59) argue, “the core ingredient is not outsider or insider status but an ability to be 
open, authentic, honest, deeply interested in the experience of one’s research participants, 
and committed to accurately and adequately representing their experience”.          
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3.8 Ethical considerations 
  
There are a number of professional associations that offer guidance on good ethical practice 
in social research. For example, The Social Research Association (SRA) advises on carrying 
out ethical social research. Within the discipline of business and management, the British 
Academy of Management, the American Academy of Management, and the Academy of 
Marketing offer guidance to researchers working within the field, and similar bodies exist in 
other disciplines in the social sciences such as the British Psychological Society and the 
Educational Research Association. Within Northumbria University, the Principles of Good 
Research Practice and governed by an independent Research Committee in each School 
(School of Business and Law). This study was granted ethical approval prior to data 
collection on 29/9/14.  
 
Within qualitative research, Willig, (2001:18) outlines five key areas of ethical practice: 
 
1. Informed consent – this study offered to each interview participant a copy of Northumbria 
University ‘Informed Consent Form for research participants’ (see Appendix 5)  
2. No deception - prior to any data collection, each respondent was informed of the purpose 
of this research, its aims and outcomes  
3. Right to withdraw – respondents were informed in writing of their right to withdraw from 
the study at any time, for any reason without question (see the ‘Informed Consent Form 
for Research Participants, Appendix 5) 
4. Debriefing - respondents were emailed a copy of the interview transcript and promised an 
executive summary of the final report 
5. Confidentiality - within this study the interview data was stored on an I-phone recorder 
for no more than 24 hours. This was downloaded to my own private password-protected 
computer, and saved as password-protected electronic files, only accessible by me. The 
audio recordings on the I-phone were then deleted. Respondents and organisations were 
anonymised with a numbering system. The numbering system was maintained in a 
separate, password-protected electronic file. Any references to locations, such as a 
building, street, town, or city were also anonymised as I felt that this may reveal the 
identity of an organisation. Therefore, the study guaranteed confidentiality and anonymity 
of respondents and organisations. The following wording was included in all 
correspondence: 
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All data will be stored securely either electronically on computer or in hard copy version 
in a locked cupboard. The recordings on the digital recorder will be deleted once they 
have been saved on my own password-protected laptop. This will be done within 2 weeks 
of the initial recording. As part of the data analysis process, hard copies of the 
anonymised transcripts (raw data) may be given to the doctoral supervision team and a 
small number of other research participants to review. Hard copies will be returned to me. 
Data obtained through this research may be reproduced and published in a variety of 
forms and for a variety of audiences related to the broad nature of the research detailed 
above. It will not be used for purposes other than those outlined above without your 
permission. Participation is entirely voluntary and participants may withdraw at any time. 
Where audio files were professionally-transcribed, the audio files were downloaded onto 
a CD and subsequently deleted from the device. The audio files were sent to the 
transcription agency by recorded delivery, and returned in the form of password-protected 
electronic files by email. The transcription agency was advised of my data confidentiality 
and privacy policy before starting any work, and the transcription agency used has the 
University’s preferred supplier status.     
    
In addition to the 5 areas set out by Willig (2001), Easterby-Smith et al., (2012) added further 
criteria for ethical research.  
 
6. Ensure no harm – this study’s aim was to ask respondents to share their experiences of 
events in a product market. As such, no harm was done to respondents 
7. Treat respondents with dignity – in this study the respondents were informed in writing of 
the purpose of the study and were treated with the due respect and formality by me  
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8. Declare affiliations and conflicts of interest – the study is funded by Northumbria 
University. I worked in the product market between 2000 and 2011, and is known to 
some of the respondents. Where I was known to the respondent, this was acknowledged 
in communication and in the interview. I agreed with each respondent that the interview 
should proceed on a formal, professional, but friendly, basis, and that the respondent 
should assume I am not familiar with the product market context. Where I was not known 
to the respondent, I declared an ‘insider’ status, but again agreed with each respondent 
that the interview should proceed on a formal, professional, but friendly, basis, and that 
the respondent should assume that I am not familiar with the product market context. I 
declare no conflict of interest or affiliation with any of the respondents or organisations  
9. Honesty and transparency in communicating about the research – in this study the 
participants were informed in all forms of correspondence the purpose and outcome of the 
study, and the data protection and privacy procedures  
10. Avoidance of any misleading or false reporting of research findings. The purpose of the 
study is academic. However, the findings may be of interest to practitioners and policy-
makers. Copies of an executive summary will be made available to respondents.  
 
3.10. Summary  
 
This chapter has explored the research design of this study. It has explained and justified 
epistemological commitments, and discussed methodological decisions. The aim of the 
chapter was to justify the selection of a subtle realist perspective, and to position the study’s 
data collection and data analysis methods within that frame of reference. 
  
The next chapter presents the Data Analysis and Findings.    
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4. Data Analysis and Findings 
In this chapter, I will present the data analysis and findings. One of the most common ways 
of presenting a thematic or template analysis is to “describe and discuss each of the over-
arching themes in turn, referring to examples from the data and using direct quotes to help 
characterise the theme for readers” (King & Horrocks, 2010). Rather than a purely 
descriptive account, this chapter aims to follow the guidance of Braun and Clarke (2006) by 
making an argument in relation to the data. As King (2004:268) reminds us, “this tends to be 
the approach which most readily produces a clear and succinct thematic discussion”.  
One of the challenges of presenting the data analysis and findings in this research study is to 
maintain a clear and succinct discussion across multiple time periods, multiple units of 
analysis, and the relationships between them. To try to overcome these challenges and 
present a clear and succinct discussion, the overall structure of the chapter will be presented 
as follows:  
 Two main sections that correspond to the two overarching research questions: 
  RQ1: What supply-side processes are associated with the co-evolution of 
architectures?  RQ2: To what extent are the design characteristics of product architecture associated 
with the design characteristics of firm and/or industry architecture? 
 
Within the RQ1 section, I focus on (1) product themes across time, (2) firm-level themes 
across time, and (3) industry level themes across time. Within the RQ2 section, the 
organising principle is time, moving successively through time from the mid-80s to 2014.  
 
Within the templates throughout this chapter, I have chosen to illustrate the full set of themes 
that emerged from the data. However, given the restrictions of space and word count set out 
in the Northumbria University PhD regulations, it is not possible to discuss all aspects of the 
data. Therefore, from the templates I have carefully selected a number of ‘integrative themes’ 
(King, 1998, 2004) which re-occur across time and which help illuminate the core issues 
related to RQ1 and RQ2. In other words, the narrative within this chapter is a sub-set of the 
templates, which, by definition, is a summary of the interview transcripts.             
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Finally, as a context-specific research study, this chapter inevitably uses technical vocabulary 
and lingo. To enable the reader to understand some of the explanations, footnotes are used to 
elaborate key issues that impact upon the key contributions discussed in chapter 5.      
 
The templates shown throughout this chapter are diagrammatical representations, using 
NVivo, of the tabular final templates as shown previously in sections 3.5.2.1 and 3.5.2.2.    
 
In vivo quotations will be shown in italics and referenced as follows, for example, 
(interviewee_28) will be shortened to (28).    
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I begin, however, with a short narrative of a few significant historical milestones in the 
history of the UK personal pension product market that sets the context for the starting point 
of this research study. The mid-1980s is the starting point of this research study as it is 
widely-recognised that so-called ‘modern’ personal pensions are associated with the personal 
pension regime announced in the Finance Act 1984 and which received Royal Assent to 
become law on 1 July 1988. As a consequence, this research study begins at the cusp of an 
evolution from ‘old’ style pensions to ‘modern’ person pensions. 
Individual personal pensions were initially offered in the post-war period of the mid-50s, 
when “we had a very simple product range, typically retirement annuity contracts that came 
in about ’55 or '56 and ran till '88” (27). These products remained largely unchanged until 
1988, linked to a single investment fund, known as a ‘with-profits’ fund designed and 
developed by insurance companies, known as ‘with-profits insurance companies’. A 
significant development then occurred in “1960, the first unit-linked insurance companies 
came along. And what caused them to set up a unit-linked company, there was the Prevention 
of Fraud Investment Act and that prevented the door-to-door selling of unit trusts26. Up to 
that point they were selling unit trusts door-to-door. But they couldn't do that anymore. But 
what they could sell door-to-door was life-assurance linked pension policies. So they 
introduced a life-assurance pension plan which was linked to their unit trusts” (24). In other 
words, this event bought the idea of unit-linked investment to the UK for the first time.     
Executive Pensions embedded unit-linking as a design concept in the mid-70s, “in c1975 
there was a new piece of legislation which allowed for executive pension plans. There was 
concern about the fact that smaller corporations didn't have pension plans because running a 
defined-benefit pension plan27was a big expensive operation. You needed trustees. You 
needed actuaries. You needed someone to do your investments. Big and expensive overheads. 
So, for big companies, it was ok, but for small companies, it wasn't. So, they introduced some 
legislation in ‘75 for the executive pension plan, which allowed small companies to set up a 
pension contract for as few as one person. They were often sold initially as directors' 
contracts. And right from the very beginning they were unit-linked. Unit-linking was now 
established in a small but growing sector. And many organisations sold these in quite large 
numbers making full use of the flexibility of the regulation. So, if you look at the mid- to late 
'70's, there were a lot of unit-linked insurance companies that started in that time” (25). 
                                                          
26
 KŶoǁŶ alterŶatiǀelǇ as ͚fuŶds͛, ͚ŵutual fuŶds͛, or ͚fuŶd ĐoŵpoŶeŶts͛. 
27
 Known alternatively as a final salary scheme. 
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In 1979, an innovative organisation entered the UK personal pensions product market with a 
unit-linked executive personal pension. And, by 1984, “they introduced effectively a 
platform. But it was introducing about half-a-dozen investment houses to compete with your 
traditional life companies. So you're in a market environment where all the life companies 
were essentially doing the same thing and there was opportunity to do something fresh” (27).  
The history of this significant moment is summarised as follows: “[Organisation] came into 
the country from a South African base and they had unit-linked methodologies down in South 
Africa in the 50's. But investment in those days was not allowed outside the UK, more or less. 
You couldn't invest. There were severe currency restrictions. So, the only funds that they had 
were a cash fund, a UK equity fund and a property fund. So, unit-linked pensions were very 
slow to take off” (24). However, “[Organisation]  realised that unit-linking would deliver a 
mass market customer need but it also delivered for the shareholder in the sense of not tying 
up huge amounts of capital to support the guarantees implicit in traditional with-profits. 
They were saying, actually one of the big components in the product world is the investment 
solutions and the investment solutions are very opaque. So, they were redesigning one of the 
core components” (24). 
 
The announcement of the introduction of personal pensions in the Finance Act 1984, and its 
subsequent launch on 1 July 1988, became the catalyst for a significant period of change in 
the product market which continues until today. This research study begins its data analysis 
from the mid-80s until 2014 and proceeds from micro to macro (ie, product to industry).    
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4.1 RQ1: What supply-side processes are associated with the co-evolution of 
architectures? 
4.1.1 Product-level analysis 
4.1.1.1 Mid to late-1980’s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Product template: mid to late-1980s28 
In the mid to late-80s, respondents associated the period with a closed and integrated product 
architecture that represented a ‘with-profits personal pension’, as shown in Figure 12.  
 
 
Figure 12: Closed and integrated product architecture = with-profits personal pension 
 
 
 
                                                          
28
 As also shown in tabular form in Table 19 (section 4.3.2.2) 
Closed and 
integrated product 
architecture 
With-profits 
personal pension 
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The with-profits product architecture had closed and integrated characteristics, as two 
respondents remarked “it was all intertwined, interlinked”(28), and “most components are 
interdependent with each other”(18). The interdependence of product components had 
significant consequences for the product development process as changes in one product 
component often had knock-on, and potentially unforeseen, design changes in other product 
components, “you tweak one part, other bits need to be looked at” (28), “it had to be all our 
components, and if you changed one thing, the whole thing changed” (22), “they're 
incredibly tough to change because everything's integrated, everything has an impact on 
everything else” (15), and “with-profits were the most internally complex products, and most 
implications were not foreseen” (3).  
This often led to a complex product development processes that was hindered by numerous 
re-iterations and re-works. A respondent reflected “so then another product comes along 
that’s broadly similar but they’re all a little bit different, so you've got to re-think it through 
all again. I would have said the product development process was quite lengthy” (4) and 
another reflected “it was very hard to change, they are tightly-bound. And you couldn't really 
see how any of those products were going to be de-constructed so you could add a different 
type of fund to them” (27). As one respondent recalled, product component change was often 
hindered and often resulted in a more architectural type innovation “if you want to change 
anything, you basically find a new product” (18). 
In the mid-80s, personal pensions were designed on proprietary IT mainframes, supported by 
a complex set of manual operational processes. The complexity of the product architecture 
meant that many IT systems were not fit-for-purpose, as one respondent recalled “they 
weren't necessarily fit for purpose because most systems were really intense from an 
actuarial perspective” (27). One of the additional challenges was that IT systems were used 
to design and administer multiple product sets, including non-pension products, building in 
further cross-product interdependence, “we had an endowment policy; we had a whole life 
policy; we had a single premium bond; we had a pension; and they were all run with the 
same system. The only difference between the pension and the bond was that the pension had 
a piece of paper which said different things on it. The system behind it was exactly the same, 
but there were no industry standards whatsoever” (4).   
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In the mid-80s, a specialist pensions product called an ‘Executive Pension’ was gathering 
momentum29. An Executive Pension was a personal pension that “tended to be targeted at 
either the owners of businesses or some of their key employees” (26). Executive Pensions 
offered more investment variety and allowed executives to take more control of their 
retirement, as one respondent stated “there was a very big divide between employed people 
and self-employed people, the types of products that would appeal. And that's again another 
game changer that materialised through the '80's where people could top-up into an 
executive personal pension” (27). A respondent also recalled that this ‘specialist’ product 
segment was dominated by new unit-linked entrants, “so the early implementers of unit-
linking looked at the Executive Pension market as being their market place” (26).  
 
By the late-80s, the concept of unit-linking30 had permeated the design of many ‘modern’ 
personal pensions. Overall, however, many product architectures remain characterised as 
closed and integrated, but some unit-linked insurance companies began to modularise31 the 
fund component interface in order to increase product variety. Exogenous factors helped it 
gain traction as “in 1980, the end of currency restrictions and .all of a sudden ooof” (24). 
Therefore, by leveraging Executive Pensions as the thin edge of a wedge, new unit-linked 
insurance companies extended their unit-linked designs into mainstream personal pensions as 
a means of competing against incumbent with-profit insurance companies, “late-'80's, there 
was an increasing trend of more investment choice becoming available through the unit-
linked route” (26) and personal pension designs launched on or after 1988 tended “to be unit-
linked at the beginning” (24).  
 
                                                          
29
 Executive personal pensions were launched in the mid-1970s, but it was not until the announcement of a 
deregulated personal pensions market in the Finance Act 1984 that the product began to gather any 
momentum 
30
 The difference between with-profit funds and unit-linked funds is that a with-profit fund is one homogenous 
pool of ŵoŶeǇ ŵaŶaged oŶ ďehalf of ŵultiple ĐoŶsuŵers, “if you look at pre-88 peŶsioŶs, there wasŶ’t aŶ 
obvious correlation between what you were paying in and the fund value of your pension. It was conventional 
with-profits so it was based on a sum insured you might get at the end plus regular bonuses, plus a terminal 
ďoŶus that you ŵay or ŵay Ŷot get͟ ;ϭ6Ϳ. The actual value of your pension entitlement was by reference to 
complex actuarial calculations. Whereas, in a unit-linked structure the fuŶd is split iŶto sliĐes, or ͚uŶits͛, aŶd aŶ 
individual consumer buys identifiable units in the fund so that the units purchased are directly linked to the 
value of the underlying assets of the fund. For example, a unitised fund with say 1000 units and with a fund 
value of £1000 has a unit price of £1. A contribution of £100 would buy 100 units. Later, if the fund was worth 
£2000 the unit price would be £2 - the peŶsioŶ͛s uŶit ǀalue has douďled. UŶit-linking therefore, can be 
charactised as a modular innovation of fund components.  
31
 IŶ this ĐoŶteǆt, ŵodularisiŶg is the saŵe as ͚uŶit-liŶkiŶg͛ 
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4.1.1.2 The early to mid-1990s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Product template: early to mid-1990s32 
In the early to mid-1990s, respondents associated the period with a closed and modular 
product architecture, representing a ‘unit-linked personal pension’, as shown in Figure 14.  
 
 
Figure 14: Closed and modular product architecture = unit-linked personal pension  
By the early to mid-90s fund modularisation or unit-linking was much more main-stream 
across the product market.  However, the variety of unit-linked funds available was still quite 
limited and nearly always designed internally within firm boundaries. For example, “early 
90s, you started to get people saying we're going to have more than just a with-profit fund, 
and commonly would have four funds or five unit-linked funds” (17).  
 
                                                          
32
 As also shown in tabular form in Table 21 (section 4.3.2.2) 
Closed and 
modular product 
architecture 
Unit-linked 
personal pension 
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However, unit-linking required significant changes to the IT architecture. For example, “I 
mean in a big monolithic system, it’s not very easy to do because you have to commit major 
surgery to cut the component out of the system. I can definitely remember that adding funds 
were made a lot simpler not just externally, but just adding funds internally was made 
simpler” (4). The modular innovation process to unit-link fund components resulted in the 
creation of a specialised interface, known as a ‘mirror fund’33. The mirror fund interface was 
a significant design breakthrough that, ultimately, paved the way for fund components to be 
sourced from external fund management groups. Outsourcing fund components was 
considered by many new unit-linked insurance companies as a route to differentiation or 
competitive advantage as “it emerged as an opportunity to provide choice to customers” (27). 
By the early-90s, some new unit-linked insurance companies had extended the range of 
modular fund components up to around 250 because “our internal funds had been so 
incompetently run” (13) suggestive of a capability gap.   
 
Despite fund modularisation, industry standards had not emerged by the mid-90s, but firm-
specific, specialised standards were permeating across firm boundaries as the basis for market 
exchange. For example, “there were some company specific standards. You give us this sort 
of information and we can put your fund into our system” (4), and in terms of the mainframe 
IT architecture “there was also more standards inside the system, one bit talking to another, 
so I think the companies were building interfaces to try and componentise the system” (4).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
33
 The specialised interface was known as a mirror fund. A mirror fund is a new unit-linked fund that invests 
into another fund. Say, you have two funds, A and B, each with different management charges. Insurance 
ĐoŵpaŶies Đreated tǁo ŵore fuŶds, Aϭ aŶd Bϭ. Aϭ iŶǀests iŶ A aŶd Bϭ iŶǀests iŶ B.  Aϭ is a ͚ŵirror͛ of A aŶd Bϭ 
is a ͚ŵirror͛ of B. The desigŶ ĐharaĐteristics of A1 and B1 are standardised in order to avoid significant design 
implications. There were significant advantages for the insurance company in this approach as the assets 
within the mirror fund sat on the balance sheet of the insurance company even where the underlying fund was 
manufactured by an external fund management group, and mirror funds could be structured to have common 
dealing and valuation points, and other commonalities that had operational and efficiency benefits  
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4.1.1.3 The mid 90’s to mid-noughties 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Product template: mid-90s to mid-noughties34 
In the mid-1990s to mid-noughties, respondents associated the period with a hybrid product 
architecture that represented a ‘fund supermarket’, as shown in Figure 16.  
 
 
Figure 16: Hybrid product architecture = fund supermarket   
 
 
                                                          
34
 As also shown in tabular form in Table 23 (section 4.3.2.2) 
Hybrid product 
architecture 
Fund 
supermarket 
 
149 
 
 
During the mid to late-90s, the variety of unit-linked fund components increased 
significantly, “so, in that time, personal pensions were offering a small range of 5 to 10 
external funds. And then that developed and evolved to quasi-open architecture. There was 
an element of plug-and-play, but within a framework” (11). Increasing fund component 
variety became a key basis of competition, as a few respondents recall: “in '96/'98, products 
would have 15 or so external fund links” (29); “we had 50 funds within our personal 
pension” (10); “the big thing was about actually how do we take the pension and go from 
having say 10 funds to having 200 mirror funds” (20);  and, “maybe to a range of 300 funds, 
where as previously, it would have been more like 20 funds” (10).  
The process of interfacing unit-linked mirror funds remained a firm-specific process rather 
than an industry-standard, largely due to the idiosyncratic nature of each firm’s mirror fund 
interface design, “because what they had was a two-pin plug and you had a three-pin socket. 
So how did you make that work? You needed to have an adaptor in place. And the adaptor 
was a whole pricing system. And that was in-house” (25) and “you almost had an internal 
translation mechanism, so a piece of middleware, and that was the mirror fund” (28). 
By the early 90s, commissions paid to IFAs35 were being charged within the product structure 
as a single up-front payment. In the single stroke of a pen, personal pensions were much more 
portable and exit penalties36 could be removed from the product design. As a respondent 
recalls “I remember around late 97, early 98, we launched a no-penalty pension. And that 
was the first product that hit the market that people could have flexibility, actually could 
move things without financial penalty and implication” (17). The ‘modularisation’ of 
commission also coincided with the removal of other ‘low value’ integrated product 
components previously designed into the architecture and hence “it was a time when you 
started seeing components like total permanent disability coming out of products. So 
products became more investment-focused and straight forward” (17). 
 
                                                          
35
 Independent Financial Advisors 
36
 Commission was previously paid as an up-front lump sum to financial advisers and collected back over time 
(usually 5 years) via product charges. As such, insurance companies held a balance sheet risk that the customer 
would switch providers within the 5-year period. To eliminate this risk, consumers were faced with a 5-year 
exit charge if they switched providers. As a consequence, exit charges can be conceptualised as an exit barrier 
that liŵited Đustoŵers͛ ǁilliŶgŶess to shop-around or switch providers. By charging commission as a one-off 
lump sum, no 5-year exit charges were needed. Conceptually, this design change is characteristic of a 
modularisation of the commission component      
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However, the core IT architecture remained tightly-integrated, “there was already an 
emergence of external fund links, but that's as far as it went really. There was nothing much 
else which you could unplug. Everything else was run off big heavy mainframes and while 
inside those mainframes there are commission modules and charge modules and rebate 
modules and all that kind of stuff, everything else is still interlinked to some extent” (28).  
However, despite these drawbacks, insurance companies remained reluctant to consider 
modular IT systems architectures emerging in the intermediate market because “it's not that 
simple because of interdependence. Some of the systems that we used as the core architecture 
for personal pensions, also powered other products that weren't ready or needed to move” 
(11) and “it was too hard, too expensive and too risky. No-one was signing up to it. No-one's 
going to say, what you should do is take out the entire core architecture of your system and 
replace it with something new that’s going to cost you 50 million quid and take three years 
and be really risky. And in that time you're going to be able to sell nothing. No-one's voting 
for that” (11).  
Furthermore, because the core IT architecture was incredibly complex, few people 
understood how to simplify it, “you’ve got a system that’s probably got 30 years of 
knowledge on it and all the legacy built into it and trying to unwind that is a very hard task 
because no-one currently alive understands all the products that were on the system. I mean 
legacy was biting,  there’s no doubt about it” (4) and “It got to the point where the changes 
have become almost out of control and unworkable and the IT language that was all built in 
so archaic that very few people could actually use and work those systems” (23).  
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While unit-linking continued to gain traction in the product market, with-profits personal 
pensions were reaching an implosive end. In an attempt to defend existing technologies, with-
profits insurance companies announced higher and higher bonus rates each year without a 
direct relationship to the underlying performance of the fund, “up to ‘97 the way that the 
with-profit declaration process worked was that you started to look at everybody else. You 
didn't start looking at the financial health in your fund. What was happening is that it was a 
willy-waving contest to be honest. So people were declaring bonus rates beyond their 
financial means, and hoping that everything would all work out in the end. They played a 
huge gamble with the underlying assets. And all that happened was that it all imploded on it. 
I recall a strong desire from actuaries to get out because it was destroying capital hand over 
fist” (28).   
 
In parallel with the events in the personal pensions product market, a new product market for 
long-term savings had emerged, PEPs and ISAs37. The PEP and ISA market led to a 
fundamental architectural innovation across the UK financial services sector. Upstream fund 
management groups seized upon the opportunity to enter the new product markets and 
leveraged existing fund management capabilities and modularised IT architectures developed 
for their core business of fund management. The PEP and ISA regulations enabled the use of 
CIS funds38 but excluded the use of unit-linked mirror funds, and therefore the ISA 
‘standards’ gave fund management groups an ‘architectural head-start’ in entering the ISA 
product market. As CIS funds were designed according to industry standards, fund 
management groups were quickly able to design ISA products to provide an almost unlimited 
variety of fund components, and ISA products quickly came to be available with access to 
1000+ CIS funds – subsequently the term ‘fund supermarket’ was adopted.  
 
 
 
                                                          
37
 PEPs were initially launched in 1986 by the then Conservative government about the same time as the 
deregulation of financial services, and ISAs were announced by the then Labour government and launched in 
1999 in order to replace PEPs. Both these products gave tax advantages to consumers who wished to hold 
long-term investments such as collective investment schemes (CIS funds). While PEPs dated back to 80s, it was 
not until the mid-90s and especially the technology-boom in the late-90s that the product really took off. PEPs 
and ISAs were not initially in direct competition with the personal pensions product market, but their growth 
had significant architectural implications for personal pensions.  
 
38
 CIS funds are collective investment schemes designed according to industry standards such as EU standards. 
CIS funds were also the underlying funds linked to unit-linked mirror funds.   
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The emergence of modular ISA products with access to 1000+ industry-standard fund 
components provided a significant challenge to all insurance companies. However, at the 
same time unit-linked mirror funds suffered another (terminal) nail in the coffin39.  As a 
result, fund management groups spotted an opportunity to extend the ‘fund supermarket’ 
architecture to include personal pensions, “it then exploded out again because actually those 
components were entirely interchangeable. And providers were then in a position where they 
could offer everything, and actually what you very quickly saw was an explosion of a supplier 
base particularly with use of funds because there were no limitations. So it was demand in 
the market and no limitations and so very quickly you ranged from having an in-house fund 
manager to having a small group of fund groups you might deal with and have a relationship 
with, to then having to deal with hundreds in some cases” (6). With unit-linked personal 
pensions on the wane, SIPPs40 were identified by insurance companies and fund management 
groups as a ‘modular’ pensions architecture that could be developed within the parameters of 
a fund supermarket architecture, essentially creating a multi-product technological platform.  
 
However, between the decline in unit-linked personal pensions in c1997 and the emergence 
and growth of fund supermarkets between 2000 and 2005, the then Labour government 
introduced Stakeholder Pensions in April 2001 in response to pensions mis-selling41 and 
consumer mistrust in the sector.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
39
 In 1997, the then Labour Chancellor removed pension fund tax credits, and a consequence, perhaps 
unintended, it removed a tax-based barrier to holding CIS funds within a personal pension. Prior to this, unit-
linked personal pension funds were taxed advantageously to CIS funds, and so this removed the final 
advantage of the mirror fund interface design solution. From now on CIS funds could be held on a tax-
comparative basis within a personal pension.  
40
 ͚SIPP͛ ;self-invested personal pension) was introduced along with personal pensions in 1988 and it has 
specific permitted investment rules set out by regulation that, for example, permits access to a wide range of 
investment choices, such as CIS schemes, but also direct holdings in listed stocks and shares, commercial 
property ownership and other esoteric asset types. It had not really taken off in the product market until 
adopted by insurance companies and fund management groups c1999-ϮϬϬϬ. SIPPs are esseŶtiallǇ ͚ŵodular͛ ďǇ 
reference to the permitted investment standards.  
41
 Pensions mis-selling is discussed as an industry level factor later in this chapter  
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Stakeholder pensions created a challenge for all insurance companies due to the ‘industry 
standard’ charge cap of 1% per year set out in the regulations (later revised upwards slightly), 
“I mean stakeholder came in 2001, but what that really changed for us was just the simplicity 
of the product – more around the charging structure than anything else” (23) and “If you tell 
people you've got one charge and it is one per cent of your total front value, that's a lot easier 
for them to understand than some multi-charge product” (7). Insurance companies, however, 
had significant problems in making money “as well as providing a service within those 
figures, providers had to pay the remuneration to advisors. The early two-thousands was a 
very advisor-driven market and basically, you started getting commission wars in terms of 
who would pay the most commission within the price-cap. So, your margins went down. But 
to still live within your means, you had to bear the pain and reduce your offering” (7) and “it 
did mean that the providers wanted to offer more choice, but they had to within a fixed price. 
So, therefore, they couldn't give people too much choice, because it would increase the cost if 
they exercised that choice too frequently” (10). 
  
Modular unit-linked mirror fund components held within stakeholder pensions could be 
added, substituted or deleted, provided the price cap was adhered to. This meant that the price 
cap created an ‘industry standard’ for stakeholder-specific unit-linked mirror funds, however, 
“because of the charge cap you were limited to the funds you could offer and this meant that 
the funds were mainly internal [funds] , but some external. I mean the fund range was really 
quite limited” (28). As one respondent summed up “as there was a price cap, insurers had to 
look at what you could and could not offer within the price cap. So, what you actually found 
is, in terms of investment flexibility, you were finding products with as few as four funds 
available, whereby previously a unit-linked personal pension could have had 250. So, 
basically, it was very much providers having to offer what they could and still make a profit 
within a price cap. So, as a result, a lot of flexibility and a lot of product features actually 
ceased to exist” (28).  
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With unit-linked personal pensions falling out of favour, and stakeholder pensions proving 
almost impossible to make money from, insurance companies were stuck between a rock and 
a hard place: on the one hand stakeholder pensions meant that “we aren’t going to get any 
money on this” (17), while on the other hand, “the market's moving more and more towards 
open architecture and external fund links” (17). The attractiveness of SIPPs was “to create a 
more efficient profitable product base that can you know sell on a lower cost base with fewer 
people and make more money. You put all of that together, and you get momentum” (17). 
SIPPs were therefore considered a product design that could make money and permitted a 
much wider range of investments that could ‘plug and play’ into the product architecture, 
“it’s your mega plug-and-play because you can put any mutual fund in. The charging 
structure differed by which bit you were in. You could add on commission. It was a real 'à la 
carte' product (31), and “so you've got a dominant personal pension coming to the fore: 
which is a full open-architecture product, which again needed a much more stable system in 
terms of the types of investments that you could hold. And so from that point of view you had 
product innovation going to the fore; investment breadth going from funds or a wider fund 
range to proper open-architecture” (27). So, SIPPs became adopted by insurance companies 
and fund management groups as an ‘open architecture’ modular pension, considered the 
natural replacement to unit-linked and stakeholder personal pensions. 
 
Many of the product components within a SIPP can be designed, developed or procured 
independently of each other. As a respondent recalls “what we had to decide was how do we 
do the self-investment bit. So, we thought we need a stocks and shares component, which we 
went and procured. We needed a discretionary fund manager proposition. So, we basically 
went to open-market tender and had an initial panel. We needed a fund supermarket hub - we 
procured it. We needed a commercial property proposition, we had to procure the 
componentry of that” (28). What developed was “a bit of arm’s race to further develop the 
product” (7).  
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Income drawdown42was also a key driver in the development of the SIPP market. Although 
first launched in 1995, it wasn’t until the wider investment choices within a SIPP became 
available that consumers were attracted to the concept, “the wedge just got hammered ever 
deeper with the advent of drawdown. The belief was we needed the SIPP to have drawdown. 
So ultimately it was about holding shares rather than just funds or property and so on, so it 
gave you much more freedom. So I think a lot of it is recognition, again a bit like the with-
profits to unit-linked transition, it was recognition that we're moving from fund-based 
personal pensions that have gone from insured funds to more wider range through to open-
architecture, where you got much greater band-width” (17). 
 
By the early-noughties, the ‘fund supermarket’ architecture had become necessary for any 
meaningful new product development. As a result, insurance companies licensed IT systems 
from fund management groups or other third-parties. And, “the reason for doing that was 
because as we're launching a quasi-fund supermarket, we thought that their systems would be 
more appropriate for a fund supermarket” (12), and “it was a nightmare trying to build a 
fund supermarket around the old model and it didn't really work. And that's what drove the 
decision to get into bed with suppliers” (12). As the fund supermarket architecture embeds, 
interface standards begin to emerge across firm boundaries and permeate the industry, “there 
was a degree of commonality and we saw that with the development of trading protocols and 
wanting to be able to trade electronically” (25), and “I guess one of the things that changed 
to make that easier was the introduction of industry standards. Different things depending 
upon the component, it would’ve been introduced where everybody would deal with 
everybody else in the same way” (1). In some cases, external third-party standard-setting 
organisations (SSO) emerged to establish industry standards, “there was an external company 
which was made up of some of the providers and suppliers who said wouldn’t it be a good 
idea if we could talk to each other in a common language to make things easier’. So they set 
themselves up as an independent firm” (1).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
42
 Income drawdown was an innovation that permitted a consumer, in retirement, to leave their pension 
iŶǀested aŶd ͚draǁdoǁŶ͛ aŶ iŶĐoŵe, as opposed to ďuǇiŶg a retireŵeŶt aŶŶuitǇ. 
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4.1.1.4 The mid-noughties to 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17: Product template: mid-noughties to 201243 
In the mid-noughties to 2012, respondents associated the period with an open and modular 
product architecture that represented a ‘product platform’, as shown in Figure 18. 
  
 
Figure 18: Open and modular product architecture = product platform   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
43
 As also shown in tabular form in Table 25 (section 4.3.2.2) 
Open and 
modular product 
architecture 
Product platform 
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In this period from the mid-noughties to 2012, the core IT architecture shifted again away 
from the ‘fund supermarket’ architecture to a ‘product platform’, as a consequence of third-
party IT system architects entering the product market, “we actually procured a new system 
that allowed exactly that – plug and play. We worked with suppliers, we did due diligence on 
all those systems, worked out which one we liked the look of, looked at the proposition we 
wanted to launch, and we wanted our stuff to be able to work with those other systems. It 
wasn’t, just chuck it to them, but we made our components plug into theirs. We got them in to 
agree the interface, to see how we administer it, before we cut them loose and off they went. 
It wouldn’t matter then if they were next door or the other side of the world. The new system 
had open architecture, it was designed knowing it needed to plug into that system over there, 
knowing it was future-proofed so that if we wanted to change that with that, we could do it” 
(9).  
Existing fund supermarket architectures were modularised in respect of fund components, but 
it was not easy to adapt them for innovation in the product layer or to permit plug and play 
flexibility to a wide range of other product components44. In response, new platform systems 
architectures were being leveraged from open architecture markets in Australia and New 
Zealand into the UK and hence “common components and platforms from Australia came to 
the UK market; day one it was running and near-ready-to-go. You spent six months 
customising it; launched it; it was probably quite vanilla in some aspects” (5). While the new 
platform systems architecture had a high degree of standardisation, there was already an 
emerging realisation of risks to differentiation and/or competitive advantage, because “it was 
90% standard. That's why I think the 'plug and play' thing to be honest is too pure” (5).  
 
 
 
 
 
. 
                                                          
44
 For example, SIPPs permitted access to an extensive range of investment options such as stocks, shares, 
commercial property, and the market was also demanded a number of decision-based software modules that 
could not easily be plugged into the fund supermarket-based IT systems  
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However, the platform systems architecture offered widespread modular partitioning and 
interfaces to providers of complementary product components, “one of the things happening 
across the platform market is platforms offering differing types of investment approaches and 
investment solutions, and platforms are increasingly saying we are fairly agnostic about the 
investment choices you make on our platform, we offer a broad range of choices, whether it’s 
a combination of different funds, a single fund solution, whether it’s using a third party like a 
discretionary fund manager, whether it’s using an organisation that pulls together a model 
portfolio, what’s happening is that platforms are offering all of those different investment 
approaches and solutions” (2).  
In response to demand-side factors, further investment components were added to the 
platform such as listed stocks, investment trusts, exchange-traded funds, commercial 
property, etc via standards. For example, “I think commercial property was a big part of it as 
well. People were beginning to look at retirement differently. They were retiring but not 
maybe completely giving up work and you know wanted the flexibility of still investing their 
pot” (30). The investment components were also being extended significantly because “the 
reason why it was successful, is that investment trends change. So, people were talking 
investment trusts, exchange-traded funds, target date funds…..no matter how the fad on the 
market or the regulation changes, it can accommodate those” (17).  
 
With this explosion of fund and investment component choice, IFAs and consumers began 
demanding access to a range of decision-based software tools that would help them decide 
which investments may or may not be appropriate. Whereas in the 80s and 90s, with-profit 
and managed funds were popular, now many IFAs and consumers wanted more control and 
choice, but with decision-based software to help them decide between the different options. 
This led to the demand for a wide range of decision-based software ‘tools’, such as risk-
profiling, retirement planning, income drawdown analysis and many more. For instance, 
“what’s happening is that functionality and components available in personal pensions has 
got richer and more diverse, so things like the ability to rebalance a portfolio, the ability to 
switch in and out of assets, the ability to monitor the performance of assets in the portfolio to 
a particular risk rating or risk tolerance, all of that has developed over the last 10 years or 
so” (2).  
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The range of fund, investment components and decision-based tools components across a 
range of pension and non-pension products led to increasing component commonality across 
the product platform, for instance, “it does give us a lot of flexibility and so if we wanted to 
we could offer an incredibly broad range of choice in terms of functionality, in terms of those 
core components, in terms of investment choice, in terms of different products with different 
types of options” (2) and “most consumers in the UK have lots of stuff they use to save for 
their retirement and so it’s not just a pension, it could be some ISAs they’ve got, it could be 
some money elsewhere, or whatever. And, suddenly, here was a proposition that a customer 
could see all that in one place and make decisions and changes quite easily” (22).  
 
With increasing commonality, a further number of industry process standards developed, 
“Origo, used for measuring service levels” (5), and fund pricing information “why would I 
want to deal with a fund pricer when there are international standards out there? People who 
do all this sort of thing and they are accepted by the end customer and advisors as a known 
brand” (10). In addition, industry standards also developed for process components such as 
quotation systems, “there was a growth in industry quotation systems” (4). Therefore, in the 
case of modular product and process components, a significant number of industry standards 
developed, One respondent summed up: “so, a lot of the basics are standardised. Things like 
how do I do valuations? How do I do an application?”(20).  
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4.1.1.5. 2012 onwards 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19: Product template: 2012 onwards45 
Between 2012 and 2014, respondents associated the period with a hybrid product architecture 
that represented a ‘product platform’, as shown in Figure 20. 
  
 
Figure 20: Hybrid product architecture = product platform   
 
                                                          
45
 As also shown in tabular form in Table 27 (section 4.3.2.2) 
Hybrid product 
architecture 
Product 
platform 
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Between 2012 and 2014, the progression towards an open and modular product architecture 
slowed, and in some cases the product architecture began to evolve back towards the 
characteristics of a hybrid product architecture. Firm strategy appears to play a role. For 
example, a few competitors have continued to offer more and more product component 
choice and variety, but most suggested that an almost infinite product component choice left 
consumers open to making inappropriate choices, “the more choice you’ve got, the more like 
a rabbit in the headlights you become” (21). As such, there appears to be two emerging 
positions: “I think, probably until the last two or three years, firms have been quite nervous 
of being seen to try and shepherd people one way or another to investment solutions. And 
some remain like that. You know, some very significant market participants who are 
genuinely there for folk who understand investments….they will say we don't care what you 
buy, it’s totally immaterial to us. Others might say, well no, we do feel some degree of co-
responsibility for what's going on and client suitability” (29) and “I think the market tried to 
go full open architecture.  Everybody wants choice – full open architecture.  But actually, 
that's not what the market wanted at all.  Nobody likes complete choice, because you can't 
make a choice when you've got a choice of everything” (11).  
 
A re-bundling of product components emerged around the time of RDR46 in 2012. For 
example, some product platforms collaborated with fund management groups to create 
‘specific’ versions of a fund component47, “if you look at some firms, they have a different 
share class now. Same fund but different pricing within their own pension, and consequently 
you can’t transfer that fund, or plug and play that fund outside. You would have to effectively 
take the same investment management approach but the pricing would be different elsewhere. 
You’ve effectively re-bundled the proposition (21).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
46
 Retail Distribution Review – a regulator initiated review of distribution and platforms 
47
 For example, by creating different share classes with different management charges 
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Firms are also embedding proprietary fund components within sets of product component 
bundles, “an example is where the platform provider or manufacturer has also got a vested 
interest in having their own manufactured funds sold. So, there are lots of examples where 
platforms are choosing to make their own fund solutions more attractive, that might be virtue 
of their price, by virtue of the way they are marketed, by virtue of the prominence their given, 
and the clear motivation there is for the platform to generate more income for its own in-
house fund business as well” (2). The re-bundling of fund and investment components had 
knock-on implications for the coupling characteristics of decision-based software 
components. For example, manufacturer/assembler firms and decision-based software tool 
providers have collaborated, in some cases, to create decision-based software tools with 
specific marketing outputs or specific stochastic models that ‘recommend’ specific bundles of 
proprietary fund and investment components. For example, “they've got a specific risk 
modelling system that plugs into a specific fund” (15). The re-bundling of product 
components appears to be a form of ‘guided modularity’ where the underlying core product 
components are loosely-coupled and independent of each other, but the 
manufacturer/assembler firm ‘guides’ the consumer towards a specific bundle of product and 
process components that, perhaps, have the greatest rent appropriation opportunities or best 
meet consumer needs.  
 
Guided modularity is considered attractive because “initially it was thought that these 
components are entirely independent, you put them together and you take that to market. But 
actually the putting of them together doesn’t add that much value. I think it then became quite 
clear that actually the value was in the way you could integrate them for the process of the 
client and the advisor”(6), “full open architecture, it came back from that and then that 
'coming back' point was driven by demand and attractiveness to the market” (11) and “I 
think here of guided architecture”(28). The ‘guiding’ remains within the framework of an 
open and modular architecture because “even if they don’t use 99% of the funds, they want to 
retain the flexibility to do that, but you’re seeing a big narrowing down” (21) and “so as 
subsequent waves of legislation have come in, I think providers are starting to think of ways 
to not narrow the choice – I think there's relatively few who have narrowed it – but provide 
an extra guided step” (28).  
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In many cases, guided bundles of product and process components have increased in 
specificity, where a bundle of product components within the architecture is made ‘specific’ 
to a particular value chain configuration. For example, a manufacturer/assembler firm may 
bring together the systems architect, an IFA firm, one or more fund management groups, one 
or more decision-based software tools providers and possibly others to create a specific 
product component bundle for that particular value chain configuration. For example, 
“[Organisation] are a classic example where they have a very tight proposition, as long as 
you don’t put square pegs into round holes. You’ve effectively got an administration system, a 
financial planning system, an investment proposition, tax wrappers, all tightly integrated 
together and within a single price, effectively” (21). Whereas product platforms were once 
competing against other product platforms, the emergence of specific value chain 
configurations has created “power blocks in the market, almost vertically integrated fully but 
through technology and other relationships. So what you end up with is relatively large 
power blocks. They’re not as integrated as the old provider ones, but they’re still big power 
blocks going against each other with the platform at the core of it. So we see ourselves as a 
competitor set and looking at different power blocks, and they come from different places. So 
what you are seeing in the market is the platform providers increasingly in concert with the 
fund groups to build out those power blocks” (6). The respondent continued “so my sense of 
it has been a period probably five years or so where disruptive technology and competitors 
came in and broke up the old provider power base, and you had a very fragmented market. 
What you’re now seeing are those power blocks trying to reform configuration” (6) 
 
As a result of these processes, industry standards are also being challenged. For example, 
“there’s been a tendency for a lot of businesses to be very similar, and almost the economics 
tried to create common interfaces and common fund ranges, fund agreements and structures, 
but that’s all commoditisation, it’s then difficult to have something that looks distinctive” 
(18), or a reluctance by organisations to engage further in an industry standard setting 
process, “I mean a lot of those things are still progressing now, they’ve been extremely slow 
to emerge but whether that has simply been less interest and people not wanting to enable 
things to happen or efficiently in the industry, or it wouldn’t be in their short term 
commercial interest. I think certainly it made it very difficult to get the players to co-operate 
and so I think across industry new standard-setting is very slow” (18).  
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Because of the need to continually innovate, few firms have committed to prioritise further 
investment in the standard-setting process, for instance “if we don’t like the standard user 
interface, we build it ourselves. So to innovate you have to go down that route, and we 
realised you could more effectively do that yourself” (18) and “industry standards are a 
barrier. I suppose the reason is that it’s sort of related to people, people  develop standards, 
and implement them, there’s never really a true standard, there’s always someone who works 
to distort it. There will always be a need for people to talk because you can standardise 
everything there should always be a next innovation around the corner, there will always be 
a need to develop new standards” (20). 
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4.1.2 Firm-level analysis 
 
4.1.2.1 Mid to late-1980s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21: Firm template: mid to late-1980s48 
 
In the mid-80s, many insurance companies exhibited vertically integrated characteristics. For 
example, the “advice” and distribution component49 was enacted within firm boundaries, “at 
that time direct sales forces were more common, so you were looking at something much 
more vertically integrated, and more face to face” (3). One of the advantages of internalised 
advice and distribution was “they were expensive to build but you got all of their business” 
(25). Integrating advice and distribution within firm boundaries was also used to aggressively 
sell new products. For example, new unit-linked insurance companies primarily used 
integrated advice and distribution processes to quickly gain market share, as one respondent 
recalls: “aggressive integrated sales forces that were entirely unit-linked. They drove the 
unit-linked product because that was all they did”(24).  
 
 
 
                                                          
48
 As also shown in tabular form in Table 19 (section 4.3.2.2) 
49
 For example, the people and processes who advise consumers and distribute products  
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However, integrated advice and distribution processes were quite expensive to set-up and 
maintain, especially in terms of recruiting, training and development, but also in terms of 
regulatory capital, “this was going to be a big burn on capital” (25). In the mid-80s, while 
integrated advice and distribution was a common governance mode, firms were beginning to 
explore other modes such as outsourcing distribution to intermediate markets, such as IFAs, 
for instance, “the company I worked for had a tied sales-force, but it also distributed through 
independents” (25) and “at the point in time it was either direct sales or intermediated, but 
independents was a way of doing something different from a distribution point of view (27).  
 
Fund management was also enacted within firm boundaries, “certainly for the early part of 
that period, most of the funds were in-house funds” (4). In addition, the variety of fund 
components tended to be limited, often a choice between a with-profit fund and a managed 
fund, “quite limited initially, so you tend to have maybe a with-profits fund or managed fund. 
The investment links were quite limited in terms of the range and they tended initially to be 
in-house investment management” (26). 
 
Firm boundary decisions were associated with a number of key factors: (1) governance 
inseperability, (2) the absence of efficient intermediate markets, and (3) the specificity of the 
firms’ knowledge. In terms of governance inseperability a respondent recalled that “I think it 
was just the era of insurance companies, people didn't tend to outsource things in those days. 
It was just after the sort of like black suit and bowler-hat phase of the City. That's how they'd 
always done it. And they'd always done it on an in-house basis” (8). Intermediate markets 
were on the whole limited for most product components, for example, in the case of fund 
management, “there was very little and it tended to be very small” (26). A final factor that is 
associated with vertical integration is the firms’ architectural and knowledge specificity, as 
few people within firms understood how the product architecture actually worked, “if you go 
back before 1988, you didn’t even know what the charges were, it was all in the product and 
the bonus rate” (1) and “you can sell and market on different features, you need to have 
marketing people who understand it, and you couldn’t do that with conventional with-profits. 
It was a hugely complicated product that people internally didn’t really understand” (1). One 
respondent summed up that “in general it was all about internal manufacture, a web of 
systems with complexity which means it’s only Geoff in the cupboard who knows how to fix 
them” (20). 
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In the late 80s, however, while most firm boundaries continued to exhibit vertically 
integrated characteristics, outsourcing advice and distribution grew, and outsourcing fund 
components also emerged as some new unit-linked insurance companies outsourced fund 
design to external fund management groups in the intermediate market. This was primarily 
driven by the availability of specialised productive capabilities in the intermediate market, 
“we didn't do it because we suddenly had this blinding flash of insight – we did it because we 
had a terrible investment record” (24). As one respondent summed up, the productive 
capabilities of in-house fund management was so poor that “in the mid and late-80s people 
started saying maybe in-house insurance company fund management guys aren't the best 
people to manage money” (25).  
4.1.2.2 Early to mid-1990s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 22: Firm template: early to mid-1990s50 
 
 
 
                                                          
50
 As also shown in tabular form in Table 21 (section 4.3.2.2) 
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While an intermediate market had grown for advice and distribution and fund components, 
insurance companies remained vertically integrated in terms of IT systems architecture, 
customer services, and administration. One of the primary factors associated with insourcing 
IT is the sheer complexity of the systems and the knock-on implications for product design. 
For example, “getting the system to talk to other systems without developing a whole brand 
new system was impossible. The system was very old – maybe it could have talked to other 
systems but the people were not around who built it to have the conversation” (9).  
Efficiency considerations also play a role, “Cost came into it. More cost to use suppliers. It 
was our product, on our system, it was our sales force selling it, our funds, managed 
internally, and you can manage the costs better that way. As soon as you start outsourcing 
different components, a) you’ve got the initial costs of building the things, and allowing 
everything to talk to each other, and b) you’re kind of exposed to the costs of that third party, 
you don’t have the same control over those costs (1), and “I suppose it was about control, the 
lack of control you had, and the risk you were building in, the risk being that if the costs do 
go up, how easy was it back then for you to change suppliers. Once you’re tied into a 
supplier, you don’t have the capability of plugging another one in, you were kind of linked in 
to the heart of the supplier, it was more of a risk really” (17).  
In order to efficiently use intermediate markets, it was recognised that there was a need to 
simplify information exchange and reduce complexity. For example, the scale of the product 
development issues are highlighted “if you try to cut up the pie and see all the effort that went 
into the product, 80% of it or more would be the systems build and a  small amount up front 
trying to decide what the product looks like in the first place. But the vast majority was on the 
systems build so that was the critical path on all developments” (4).  
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With the introduction of modern personal pensions in 1988, and hence exponential growth of 
unit-linked product architectures, speed to market became a significant strategic issue and 
simplifying the product architecture and so facilitate the use of intermediate markets became 
critical. For instance, “we don’t want it to cost twice as much because you’re componentising 
it, but it’s not actually about cost, it’s the timescale we’re worried about really” (4), and 
speed was one of the main factors in simplifying the interfaces for fund components, “where 
we’ve simplified he fund addition process, it was time to market. I think cost and time were 
embarrassing and there’s no doubt about it, you felt like a big clunky organisation, it takes a 
long time to get something to market, losing market share. So I think time to market was 
pretty key and the overall cost is pretty key and there were some eye watering costs” (4). The 
respondent continued “Yes, I would have said internally whether its funds or the whole 
system, the idea of a componentised model would make things easier and we could just link 
these components together to make the whole development easier, and the battle was how do 
you change this great big monolithic piece of code into a componentised thing?” (4). 
 
Accessing external specialised fund management productive capabilities was another key 
factor in driving insurance companies to adopt unit-linked product designs. As one 
respondent recalls “what we'll never be able to do is be a top investment group in every 
aspect for all scenarios; so what we want to do is to offer expertise that we don't have, 
necessarily on a wider basis from fund management groups who know how to manage 
money” (26). As such, “the hypothesis was that you would not get as good investment 
performance as you would if you outsourced to people who are experts in fund management 
in different asset classes and different countries” (25). Rather than being specialists, 
insurance company in-house fund management teams were often ‘jack of all trades’. This 
lack of specialisation presented a problem, “they were trying to research Japanese equities 
from the UK, how on earth do you recommend a buy or a sell of a Japanese equity if you've 
never been to see the directors of the firm? All you're looking at is the report and accounts. 
You probably aren't big enough to even pick up the phone and talk to them and have them 
talk to you because they'll probably go: “who the hell are you?”. So, actually what you need 
is either local fund managers in the various markets for equities or firms who are experts in a 
particular asset class. Whereas, you've got this sort of 'jack of all trades' fund management 
business sat inside the insurance company” (25). 
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However, while the unit-linked insurance companies collaborated and outsourced to upstream 
fund management groups with relish, the traditional with-profit based insurance companies 
were slow to follow, continuing to focus on their own productive capabilities in ‘with-profits’ 
fund management. As one respondent suggests, “in that initial stage, they were the 
traditional players and therefore unit-linking wasn't seen as being necessarily immediately 
something they wanted to get into” (26).  
 
4.1.2.3 Mid-1990s to mid-noughties 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23: Firm template: mid-1990s to mid-noughties51 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
51
 As also shown in tabular form in Table 23 (section 4.3.2.2) 
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Outsourcing product components such as funds and advice and distribution continued in the 
period of the mid to late-90s. In terms of outsourcing the fund components, gains from trade 
were associated with growing scale economies that supported ex-post negotiations with fund 
management groups, “the margin that we had to give away was negotiable downwards on a 
growing basis” (26) because insurance companies gave fund management groups access to a 
product market that they could not access directly, “we'll want to negotiate and review on a 
regular basis. You'll get something, but something that's less than you thought. But you're 
getting 100% of something as opposed to nothing” (26).  
 
One respondent suggested that “it wasn't a cost-driven thing. There's a marketing 
opportunity here, there's an opportunity for us to differentiate what we do as opposed to what 
other people do, produce some more value for the customer and therefore gain market share 
so ultimately get a return for the shareholder” (25). Another respondent recalled that a 
growing market and scale continued to support ex-post negotiations and hence gains, 
“initially, we paid the fund managers too much. We got wise to that and we squeezed them 
down and down. So we were retaining a very significant part and what we did was we 
expanded the cake. So it became much more profitable. So we made lots of money during that 
time (24). 
 
Insurance companies were also withdrawing fully from advice and distribution and 
outsourcing to IFAs, driven by increasing bureaucratic and production costs, “originally, it 
was just the fund management that was outsourced. What you also saw in the mid-'90's, you 
began to see product manufacturers withdrawing completely from distribution. I think that 
was simply the fact that shareholders were waking up to the fact that these beasts of direct-
sales forces, they couldn't see how they could make money out of them. They were waking up 
to the fact they couldn't run effective distribution. So, they began to withdraw from 
distribution and so that began to get outsourced” (25) and another respondent associated the 
process with regulatory costs, “definitely the economics of running those businesses, then the 
first wave of regulatory scrutiny” (18).  
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By the early and mid-2000s, the process of de-commissioning existing IT systems began 
which, in turn, signalled the eventual end of the unit-linked and stakeholder personal pension 
product design. In its place saw the emergence of a ‘fund supermarket’ product architecture 
based upon an industry-standard fund architecture. In addition, with a pension simplification 
review52 announced by the regulator for completion in 2006, signalling an imperative for all 
incumbent firms to embrace a new era of ‘flexible’, transparent and modular product designs 
for the personal pensions market, and speed to market was again essential.   
 
With limited productive capabilities in ‘modular’ IT architectures, one motivation for 
insurance companies to license-in the fund supermarket architectures was timing - the 
momentum and volume growth in ‘fund supermarket’ designs between 2000 and 2005 was 
huge, largely driven by the recycling of existing personal pensions away from insurance 
companies and switched into more flexible and modular pension architectures, such as SIPP. 
The unit-linked mirror fund standards perpetuated by insurance companies were now seen as 
‘old-fashioned’, expensive and non-transparent. By comparison, with-profits as a concept 
was seen as a relative ‘dinosaur’ of another era. Being slow to adopt the new fund 
supermarket architecture, incumbent with-profits insurance companies also had some 
significant catching-up to do, “it was pretty much speed to market, because a lot of 
organisations misjudged what pension simplification would really mean. But I think as the 
market moved a lot of people realised that they were now 18 months behind a competitor and 
couldn't make up 18 months without actually buying in the technology” (7). Cost also played 
an important role, “it all depends on the cost. I think originally a lot of companies keep stuff 
in house because it was perceived to be cheaper. Then because of the rise in technology, and 
how other companies had embraced it, the life companies then realised that they can do it 
quicker and cheaper, so it’s a commercial decision, we can retain our profit and still get 
what we want but we just outsource it” (7).  
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 This was known as A-day, a pensions simplification date, whereby all existing pension rules were unified or 
͚staŶdardised͛ iŶto a siŶgle set of rules. A daǇ ǁas set for ϮϬϬϲ, ďut ǁas aŶŶouŶĐed as earlǇ as ϮϬϬϯ/ϰ 
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The intermediate market was also growing in terms of providers of complimentary product 
components beginning to converge around the fund supermarket architecture, “it was very 
much growing, the necessity of the open architecture, so you take the progression, you 
started with with-profits, you’ve then got unit linked insured funds which were effectively the 
insurance company going out to buy the underlying funds to offer to its customers. So that 
increased the supply base. Then I think we went to the ISA and SIPP world, it then exploded 
out again because actually those components were entirely interchangeable. And we were 
then in a position to offer everything, and actually what you very quickly saw was an 
explosion of a supplier base” (6).  
 
Another respondent recalled that “lots of suppliers saw it as an opportunity to get in on the 
pensions market, whatever you were supplying, whether it was software or funds, everyone 
wanted a bit of the value chain, and all it did was really was break up the value in there to 
lots of different bits. I think the supplier market was becoming competitive, as a provider 
you’ve now got a choice of suppliers and they’ve got to compete with each other, so, whether 
it was IT supplier or a fund provider, as a product manufacturer I now have a wider choice 
so they had to compete and their prices come down, and that reduced the risks. So, the fewer 
product manufacturers there are, the fewer suppliers there are, the less competition there is, 
the bigger that risk is, and prices change” (1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
174 
 
 
 
4.1.2.4 Mid-noughties to 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24: Firm template: mid—noughties to 201253 
By the mid-noughties, the ‘fund supermarket’ architecture had become a dominant design, 
and yet it was superseded by an IT platform systems architecture which arrived in the UK via 
the entry of a handful of systems architects primarily from Australia and New Zealand, where 
multi-product platform architectures were already dominant in home product markets. Owing 
to its open and modular design, insurance companies “pretty much just handed everything 
over” (9). This was because “running a core platform technology needs investment, and 
unless you're going to hire the developers, you're better to find them. We outsource a lot, and 
they spend billions of pounds in core operating infrastructure so scale and quality comes 
from outsourcing” (5).  
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 As also shown in tabular form in Table 25 (section 4.3.2.2) 
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The emergence of a new open and modular systems architecture established an efficient 
intermediate market, and incumbent insurance companies could leapfrog the fund 
supermarket architecture because “it costs us a lot of money to keep up with legislation and 
it's just not efficient anymore to make all of those changes in-house. We are not a specialist 
technology provider. You know, it makes more sense for us to use the likes of [organisations]  
where they're looking after four or five different providers. They make one change at one 
point. If they make the change once and, you know, we pay a fifth of it because we're splitting 
it between the five people who are using them, how can we compete with that if we're trying 
to do it all in-house?”(23).  
 
Efficiency considerations were also a significant motivation, “technology is really all about 
scale. The technology is scaled so quickly and that's the challenge. So technology creates 
massive scale and it creates massive winners and losers really quickly. But also there's going 
to be casualties there. So I think that greatly influences the level of suppliers” (5). As the new 
systems architecture embedded, the growth of complementary product and process 
components that could plug and play into it also explodes, “in terms of the component 
technology, we saw quite a lot of innovation in that space” (20). 
 
Furthermore, the use of modular and technology-enabled IT architectures meant that “it is 
operationally most cost effective for us to do it that way. We are writing a lot more business 
but driving more transactions online because of cost” (28) and “this was a period where 
everybody was going through lean and Six Sigma and everything and driving costs out of the 
organisation” (4) because “the fact that the with-profits and unit-linked period was well and 
truly over, but the organisations hadn’t actually slimmed down at this stage and now they 
were going through the pain of slimming down to get to the lower margins” (4) and “CEOs 
were saying “I’ve now got variable costs and less of a fixed expense company””(8) 
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Productive capabilities also played a role. Upstream firms in the intermediate markets had 
superior and specialised productive capabilities in modular and technology-enabled IT 
systems. For example, one respondent simply recalls “we absolutely did not have the 
expertise to build it. It was getting to the point where it was just not sustainable. This old 
culture of “we build everything”, actually things were changing so rapidly. Technology was 
changing and requirements were changing so rapidly, we just didn't have the expertise and it 
became a massive bottleneck” (30). Productive capabilities around the systems architecture 
created a significant challenge for incumbent insurance companies, as one example illustrates 
“we didn’t have a core competency around systems so we didn’t have a new world thinking 
in that type of technology. The strategy was we knew we wanted to be in the market, we knew 
we didn’t have a core competency around it. We knew it would be expensive to do it 
ourselves. Somebody else needs to do it for us, so let’s pick somebody who’s good at it (22).  
 
New modular and technology-enabled IT systems threw everything up in the air, and 
incumbent insurance companies and ‘fund supermarkets’ needed to make strategic decisions 
about what to outsource and what to retain insourced. As one respondent recalls “so I think 
dis-intermediation is definitely going on and there’s re-carving up of the value chain” (4). 
With many advice and distribution and fund components already outsourced in earlier time 
periods by the mid to late-2000s insurance companies had outsourced the core IT systems 
architecture to new-entrant IT platform systems architects as well, while seeking to retain 
within firm boundaries the service and process components that they believed offered some 
limited differentiation or competitive advantage, for example “the outsource is almost a 
given. We wanted to keep the customer experience, the front-end, we didn’t want to outsource 
that” (21), and “contact with new customers or current new business customers we’d like to 
keep within the organisation” (4).   
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Some gains were still appropriable through foregrounding the marketing and distribution of 
proprietary fund components54. So, while the fund and investment components were to a 
significant extent outsourced to hundreds of multiple upstream fund management groups and 
other providers, manufacturer/assembler firms had a commercial interest in directing 
consumers and IFAs towards its own proprietary fund components, “I mean clearly it's in our 
interest if they invest in our own funds. The margins can be very different” (28) and “the big 
life assurers, with their own funds in the products were getting revenue on the underlying 
fund in one part of the business and the product wrapper at the other side. And if you were 
lucky, both parts were making money. And if you were less lucky, the fund charge was 
probably covering a lot of the expenses overrun on the pension wrapper” (11).  
 
4.1.2.5 2012 onwards 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 25: Firm template: 2012 onwards55 
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 As also shown in tabular form in Table 27 (section 4.3.2.2) 
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As an open and modular product architecture became dominant by the late-noughties, 
manufacturer/assembler firms came under increasing commercial pressure to differentiate 
and seek competitive advantage – gains from trade were diminishing and many plc firms 
were under pressure from analysts and the investor community. In response to the known 
threats of commoditisation and imitation, most firms began to consider mechanisms to 
improve profits “how do you add more value back? Margins get squeezed so, so tight, that 
somebody in the value-chain's got to do something different (15) because “there's a footrace 
to the floor, which is clearly doing damage” (14) so that, “you can certainly see some of 
those companies taking back bits that they would think offer differentiation, even though that 
worked out fine with outsourcing, taking some of those back in house to try and find different 
levels of differentiation there” (5), and “It’s all commoditisation, it’s then difficult to have 
something that looks distinctive” (18). As such, “as platforms become bigger, the challenge 
is why outsource if you can do it internally?  Why pay the extra to somebody else? So there's 
a bit of a balance between getting the market standard, best of breed onto a platform versus 
can we do it in-house?” (10).  
 
In terms of which activities to insource within firm boundaries, different 
manufacturer/assembler firms seem to have different productive capability trade-offs, 
dependent upon the product component type. For example, one respondent suggested that 
“providers recognise there are things like commercial property. Some companies have now 
specialised in how they manage commercial property in pensions. We currently don't have 
the expertise, so we outsource it” 14). The respondent continued “we say we've got great 
customer service at the front end, but the back end it can be delivered by those companies 
that can run it and do it differently to what we do. What you're faced with is “can I do all 
things brilliantly?” Probably not. “Can I do all things brilliantly and efficiently?” Definitely 
not. So, you then have to pick and choose what you're good at. So then, you'd go, “we're 
really good at trading. What we're not great at is running property funds; or what we're not 
very good at is doing self-investing, or commercial property”. So, I buy that service in” (14). 
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Fund components were, again, perceived as one significant source of differentiation, 
competitive advantage and rent appropriation. While the fund architecture remained largely 
open and modular, manufacturer/assembler firms took significant steps to foreground their 
own in-house fund components, for example “having your own funds, you take a bigger 
margin” (24). They also created selective fund lists, including many in-house funds, and 
these lists were often integrated within the products in order to increase revenues, “where can 
we make extra money?” We've got our extra special funds, our elite range or whatever” (24). 
This gained “real impetus 3 or 4 years ago and coincided with a big increase of business for 
platforms, there was an expectation that they would become easier and cheaper and so 
what’s tended to happen is that margins in that area have been compressed, and one of the 
ways of the providers overcoming that down-squeeze in margins is to get more fund flow into 
their own in house funds” (2).  
 
The product components resourced within firm boundaries, however seem primarily 
associated with productive capabilities, “we insourced because we thought we would be 
better at it” (22), “so keep the stuff that you're good at in-house. And decide what you're not 
good at and stick it outdoors” (14), and “if they think that a particular process or component 
is where you get the majority of your margin, this might influence them on where you 
insource. But, yes there will be a capability issue there as well. Companies that have the 
investment capability behind them are naturally going to insource that and say ‘we can build 
our own risk rated portfolios; we have the expertise, so why wouldn’t we use that?’ 
Obviously, if you haven’t got that, but might have software capability, you might insource 
that side of things. (1). Furthermore, “what's been happening really is a lot of providers have 
realised the sort of things they outsourced originally, from about 2006 onwards, they realised 
that they could actually do that function themselves now. And now that companies have 
changed structures and the way they work, a lot of the stuff which was going outsourced is 
actually being brought back in house because it can be done for a cheaper unit cost. I think 
it's the mind-set in terms of providers now seem to be more happy to actually spend on 
infrastructure for the long term rather than trying to do the short-sharp fix” (7). 
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It also appears that productive capabilities have been strengthened in this period either 
through recruitment or through acquiring product component suppliers, one respondent 
recalls “We’ve built our capabilities and built out internal capabilities, rather than 
partnering. I think largely bringing people in from other businesses that have those 
capabilities, you’re piecing together the capability” (18) and “some brought investment 
firms; they just saw some benefits in buying investment capability. At the other end, some 
brought distribution back in very expensively. (16).  
 
4.1.3 Industry-level analysis 
4.1.3.1. Mid to late-1980s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 26: Industry template: mid to late-1980s56 
Product market stability characterised the industry at this time. In the mid-80s, the personal 
pensions product market was focused on professional investors and the self-employed. For 
instance “the market was quite small, so it was focussed usually on professional types” (8) 
and “I think there were quite a lot of people in the marketplace, but the volumes that were 
being sold weren't particularly high because the market was really confined to professionals 
and very few other people - self-employed effectively” (8).  
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 As also shown in tabular form in Table 19 (section 4.3.2.2) 
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The mid-80s saw the market entry of a number of new unit-linked insurance companies into 
the personal pensions product market, having used Executive Pensions from the mid to late-
70s as a thin end of the wedge, “so, I suppose [organisation] broke the mould. They were in 
executive pensions so they were a challenger-brand” (21). One of the key factors in entering 
the UK personal pensions product market at this particular time was the low capital 
requirements for unit-linked insurance companies, “we set up with capital of £60,000. That's 
all it took to set it up £60,000. Because there were no solvency regulations” (24).  
 
The deregulation of the personal pensions product market in 1988 plays a significant role in 
the timing of entry and the growth of unit-linked personal pensions. The then Conservative 
government played an active role in the promotion of modern personal pensions and 
‘contracting-out’ of the state pension scheme (SERPs). One respondent recalls, “in 1984, the 
legislation was first muted, but eventually in 1988 the personal pension was introduced. 
From the start was primarily unit-linked. The Conservative government didn't want to be 
involved with pensions. They were being crippled by the State pension as it was. So, they said 
this has got to be done by private industry and we'll just let it get on with it. And so they 
introduced the personal pension” (24). Another respondent recalled, “in 1988 we had the 
introduction of personal pensions. We had the Government advert “Breaking the Chains”. It 
was also said “get out of your defined-benefit schemes, because they're rubbish and you'll be 
able to understand personal pensions”. The context at the time was that there had been the 
“Big Bang”; the stock markets had just opened up to the public; people were buying shares, 
floatations and privatisations were king. And so, everybody was interested in making a fast 
buck on the stock exchange and the personal pension market effectively got behind that” (8). 
Or, as one respondent flippantly puts it “people were told ‘you need a personal pension, 
come out of your all-singing, all-dancing, defined benefit scheme, where you take none of the 
risk, where your employer takes all the risk, you have none of the downside, you’re gilt-edged 
pension with inflation-linking for the rest of your life, you don’t want that, you want a 
personal pension where you’re in control of it’. That’s what the Government said effectively. 
So, there were even TV campaigns about it and people suddenly had all the responsibility for 
picking funds and bore all the risks of poor performance” (9). 
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At the same time, the Conservative government was promoting the idea of opting-out of the 
State-Earnings Related Pension Scheme (SERPs). Under this initiative, consumers could 
transfer money built up inside the State pension scheme and transfer the whole amount into a 
personal pension, and invest it into the stock-market, as one respondent suggested “you have 
to remember a lot of them in the market got fired up by SERPs contracting out, so when the 
market was created, people bought products who wouldn’t have necessarily been in the 
financial services market beforehand” (26). To help ensure the personal pension product 
market took off, the Conservative government also offered tax incentives for contributions to 
a personal pension scheme, for example “tax relief at source, that was a huge swinger for 
many customers” (27). The government also opened up who could offer personal pensions 
because “up until 1988, the only people who were allowed to provide pensions were 
insurance companies.  Before 1988, nobody else was allowed to provide a pension. So there 
was a monopoly for insurance companies in the pension market” (25) 
 
The Financial Services Act 1986 also came into being on 1 July 1988. However, it “was 
unfortunate that at the moment personal pensions were introduced was also the moment 
when the Financial Services Act came into being. Again the Government didn't want to get 
itself sullied with regulation of financial services. So, the industry was going to organise how 
it was all going to be done. And they came up with the idea of self-regulation. And the rather 
naïve Conservative government swallowed it hook, line and sinker. But what that meant was 
that the industry captured the regulatory process and wrote it for its own benefit. It was 1998 
when it was implemented.  They hadn't put in place any monitoring at all. They didn't really 
know what they wanted to be monitored. So they ensured that all the regulation was biased” 
(24). Ultimately, the Financial Services Act 1986 regulated financial advice and distribution, 
with the result that “sales-forces started getting smaller and smaller and it went towards 
independents” (12).  
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The motivation for insurance companies to outsource to independents was that “a tied sales-
forces automatically carry risk. From that point of view, if you're selling as well as 
administering as well as running funds, you carry risk in all areas. Whereas, if you're just 
segmenting the value chain and just focussing on a key component, there's still money to be 
made by specialising in a certain part of that value chain” (27).  As the product architecture 
began to evolve towards a unit-linked design, there were also productive capability issues in 
distribution, “the tied guys were coming in trying to learn the basics of the new unit-linked 
pensions product.  I can remember quite a lot of pressure coming down from above to get 
those people through those tests so that they can you know...“no matter how you do it” to get 
them on the road, because there was money to be made from people selling these products!  
That's the kind of market it was in those days!” (8). However, “there was an awful lot of 
intermediaries that were previously direct sales, providing more sophisticated investment 
advice to customers. So the shift is starting to get into investments” (8). Ultimately, this shift 
had important implications for product design as, “if you've only got four funds, what's the 
IFA got to do? He can't really justify a greater income, if he can only actually recommend 
from four funds” (27). In other words, demand for variety from downstream IFA firms also 
played a role in fund component modularisation.  
 
As consumers were being urged by Government and the industry to take accountability and 
control for their own personal pension provision, “increasingly people were attracted to the 
idea of being responsible for their own futures and taking responsibility for their own 
financial affairs” (25). There was also a motivation from consumers to participate in the 
stock market, “every week there was a new IPO. But that was the mentality. There was an 
increasing interest in the population in being responsible for their own wealth management.  
And I think unit-linking was a reflection of that” (25). With-profits investments just didn’t 
offer the potential upside of unit-linked funds linked to the stock-market and “people didn't 
want to miss out on the upside” (26), and “stock markets sort of kept on going up and up and 
up.  So, they could sell on the basis of look at our equity funds – vroom!  Fantastic, and it was 
all going into unit-linked” (24).  
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4.1.3.2. Early to mid-1990s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 27: Industry factors: early to mid-1990s57 
Following deregulation in 1988, it was only a few years before a wave of pensions mis-
selling scandals hit the industry and continued for a decade or more, “ you had the advent of 
personal pensions in the late 80s, have your own personal pension, which then led to the mis-
selling scandals about five to seven years later” (9). In the personal pensions product market, 
there were “a lot of high commissions, a lot of scandals – people going to jail, it was a very 
cut-throat business” (12) and it was a scandal that “ultimately cost the industry, 50 billion 
pounds of compensation. Companies completely disappeared.  The compensation was so 
great that they just couldn't support it.  It was a terrible mess” (24) and “a lot of the sales 
people were villains basically” (4).  
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 As also shown in tabular form in Table 21 (section 4.3.2.2) 
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Pensions mis-selling was, therefore, one of the factors that led incumbent insurance 
companies to review the governance mode of advice and distribution and began at pace to 
outsource the activity. Pensions mis-selling was effectively “underpinning the growth of the 
IFA market. IFA's were directly accountable. So they were accountable for their own advice” 
(26). The emergence of IFAs was also facilitated by selection forces, “the market was 
evolving fast, I suppose more of the quality, top-end, direct-sales people, who historically 
could only go and recommend their own company’s product could see unit-linking evolving 
with products that were more attractive, but they couldn't sell it while they were employed by 
a with-profits company. So if they couldn't compete on options, they were being outsold by 
the increasing IFA market” (26).  
  
The pensions mis-selling scandal and changes to the governance mode of advice and 
distribution are ultimately associated with the fast rate of adoption of unit-linked product 
designs in the early to mid-90s such that traditional with-profit insurance companies 
“suddenly realised they needed to embrace it otherwise they could see market share 
disappearing” (26) because “unit-linking became a very significant part of the market 
relatively quickly” (25) and “the pendulum was swinging towards providers within the unit-
linked space, Growing very, very rapidly” (13). As the product market evolved towards unit-
linking at pace, the industry begins to horizontally consolidate, “so you certainly have the 
mergers going on in that place so there’s a fight for scale going on” (4) as “the smaller fish 
are losing out and the bigger fish are merging” (4). Some of the traditional insurance 
companies, however, “became casualties because of the trend in demand. So there was quite 
a lot of acquisition and takeover through that period. So, there was an awful lot of 
consolidation of the provider market place going on as some of the smaller players realised 
that they were never going to be able to compete by themselves” (26).  
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4.1.3.3. Mid-1990s to mid-noughties 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 28: Industry factors: mid-1990s to mid-noughties58 
 
By the mid to late-90s, there is continued growth in outsourcing advice and distribution - “the 
world had become more intermediated, people going to IFAs” (22). Part of the attractiveness 
of running an IFA business was the amount of commission being paid by insurance 
companies to influence sales in a growing market, “if you wanted to win business, you paid 
big sums of commission” (23) and “from a financial point of view, it probably started to 
become non-viable” (8). However, a brake was applied in 1997 when the regulator 
introduced ‘standards’ that all personal pension product charges and intermediary 
commissions had to be disclosed to consumers in a prescribed format known as a ‘quote’, 
‘projection’ or an ‘illustration’. The illustration had to use ‘standard’ growth rates to show 
what consumers might get back in the future, less all product charges and commissions. At an 
instant, the illustration revealed the extent to which charges and commissions reduced 
pension returns, forcing downward pressure on both. The emergence of league tables also 
reinforced downward momentum, “it wasn't until 97, when your projections had to reflect 
your product charges, that our quotes didn’t come out competitive at all. There was complete 
panic” (13). 
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 As also shown in tabular form in Table 23 (section 4.3.2.2) 
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With the pensions mis-selling scandal continuing and the new disclosure ‘standards’ biting, 
“commentators were saying: hold on a minute, the price is higher than it should be. That led 
on to stakeholder pensions. Give people choice, but protect the customer by limiting what the 
provider can actually charge” (10). Because the price cap on stakeholder pensions was 
deemed likely to reduce variety (as it did), the Government permitted insurance companies to 
continue to offer other types of personal pensions at a price higher than the stakeholder cap 
providing ‘RU64’59 rules were met. As a consequence, insurance companies and downstream 
IFA firms were attracted to SIPP as the product was deemed a ‘legitimate’ route to comply 
with RU64 requirements, permitting an almost unlimited range of investment options not 
available within stakeholder pensions. However, with continued downward pressure on 
margins, horizontal consolidation among incumbent insurance companies continued, as 
“there was increasing competition and therefore scale was becoming more and more 
important. You saw some big mergers” (25) and “there was quite a lot of consolidation and 
some of them were exiting. It's all to do with margin” (8).  
 
By 2000, the prevailing head winds for insurance companies came together to initiate the 
next evolution towards a ‘fund supermarket’ architecture. Upstream fund management groups 
began to forward integrate into product provision as new product opportunities emerged, but 
also as a defensive measure. One of the key reasons for forward integration by fund 
management groups into product provision was diminishing gains from specialisation; for 
example, “if you have a fund that's performing well and has a reputation and track record – 
happy days.  If you don't, unhappy days!” (17). The fund management groups also saw 
possible disintermediation risks, which were further compounded as soon as other fund 
management groups forward integrated into product provision. For instance, the fund 
management groups panicked and said: “oh my God, we're all going to be subject to [first 
mover organisations] whims and they're going to hoover up; we've got to defend ourselves”. 
So a group of them got together, there was six of them and they all put in a sixth and they 
said we'll build a fund supermarket too. And they had no idea how much it was going to cost 
them to do what they were doing but you know we've got to protect ourselves. It was initially 
purely a defensive step” (24).  
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 RU64 meant that any IFA recommending a non-stakeholder personal pension had to have legitimate 
reasons, but ͞with oŶe stroke of the peŶ, the Đost of peŶsioŶs pluŵŵeted͟ ;Ϯ4Ϳ. Reasons had to be based upon 
consumer need, ie, the need for investment options not available within a stakeholder personal pension 
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Forward integration also had a commercial logic, however, as one respondent suggests “so, 
originally, where you earned the money was each fund manager's happy selling their funds 
and just being best at it. So long as you had the best performing funds, but we all know that 
you might have the best sometimes, but not other times. So distributors were picking and 
choosing between you all. So if you could get into the product provider food-chain and create 
a platform for everybody to go through, then you could earn some money off that as well” 
(15). The fund management groups initially began offering ISAs in 1999. There was a race to 
acquire market share, “it was all a race, it was a case of we will have this out in weeks” (17). 
Some of the fund management groups capitalised on existing productive capabilities to enter 
the market quickly, “they had street-corner outlets in the US, where people would come in 
and would buy and sell funds. So, they had a system and they just brought the whole system 
over to the UK” (24). The new entrants “started from the basis of the ISA market and the 
investment market, attracting assets that might otherwise be going into with-profits. I think 
also those providers started to nibble at the life office in terms of offering other wrappers like 
the SIPP pension too” (6).  
 
Despite these shifts, many incumbent with-profits and unit-linked insurance companies were 
still slow to react to the fund supermarket architectural innovation, but slowly “there was a 
dawning realisation from the providers that in this possible future world maybe we’re not 
really needed” (4). The reason for slow adaptation may be associated with rent appropriation 
and the burden of legacy, “it was mainly down to cost and the implication. So, if you're to 
launch a brand new shiny thing, but you've got say one million people in legacy products, 
what are you going to do with those one million people? Those one million people are in high 
margin products. If you then shift those people, you run the risk of losing that profit. 
Basically, a lot of providers looked at the sheer cost and thought that you could be looking at 
a hundred million pounds spend and the payback period on that would be a very, very long 
time for a life company” (7).  
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4.1.3.4. Mid-noughties to 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 29: Industry factors: mid-noughties to 201260 
The bringing together of ISAs and SIPPs into a multi-product platform architecture is 
primarily associated with pensions simplification regime (‘A-day’) in 2006. The intention of 
A-day was to unify the tangled range of pension rules since the 1950s into a single set of 
‘standards’. The unification of rules was seized upon by the industry as an opportunity to 
promote the consolidation of a vast range of existing legacy pension products into a single 
‘industry standard’ product type under a single set of rules, and SIPP was positioned as that 
product, owing to its modular properties and wider permitted investment rules.   
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A-day, therefore, was cast as an opportunity for pension consolidation, and this initiated a 
vast movement of legacy pensions away from incumbent insurance companies and towards 
new entrants with multi-product platform technologies. For instance, “A-day in 2006 was 
another big catalyst. Suddenly the barriers to entry are removed, as getting regulated as a 
SIPP provider has a lot lower capital adequacy requirements than insurance companies, and 
that blew open the market at that point, and you started to see platforms gain traction from a 
standing start in c2003/4 to where by the end of decade pretty much all pensions business 
was being written on an open architecture platform product” (21). A-day ultimately forced 
incumbent insurance companies to react quickly and adopt the new platform systems 
architecture, as one respondent points out “from A-Day, it was such a massive change to the 
market. They had to do something or they would go out of business. You had this massive 
bubble of consolidation business at A-day that forced people to do something or you died” 
(9).  
 
By unlocking access to hundreds of billions of legacy pensions, the volumes available to new 
manufacturer/assembler firms meant that downward pressure on margin continued and 
volume and market share were king, “when stakeholder came along it was a 1% world and 
it’s a 0.5% world now. When you did all the maths in current new business world, the only 
way it’s really going to work is six scale players, it can’t be more than six because they won’t 
get enough volume to actually get on the scale (4) and this “shifts the mind set towards scale 
so when you’re looking at scale and you’re looking at technology that will charge you on the 
basis of benefitting from that scale” (20).  
 
A-day signalled the entry of a number of new manufacturer/assembler firms, as well as 
systems architects with existing platform technologies bought into the UK primarily from 
Australia and New Zealand. This fast-changing environment increased the level of 
competition in all layers of the value chain. For instance, “competition is getting stronger 
even though there are probably 30 platforms now, because the market was growing, there is 
enough capacity at the moment for them” (3) and “what happened was we saw a 
proliferation of new entrants who are very small which have dragged the existing incumbents 
to change their businesses and to adopt those models in order to survive” (25).  
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The effect on rents is well summed up by one respondent “the platform space was very 
profitable thank you very much indeed. In came the fund supermarkets in 2000 – not 
profitable anymore. So, you basically tried to hang on. And we had more volume than other 
people so, we could squeeze suppliers harder, so we could still make enough money provided 
we could keep the overall volumes up but certainly, it wasn't like the game before. But then 
people kept on coming. Product platforms then came in. All the time chipping away at your 
underlying margins until now you know, you need £50 billion under management before you 
can make any money. So they were looking at other ways – how would you make money out 
of this?” (24).  
 
The bases of competition began to shift also. Price was important to secure volume and 
market share, however “technology reduced the barriers to entry significantly, and it also 
reduced the basis of competition, or changed it, where it was only once the big life companies 
and fund managers who could afford a platform to one where you can effectively get a bit of 
technology that you license, and then you can take it where you like. And, so I think that in 
this period it has greatly increased the number of competitors and has effectively created a 
market that didn’t previously exist” (20).  
 
Platform systems architects entered the market around 2005/6 with platform architectures that 
had “common components and platforms from Australia to the UK market but day one it was 
running in ready-to-go. A very obvious example is of the open architecture funds. So that was 
the expectation in the Australian market” (3) and “some influential people and influential 
firms that came into the market from Australia and New Zealand, who were champions and 
who led the change as well. So, trailblazers, early adopters and new entrants into the market 
who wanted to break down this really profitable market; let’s knock those barriers down and 
come in with something world beating to get some of the action” (22). As one respondent 
observed, “it’s a natural extension once they've kind of done it in their home market they will 
look for industries with similar rules, similar types, similar markets to try and play there” 
(23).  
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4.1.3.5. 2012-2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 30: Industry factors: 2012-201461 
The implementation of RDR in 2012 continued to influence the industry and value chain 
dynamics such as division of surplus. With a ban now in place on IFA commission, the 
direction of travel for IFAs was to shift to serving mass affluent and higher net worth 
consumers who were more able to pay fees, as one respondent points out “with the end of 
commission, I think the IFA market will continue its journey to higher wealth” (3) and “for 
IFAs, their margins are being squeezed as well, they can’t take commission, only a fee. And, 
they’ve got to be very transparent, bring their fees down, and people don’t want to pay as 
much as they were paying through commission – but didn’t know. So, the amount of time they 
can spend advising for a small fee is now lower, so it’s a time issue” (1). 
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Another factor that is associated with IFAs moving ‘up-market’ comes from the Group 
Pension product market. Auto-enrolment 62came in 2012 and compels an employer to enrol 
employees in a group pension scheme, subject to certain rules. This significantly limited the 
size of the personal pensions product market, for example “we see the demise of the personal 
pension with auto-enrolment. But you definitely see a blur of the individual market with the 
corporate market, because if anybody's an employee, you're going to get auto-enrolled into a 
pension scheme. So that almost makes the individual personal pension redundant now. I 
mean the volumes, they were starting to fall off a cliff” (8). As one respondent suggested “is 
that not equal to stakeholder with compulsion?” (13). For manufacturer/assembler firms, 
auto-enrolment has commercial consequences because “we're now looking at a much more 
commoditised market again. A lot more people are going to have pensions because of auto-
enrolment. But a lot of them are going to be putting very little into them. So again, it's like 
stakeholder and the problems of stakeholder because you've got even smaller fund amounts 
and you've got even more people. So it just drives the financials even further in the direction 
of get as big a slice of this market as we possibly can, and do it with as small a cost base as 
we can” (8) and “I mean we make a small margin on massive amounts of money under 
management” (24). 
 
As a result, “platform providers are trying to dig out a niche for themselves to make some 
money because they're being squeezed. I mean everybody is being squeezed. We're going 
through the pain now. The gain will come to an end when the number of providers has shrunk 
down” (24). The open and modular product design is associated with the squeeze on margin 
“where you can pick any component you want, from a customer perspective that makes sense, 
but for the players in the industry it is hard to work out that if we give the consumer this 
much control, where do we make our money?” (20) and “I suppose added value is what it 
comes down to. You can't add value if all you do is allow access to everything under the sun.  
You can add value if you can give them something that you've created, which is value to you 
and the customer” (15).  
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 Auto-enrolment came in 2012, and enforces employers to fund a pension for all of their employees which is 
likely to reduce the size of the UK personal pensions product market 
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The issue is summed up by one respondent “there doesn't need to be lots and lots of 
platforms if all that they're doing is aggregating external funds and components. Because one 
pension now looks just like another and they're all priced maybe at nil or very low cost. It's a 
product of convenience. And product provision is no longer a value-add to the customer.  
Investment advice and the outcome is a value-add for the customer” (10).  
 
Upstream fund management was also getting squeezed. As one respondent highlights, “I 
think the fund management segment is getting massively squeezed and there’s a price war 
going on. They just keep chopping down, step by step by step” (21). The squeeze is also 
compounded by the manufacturer/assembler firms squeezing fund management groups ex-
post for a position within ‘selected fund lists’, “we're certainly seeing the fund managers 
being squeezed very hard by the platform providers. So they're going to the fund managers 
and saying: “I know we allow you to keep 75 basis points on that lot, if you want to come in 
this one, you can only have 40”. And the fund managers are saying: “well, it's better to have 
40 on this big pot rather than 75 basis points on bugger all”.  So they're complying with that 
but they are feeling the pain” (24).  
The IT platform systems architects have also seen margins under pressure. As one respondent 
suggests “the number of IT and admin providers is reducing. One or two of them have had to 
pull out. [Organisation]  now runs the systems for four or five firms. [Organisation]  are also 
running three or four. Still margins are very small and you've got to have enough scale to 
make it work. So it’s a bit like the Hewlett Packard model, that is you sell a printer below 
cost and then you rip people off on the cartridges. So that's what they're doing, they're selling 
the system at the price that's dictated by the market because they have no control over the 
price at all.  They sell at the market price and then they try and entice you with proprietary 
add-ons” (24).  
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The compelling need for differentiation and competitive advantage has led to “firms pulling 
back particularly as there's been pressure on price, I think some of those bells and whistles 
have been dispensed with. The drivers, there is one around the commercials of it, particularly 
as you go to open architecture, the actual operation of the platform gets commoditised and 
it's where can we add value?  And one of those is to actually manage investments on behalf of 
the customer and charge them a fee for doing that.  Even if what you're doing is managing 
other people's funds. So it is a reversion back, but it's back to a different version of what was 
there before” (19). 
 
This has led to manufacturer/assembler firms offering simplified bundles of product 
components, but within an open and modular systems framework, as one respondent pointed 
out “I suppose look at auto-enrolment, you're back to a simple personal pension where 
people who are looking at what's put in front of them and I suppose relying on the people 
who either advising the employer or their employer to have made the right decisions for 
them” (28). Therefore, following RDR there has been a convergence towards simpler and 
integrated bundles of product components, but within the context of an open architecture 
framework.   
 
The value chain also began to reconfigure into ‘power blocks’ to try to mitigate against 
diminishing rents and gains from trade, as “firms are wanting to self-restrict themselves, and 
suppliers are keen to support that happening too” (6). The respondent continued “there are 
power blocks in the market, quasi-vertically integrated through technology and other 
relationships. So what you end up with is large power blocks. They’re not as integrated as 
the old provider ones, but they’re still big power blocks going against each other with the 
platform at the core of it. The heritage of those power blocks will vary depending on the 
platform they stand on. So what you are seeing in the market is the platform providers 
increasingly in concert with the fund groups to build out those power blocks” (6).  
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The product market has also started to integrate both horizontally and vertically. For 
example, “there were new firms that came up through the late noughties that were, by 2012, 
consolidating with more mature players” (11). Horizontal consolidation was occurring at all 
levels of the value chain. For example, in fund management “fund-management groups with 
history were gobbling up newer fund groups to bring their expertise in to widen their own 
product set” (11) and “we see more of a shake out as RDR pushes down the prices and we 
will see a move towards more super-fund groups. It's certainly created a shift in terms of 
where the value is and the fact that the fund management is commoditised in some ways” 
(19).  
 
In the downstream distribution and advice layer of the value chain (ie, IFAs), consolidation 
was also evident because “at the advisor level, there was chaos in the market. Post-2008, you 
had the big IFA networks going broke. You had the emergence of new networks driven by the 
same people that sold the last ones just before they went broke. You look back where we are 
now and look back five years, the market looked very different. So you absolutely had 
consolidation across all different elements in the market and that all meant huge tightening of 
margins. So nobody was winning at that point” (11) and “you’re seeing IFA consolidators 
coming in. And, the advice-side becoming less fragmented” (21).  
 
In complementary product components, horizontal consolidation also took root, “a classic 
example would be [organisations]  purchased by an Australian company called 
[organisation] , so they were a big software management organisation in Australia, they 
bought them along with some other sort of peripheral bits of software that are all aimed at an 
intermediary perspective; but their strategy is very much ‘we want to get a market-leading 
component in all these different areas”.(20) 
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Interestingly, the manufacturer/assembler layer of the value chain seems currently immune 
from horizontal consolidation “you're not seeing it at the moment in terms of existing 
platforms” (17), perhaps because “some of the platforms decided they know exactly what they 
are, and they’re going to stick to being what they are, and some of them have been profitable 
as a result. I think it’s because they stick to their knitting; that has enabled them to focus on 
key profit drivers and, therefore, have managed to drive and derive some profit. Some of the 
larger ones have tried to do too much and are still to get to the point of scale, where they’re 
covering fixed costs (16). One respondent, however, looked into a crystal ball and suggested 
that “but the statistics say that we're unlikely to have 35 or 37 platform providers in three 
years, because there isn't enough money to make it sustainable. I reckon there could be about 
ten” (14) 
 
Forward and backward vertical integration has also begun to be a characteristic of the product 
market since RDR in 2012. For example, manufacturer/assembler firms forward integrating 
into advice and distribution again, “a quasi-arms-length solution where the providers were 
taking more and more significant financial stakes in the advisory businesses. And were using 
those stakes to provide additional distribution” (11) and manufacturer/assembler firms are 
“buying IFA's and wealth managers at the moment” (17). One respondent sums up the logic 
“for guidance and advice, we bought an advisor. So we now have our own advice capability 
in house, which we've now fully integrated, and rebranded. We wanted to do more in 
retirement for people who need help and advice as a lot of them won't be able to get it from a 
financial advisor” (19).  
Manufacturer/assembler firms were also backward integrating into complementary product 
component suppliers to buy-in specialist productive capabilities, such as “we bought a 
stockbroking business. I think in terms of development of products now, it's all about actually 
being very close to how the things behave” (17), “[organisation] bought a front office 
portfolio management and reporting solution that sits in front of platforms; can take in 
standardised data feeds from other areas and give you aggregated reporting and portfolio 
construction, which is much richer than a platform can do” (29) and “one of the big 
platforms recently has purchased a commercial property supplier and platforms have 
purchased organisations that do portfolio management construction (2).  
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There is also evidence of downstream IFAs backward integrating into the product provision 
and fund management. For example, “an intermediary business that brought a SIPP 
manufacturing business, and then also brought other intermediary businesses that had SIPP 
clients, so buy the skill or the capability that you don’t have, and then buy others that then 
give you the scale, to grow that capability” (16) and “[Organisation] has an investment 
management division that runs funds, they have a master trust, they have the product 
wrapper. And if you look at the value chain, they own the client relationship, they put them 
into a product where there’s product manufacturing margin. They invest them in funds where 
there’s investment manufacturing margin and, for certain types of individual members 
underneath that, individual wealth management services that they own. You know, they 
manufacturer a lot of their own product, and build their own investment capability. These 
firms, you could look at them and say, “Are they actually an intermediary? Or are they a 
provider? Or are they a bit of both?” (16). 
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4.2 RQ2: To what extent are the design characteristics of product architecture 
associated with the design characteristics of firm and/or industry architecture? 
 
4.2.1 Mid to late-1980s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 31: Correspondence: mid to late-1980s63 
 
In the mid-1980s, firm boundaries were characterised by vertical integration. Product 
development teams were co-located, for instance “the way the trend was going was to base 
the product development people with the IT people, so when you did the project you went and 
worked in the IT area with the project to have everybody in the same room so that when the 
IT programmer got stuck, if the analyst couldn’t answer the question, someone was there to 
answer the question that day rather than, “Oh let’s see, I’m seeing him next Wednesday let’s 
find out the answer then” (4). Product development was, therefore, a multi-discipline 
approach, “development was done by multi-disciplinary teams within the firm so you'd have 
an actuary; you'd have a marketing person; you'd have an IT person; you'd have a finance 
person. And they were all sitting in the same building” (3).  
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The co-location of product development teams may, in part, be associated with the smaller 
size of firms, “companies were just smaller, so the idea that everybody knew everything is 
more likely to be true” (3). One respondent recalled that in some cases functional specialisms 
were geographically-separated, but only ever by a short distance, “mainly they were 
geographically very close to one another. I can remember the company I worked for had an 
office in Croydon and then they had their IT team in London. And they used to talk about it as 
if it was at the other end of the universe. And actually, it was about ten minutes down the 
road! And even then it was a sort of a “them and us” kind of culture was created” (8).  
 
Despite multi-disciplinary product development teams, there were very few, if any, project 
managers, “I don't recall there being project managers” (8), or product managers “I 
wouldn’t say there was anyone who sat across all of it and said “well, actually, I own the 
proposition, I want pricing to be this, I want investment content to be this”. So, it was quite 
difficult to work all that together because there was no-one person who bought it together” 
(1), and later by the very early 90s “because so many disasters occurred with that structure, 
a kind of middle group of product developers seemed to be created” (8).  
 
In the meantime, the product development process was led by the actuarial product 
development function, “product development was very Actuarial led” (3) and if “you were 
looking around to see who was doing sort of job it would have been 99% actuarial, and a 
very small number of people” (8). This led to a very linear product development process, for 
example “so standard waterfall, do X, once you’ve done X you do Y, once you’ve done Y you 
do Z, if Z doesn’t quite work you go back to X or you go back to the point, in the chain, where 
it broke and go back and fix it. So very functional and linear, in its approach” (16).   
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High-levels of information-sharing were common within the actuarial product development 
team, but information-sharing between them and wider functional teams was characterised as 
low, “actuarial would determine the rights and wrongs of product evolution and the features 
that were offered. Little involvement from marketing and sales. Little involvement from 
customer services – they were there to do their support function” (27) and “it's usually the 
actuaries that come up with an idea and they usually specify it. Then it goes out to a team 
with input from admin, marketing, compliance, legal, all commenting on whether that will 
work. So the admin people will say: “well that charging structure won't work because our 
systems can't cope with it” (12). As one respondent recalls “that's the odd mismatch. You've 
got a product where every piece affects every other piece.  The actuarial team might not talk 
to the finance team or any team. And it will take them a very long time to suggest something 
and an even longer time for somebody to realise that it's happened” (15). As a consequence, 
“then what comes out the other end is completely different to what we started with.  There 
was quite a lot of concern about IT developments taking a phenomenal amount of time and 
having lots of problems at the end anyway” (4) 
 
As fund components started to be modularised, there is an association with the loose-coupling 
of the fund development team, for instance “there was the investment component that would 
have been in a different site within the same company” (1). The late-80s also witnesses the 
early emergence of a ‘product owner’ role, to bring together and coordinate the various 
component parts of the product architecture, for instance, “you had now product owners who 
understood the product, then there were teams of investment people who understood 
investment content, and finance people who understood the pricing, and they all had 
accountability for their own bits really” (14).  
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4.2.2 Early to mid-1990s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 32: Correspondence: early to mid-1990s64 
 
As advice and distribution and fund components were modularised, the respective task and 
knowledge boundaries are also partitioned. In addition, functional specialisms such as 
customer services begin to be modularised “all the customer services was done in particular 
teams, all the marketing in done in a particular area, actuaries, in one place, it had become 
quite componentised and not only for pensions, for all products” (3) and “it was 
functionalised and we spent a lot of time on what we call, meta processes, the money out 
process, a death claim process, and it really didn’t matter which product you had” (11). 
 
However, loose-coupling of product components, tasks and knowledge was not associated 
with geographical distance or outsourcing. For example, one respondent recalls that while the 
fund development team had a separate structure, “your investments team would have been a 
lot closer, if not in the same building in some cases” (23), and where geographical separation 
occurred it was usually along functional lines and within the same town or city, for instance 
“many of the teams had been segmenting by business structure and they typically wouldn't be 
co-located. They might be co-located within the same city, same town though” (27). 
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The product owner role, however, began to be more dominant in many firms, and they 
oversaw “the ownership of the product development area and the drive of making it happen” 
(4). A product owner was needed to coordinate and orchestrate activities because “it was 
Chinese whispers. We had a product team who put the product together, and it goes from 
component to component until it gets out in the market, and if you don’t understand the whole 
process, and it goes wrong, you need to know which component team dealt with it and who 
understands it” (1). 
 
4.2.3 Mid-1990s to mid-noughties 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 33: Correspondence: mid-1990s to mid-noughties65 
 
By the mid to late-90s as product design evolved towards hybridity, the partitioning of the 
product development structure – and hence task and knowledge structure - began to shift in a 
number of ways. For example, many firms began to develop more formalised proposition 
development teams with a ‘proposition owner’ for each product type, encompassing 
developers across different functional areas, “so, you had a product development team 
responsible for the product. So they would do a lot of the architectural level” (7).  
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Proposition owners (or systems integrators) controlled the architecture, and were “very 
unified teams, often in one location where they wouldn’t have broken up” (18) and “there 
would have been probably one team designing the product architecture” (23), because the 
nature of the product market was such that “a lot of the competition was on the features of the 
product, almost the way the product worked” (23).  The proposition owner had “big teams 
that did everything from design the product, associated services, and then you had the 
teccies, designed the sort of technical aspects of the product” (21). Co-location remained a 
dominant feature of the proposition development teams, “so people that knew each other 
well, we were all on the same floor. We all sat together, worked together (17), “it was in the 
same building, same location, always geographically co-located” (6), and “if you were 
working on a new thing, everybody would go and sit in one location” (28).  
 
The emergence of a proposition owner that co-ordinates product design is associated with the 
emergence of a componentisation of the firm architecture that corresponds to product 
architecture, for instance “if you wanted more funds added, you would outsource that to the 
existing funds team and they would see what could be done. And then the actual adding those 
funds would be outsourced internally to the architectural IT people” (7). In addition, 
functional component teams were partitioned to offer specialised expertise, “we pulled out 
the service component, and that was done as a cross-functional piece, so you could have 
common service teams across different propositions. They became very independent and very 
geographically dispersed” (6).  
 
Furthermore, other component development teams started to become geographically-distant, 
“you see things start being broken out, so the investment people moving away from the other 
bits, centres of excellence around different parts and processes. So an administration centre 
being up and an actuarial centre being set up” (18), or “if you want good quality fund 
managers, you have to be in London, so you end up having a geographical separation” (15). 
Where product components were outsourced, “fund providers always been a separate team, 
and they have always worked very closely but are in a totally separate location” (23) and 
“once you were using suppliers, outsourcing components, so you’re bound to get a 
geographical change” (1).   
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Despite the partitioning of the firm architecture into a proposition development team and 
loosely-coupled product and process component teams, information-sharing between 
component development teams and the proposition owner was high, for instance, “a lot of 
close communication because the product teams and component teams to resolve issues (6). 
Where the product component was outsourced, high-levels of information-sharing were also 
maintained ex-ante and ex-post, such that “in the early days of using component suppliers it 
was one of the difficult things, setting them up, and then you also had to set up that 
communication process and sharing of information throughout” (1). 
 
In other words “it moved to a point where we wanted to have a small number of people who 
had to have a good level of understanding of everything, and within there you would have 
component teams who specialised. So, more component teams, more wide spread because 
some are external, but internally you needed a better knowledge about how those components 
worked and fitted together” (1).  
 
By the early to mid-noughties, with the evolution to a fund supermarket product architecture, 
many manufacturer/assembler firms seized upon this as an opportunity to establish a separate 
business unit structure (SBUs), partitioned into a component structure, and coordinated by a 
systems integration function, “so we weren’t building from within the existing infrastructure, 
if you looked at the proposition, it was divided into the components, so we had a product 
architecture team, an investment proposition team, and a software team, and I had dotted 
line report into me from the admin guys” (21). Moreover, “the product had a proposition 
team within the firm who grew to understand all the different components on offer, but then 
of course, you were also dealing with not just the internal component people, you’re dealing 
with component people outside, we were dealing with fund management people all over 
London, we were dealing with IT platform suppliers all over the country. It was like a jigsaw 
puzzle. You had all these pieces that were all over the place, and all had a part to play, but 
someone needed how to fit them all together to make a coherent proposition to the market 
(1).  
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Systems integration, however, created challenges around information-sharing and there seem 
to be a number of different ways this was overcome. In some cases there were “lots of face-
to-face meetings, telephone conferences” (7). However, the emergence of internet-enabled 
technology in the late-90s made information-sharing among geographically-dispersed actors 
more possible, for instance, “you can share information, you can communicate a lot better 
than you could in the 80s, for example by using collaboration software. You don’t have to 
meet somebody” (1). In some cases, external firms were bought together to work on co-
development projects, “from time to time we might do a project, where designers and 
representatives would come in and work with us” (28). However, another model was a 
‘relationship interface’, where “there was typically a single point of contact from each firm 
that communicated together as a team” (25). However, as some product components became 
more modularised, ex-ante information-sharing replaced the need for high amounts of ex-post 
information-sharing, “the communication became more co-defined up-front, so it wasn’t 
required as much thereafter” (6).   
 
4.2.4. Mid-noughties to 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 34: Correspondence: mid-noughties to 201266 
 
                                                          
66
 As also shown in tabular form in Table 26 (section 4.3.2.2) 
 
207 
 
 
 
 
 
A firm architecture characterised by a systems integration team and loosely-coupled 
component development was not without issues and problems. As one respondent recalls 
“Projects created all sorts of problems. They had a pension team, they had a team that were 
looking at customer journey, web look and feel and all that, they had a team for pricing and 
so on, and the trouble was that these teams worked in verticals having agreed a certain 
standard, the trouble was when you came to end to join back up again, it didn’t quite join 
back up again very well. So, you found actually, we didn’t think of that, and that doesn’t now 
work on the customer journey or whatever, and we effectively had to re-work and undo, 
backwards in those verticals to join back up again” (21). In other words, ex-ante 
information-sharing to agree standards failed to eliminate all ex-post interdependencies.  
 
As the product was now effectively a ‘component’ of a platform architecture, a platform 
systems integration function emerged. Product-level systems integration teams continued to 
exist, but reduced substantially in size. What emerged was a platform systems integration 
team that focused on coordinating and integrating the various platform components into a 
coherent whole, as one respondent explains “what you saw is the advent of the idea of the 
platform during this period. So what the platform team was all about was integrating 
products together, so you retained the product team, typically they got smaller and more 
specialist in their focus” (6) and “so the platform team then effectively brought together the 
components. So the platform team would have a very close relationship with product teams, 
but the platform team would agree a common user interface so the platform teams then start 
to work with other product teams to create a common set of tools. I suppose what’s happened 
is this platform team structure emerged and that became the actor in the process that brought 
it all together. So what happens is the platform team built up its own capability, and actually 
the products were almost quite transactionally handed over to the platform team and they just 
put them together. And then again, the investment teams handed over their components so 
they were all kind linked together” (6). In other words, the systems integration role evolved 
to the higher hierarchal level of the platform, and the propositions team became a 
‘component’ of the platform team.    
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As the platform architecture was multi-product, few developers had knowledge that ranged 
across the entire platform architecture and so “they become 'Jack of all trades'. They know 
quite a bit about technology. They're prepared to accept that they usually don't know what 
they need to know about the new thing they're working on because it will always be in a 
slightly different area to the one that they're working on. And they're very good at building 
solution designs and sometimes almost architectural solution designs, so that they can work 
out, usually with help from IT architects, but usually having to drive things, so we've got that 
component and that component and that component; we're missing something here to do this 
new job and we need to find something to do that, so their job is to then use expertise that's in 
the business to try and get to the right third-party supplier. And not always to accept that the 
one that is in-house is the right one” (8). 
Task partitioning seems to depend upon the coupling characteristics of the product or service 
component. For example, product component teams had “ownership and accountability for 
delivering different strands of that proposition, you know whether it be commercial proper ty 
team or the drawdown team” (29) and “we also used people in the funds team who thought 
about what new funds we wanted, pricing team who were doing pricing”(22). Moreover, 
where a product component could be characterised as loosely-coupled, many firms shared 
information ex-ante in order to agree standards, and then reverted to a low-level of ex-post 
information-sharing, for example, “if it is complex, it is very difficult to specify. You don’t 
know where you’re heading until you’re on the journey and an agile form of development 
lends itself well to platforms – it requires you to co-locate or at least collaborate, however if 
it’s a pure waterfall type of development approach, and it’s absolutely specified, you’ve 
agreed standards, and at a massive level of detail, you can avoid it” (21). However, as the 
platform architecture was complex, often high-levels of information-sharing and co-location 
were maintained throughout an agile product development methodology, “it's more co-
creation and working with colleagues in the business and where you have third parties 
working in a more collaborative way” (28).  
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There also seems to be an association between co-location or geographical distance and the 
complexity and ambiguity of the development, for instance, “I think it really depends on the 
nature and the scale of the project” (28) and the “colocation partnering model, where quality 
and speed are important works really well, particularly in an ambiguous environment, in a 
market that we think something needs to look like this. You think you know what you want to 
achieve, and somebody might have come to you with a kernel of an idea, but you actually 
don’t really know, when you take it to market, exactly what it’s going to look like and that’s, 
for me, been a critical driver, in what works well. If you try and run that type of build, 
without doing an element of skill-sharing and knowledge sharing, it won’t work. If you’re 
building new capability that might break new ground in a market, you would look to 
collocate” (16). 
 
Temporary co-development and co-location is a dominant innovation mode, as one 
respondent recalls “the team is constructed so it's more relationship management with third-
party providers including fund providers and technology providers. And they are almost like 
the core team” (7) and “it's co-location and it's lots of communication, we will have people 
in our team who have very strong relationships with you know some people on the component 
side and they'll have specialist relationship managers for us.  But it is co-located.  We have 
people who go and sit in with them and we have people from there come and sit with us. We 
have people who have very strong relationships between the two” (23). Advantages of co-
location and high-levels of communication were “good ways to communicate and be co-
located for developments so you can knock down issues” (22), as well as stimulating new 
innovation “because what you find is that when you get clever people together just sitting 
over a coffee having a chat, they fire off new ideas and create brand new innovation out of 
nothing. Things that none of them as individuals would ever have come up with. I think that 
there is definitely a 2+2 = 5 effectively to get people in the same place” (21).  
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The decision as to whether to co-locate with external firms or remain geographically-distance 
was often based on the differentiation potential of the component innovation, such as “you 
can collocate or not co-locate for the simple stuff. If it’s a very clearly defined task that you 
know, for example, the messaging standard for contract enquiry, go and do it, they can be 
sitting in Xatmandu as far as I’m concerned, it doesn’t matter. But, when you’re not quite 
sure, and part of the process is creating a differentiated solution, the more you develop things 
jointly, the more you need to be in the same place” (21) and “when standardised, we cut 
them loose, they go off and do what you’ve asked them to do. We give you a mandate to do 
this, in this way. This is what we want the outcome to be. There would be much more 
oversight, ownership and co-development if the component offered differentiation”(9). As 
one respondent summed up, “I think where we want there to be a differentiating factor, we 
will work very closely with suppliers, the component that we've outsourced, given that it's 
probably a) important to us and b) the component knowledge is a separate skill to the core 
product knowledge. We have then build up a team to specifically look after that component, 
from our side, in terms of thinking about the innovation of that component, even if it's 
someone else who actually goes and builds it” (11).  
 
Conversely, where the component was low-value and standard, “I think it's potentially the 
sort of simplicity of the components and maybe just how much of it was outsourced. So, the 
illustrations, was just outsourced everything. And we probably don't particularly want it to be 
a differentiator.  And so it doesn't get a whole lot of focus from the product side of things. It's 
almost something we have to have whereas technology, we do want that to differentiate us, 
because it's not one of the big differentiating factors in the market” (23) and, “if you can 
clearly define something, then who you select to build with is quite straightforward, it’s about 
capability, at the right price, on time” (16). 
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4.2.5. 2012 to 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 35: Correspondence: 2012 to 201467 
 
By 2012, many manufacturer/assembler firms have adopted a quasi-autonomous SBU 
structure that is “radically smaller than we’ve ever been as we’d lost sight of the customer 
and the value chain. So when we actually reorganise our business around our value chains, 
actually we dismantle all the big combined teams that did a little bit of everything so we 
found that efficiencies by separating out” (3), and another respondent points out that “I think 
now you bring in an SME model” (14) so that “we are at a point where you have a team who 
owned all the pieces of the jigsaw. They were then deciding which of these components do we 
go externally for, and which internally for. They are probably brining back in house some of 
the components so geographically it brings people closer together again” (1), although there 
remains a high degree of task and knowledge partitioning “you'd have somebody that would, 
let's say, specialise in the financial planning arm, somebody specialising in pension 
legislation; somebody that might specialise in investments and build up from there (14).   
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Levels of information-sharing, both within- and across firm boundaries, appears to be 
associated with setting standards or ex-ante design requirements, such as “having defined 
those basics, you can then disperse the team but you still need to regroup regularly to make 
sure that you continue to understand each other with an ongoing dialogue” (27), “so even 
though there are industry standards, it’s easier to communicate externally anyway and its 
even easier if you can bring it in house, but in terms of the flow of information, it makes it all 
easier as its back in house” (1) and “fund groups obviously work at a distance but I think the 
need to manage relationships with them has grown over time. The actual fund managers are 
locationally quite distant but there is an on-going dialogue between them and across them as 
well, because you want lots of commonality, you’re dealing with hundreds of them and want 
to deal with hundreds of them in the same way” (6) 
Geographical distance is a common mode for loosely-coupled and perceived low-value add 
product components, “where it just works, say, a new third-party software provider and they 
want to take valuation data out of our pensions business, we gave them a manual and said 
‘just do it, kind of thing” (20). However, there does, however, appear to be an increase in 
information-sharing ex-post where the product component offers the potential for 
differentiation and competitive advantage. For example, internally-designed fund 
components, “the internal investment capability offers differentiation, and the information 
flows have got much stronger (6) and “the software suppliers, those relationships began in a 
transactional way, but we realised there’s actually a lot of intellectual property with those 
suppliers that we need to tap into. So the relationship has become a lot closer, to the extent 
that in many cases, it’s not co-location but it’s near as damn it, so they are operating in a 
building very close to ours and regular meetings are taking place so that relationship has got 
closer” (6).  
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The respondent continued, “advisor relationships are important because they’re in a really 
good position to actually define requirements. What the platform provider can bring to that is 
an understanding what the technology is capable of, and actually that’s where most 
competitive advantage is, where you marry the two and say, here are the set of requirements, 
here are the technical capabilities, to what extent can we bring those together to differentiate. 
So actually it’s a shared intellectual property across the two. And if you separated them, 
actually neither of them would be that successful without the other. So there’s a lot of time 
spent back and forth, defining the sort of requirements, getting a proposal by the platform to 
define that, and going through the project management cycle. If you don’t do that, you have 
generic components and you probably come to market with something vanilla” (6).  
Another respondent summed up, “it’s a really involved process, although there’s a lot of 
standards, but there’s actually so many little nuances there and things, that anything that 
could go wrong….you need that sort of personal co-location. We’re seeing a lot more of that 
cross-company working as one, where you’re relationships are so integrated because they’re 
doing such a major core component of your business, the behaviour is to treat them as part of 
your business, because how much you are reliant upon them effectively” (20).  
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5. Discussion 
 
This chapter presents a discussion of the key findings from the primary research presented in 
Chapter 4 and synthesises them with the relevant extant literature.  
 
The discussion presented is structured into three parts: section 5.1 confirms the key findings 
derived from the product architecture typology between 1984 and 2014 and positions the 
design evolutions within the innovation framework presented by Henderson & Clark (1990). 
Next, by then incorporating an efficiency and productive capabilities perspective68, section 
5.2 examines how architectures may co-evolve across time. Finally, section 5.3 highlights 
how and if architectures correspond as they co-evolve. 
 
By way of a reminder, this chapter aims to illuminate: 
  RQ1: What supply-side processes are associated with the co-evolution of architectures? 
(sections 5.1 and 5.2)  RQ2: To what extent are the design characteristics of product architecture associated with 
the design characteristics of firm and/or industry architecture? (section 5.3) 
 
5.1 Product architecture evolution and innovation modes 
 
By way of a summary of the findings presented in chapter 4, I highlight in Figure 36 how the 
product architecture evolved from one design type to another in the UK personal pensions 
product market between 1984 and 2014. In further detail, appendices six to eight show the 
evolution of product architectures at the product component level and the associated 
governance mode. 
 
 
                                                          
68
 Section 5.2 develops its arguments from an efficiency and productive capabilities perspective as the 
teŵplates illustrated iŶ Đhapter ϰ iŶ respoŶse to ‘Qϭ ĐlearlǇ ideŶtifǇ theŵ as ͚iŶtegratiǀe theŵes͛ ;KiŶg, ϭϵϵϴ, 
2014) throughout the 5 time periods. In other words, while the findings presented in chapter 4 outline a 
number of different possible explanations, efficiency and productive capabilities considerations seem to 
represeŶt the ͚glue͛ aĐross tiŵe that ĐaŶ help illuŵiŶate the proĐesses uŶderpinning architectural co-evolution 
in the UK personal pensions product market. The Northumbria University PhD regulations on word count also 
provide a secondary logic for narrowing the scope of this discussion to such integrative themes. It is 
acknowledged that further research opportunities exist to explore other theoretical perspectives and themes 
arising from the templates.    
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Figure 36: Product architecture evolution  
 
Wolter and Veloso (2008) argue that one of the challenges to examining and understanding 
the combined effects of efficiency considerations and productive capabilities on innovation is 
that the mode of innovation being analysed often lacks precise definition. Hence, like Walter 
and Veloso (2008), it seems reasonable to follow the seminal work of Henderson and Clark 
(1990) and develop the discussion primarily from the perspective of the 
manufacturer/assembler layer of the value chain responding to incremental, modular, 
architectural or radical innovation modes. However, as Fixson and Park (2008) note, the 
typology proposed by Henderson and Clark (1990) does not envisage a type of innovation 
mode associated with reintegration, and hence I also follow Fixson and Park by proposing 
‘integrative innovation’ as a further stylised innovation type.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mid to late-1980s  
Closed and integrated  
(With-profits) 
Early to mid-1990s 
Closed and modular  
(Unit-linked) 
Mid-1990s to early 
noughties 
Hybrid 
(Fund supermarket) 
Mid to late-noughties 
Open and modular 
(Platform) 
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Hybrid 
(Platform) 
Towards openness and modularity Towards reintegration 
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As I shall go on to highlight, the findings in chapter 4 indicate that there are four distinct 
innovation phases as shown in Figure 37:   
 
 
Figure 37: Innovation modes 
 
Having proposed the stylised innovation modes that permeate the findings, I now turn to 
discuss how efficiency considerations and productive capabilities may combine in different 
ways across time to co-evolve architectures in the UK personal pensions sector.   
 
5.2. Architectural co-evolution  
 
Cacciatori & Jacobides (2005:1851) posit the question “how do value chains evolve?” and 
argue that in fact very little is known about how the institutional and vertical architectures of 
product markets change over time. To provide analytical focus, this section will relate the 
findings presented in chapter 4 to the extant efficiency and productive capabilities literatures. 
Although using interchangeable terminology, the gap in the extant literature is succinctly 
summarised by Walter & Veloso (2008:586) who argue that “most studies of vertical 
structure incorporating TCE and firm competencies have neglected innovation” and further 
posit that “technological change reasonably complicates the task of identifying transaction 
costs, relevant competencies, and how the interplay between them shapes firm boundaries”.      
 
 
 
 
Phase  1 
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Modular innovation 
Phase 2 
Early- to mid-noughties 
Architectural innovation 
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Mid-noughties to 2012 
Architectural innovation 
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2012-2014 
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Efficiency considerations in determining the ‘vertical architecture’ (Cacciatori & Jacobides, 
2005:1852) of a product market are often associated with production costs (Stigler, 1951), 
bureaucratic costs (ie, Jacobides, 2008; Jacobides & Hitt, 2005), and the presence or absence 
of transaction costs (Klein, et al., 1978; Williamson, 1975; 1985). Therefore, in general 
terms, the balance of bureaucratic costs (BC) + internal production costs (IPC) versus 
external production costs (EPC) + transaction costs (TC) may determine firm boundary 
decisions (ie, Williamson, 1975). As a generic term for external governance costs, transaction 
costs economics (TCE) has typically examined firm boundaries at the level of the transaction 
(Jacobides, 2005), presenting a static picture of the menu of alternative governance modes. 
Many scholars, such Baldwin (2008), Jacobides & Winter (2005), Langlois (2002, 2003, 
2006), and Sanchez, et al., (2013), in contrast, argues that transaction costs are often transient 
and dynamic, hence they can decline or increase across time, especially under conditions of 
technological change (ie, Furlan, et al., 2014; Wolter & Veloso, 2008). Indeed, Williamson 
(1985) acknowledged that TCE would be less persuasive in dynamic environments as 
compared to a static analysis. 
    
Jacobides and Winter (2005) highlight that transaction costs are often mediated by the 
productive capability distribution in a given product market. Hence, the notion of ‘productive 
capabilities’ embraces an ‘efficiency’ perspective in so far as it relates to how efficiently or 
effectively a given firm carries out its productive activities. According to Jacobides and 
Winter (2005), productive capabilities along a value chain are often heterogeneous and path-
dependent and differences in productive capabilities are often amplified and evolve to reveal 
comparative advantages and disadvantages between value chain layers that can be the source 
of potential gains from trade between two or more parties (Jacobides, 2005; Jacobides & Hitt, 
2005).  
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Therefore, governance modes are often likely to depend upon both efficiency considerations 
and heterogeneity in productive capabilities. Following, there is growing empirical support 
for the notion that transaction costs trade off against productive capability considerations (ie, 
Jacobides & Hitt, 2005; Jacobides & Winter, 2005 Poppo & Zenger, 1998; Schilling & 
Steensma, 2001; Walter & Veloso, 2008). However, as noted by Jacobides and Winter 
(2005), often such contributions focus on static, firm-level considerations, rather than focus 
attention on dynamic, systemic perspectives. Therefore, there remains a gap in our 
understanding of how transaction costs and productive capabilities combine dynamically 
across time.   
 
In proposing a longer run, dynamic perspective, Jacobides & Winter (2005:400) argue that 
evolutionary forces can temporally change the respective trade-off between transaction costs 
and productive capabilities as (1) selection forces such as competition and imitation initially 
reinforce and amplify the static combination, however (2) productive capability differences 
are amplified, often reducing transaction costs to reveal gains from trade, which in turn (3) 
changes the scope and trajectory of productive capability development, which (4) allows new 
entrants to participate in the product market thereby changing the capability pool and its 
subsequent distribution. The implication of Jacobides and Winter’s (2005) work is that in the 
long run firms can and do shape their own institutional environment to fit their own 
advantage (ie, Penrose, 1959). In sum, there is a continued need to move away from a static 
analysis of efficiency considerations and productive capabilities and shift to a more dynamic 
and longer run analysis of how they combine in context-specific settings to underpin 
architectural co-evolution.  
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I structure this section of the discussion as follows: section 5.2.1 examines the progression 
towards product modularity and industry specialization (1990-2012) and section 5.2.2 
examines the progression towards product and industry integration (2012-2014), as 
highlighted previously in Figure 36.    
 
5.2.1 Progression towards product modularity and industry specialization (1990-2012) 
5.2.1.1. Phase one: the 90s – modular innovation   
 
Table 29 provides a summary of the mechanisms underpinning modular innovation in the 
90s.     
 
Co-evolutionary cycle 1 – modular 
innovation  
Process Findings 
1. Exogenous shocks Exogenous shocks provide a 
discontinuity to the vertical 
architecture of the industry.  
Exogenous shocks such as deregulation 
(1988), provide industry standards (ie, 
exogenous reductions in transaction 
costs) that promote product modularity 
in peripheral components and industry 
fragmentation 
2. Expanded roster of industry 
participants 
Exogenous shocks provide incentives 
for new specialised firms to enter the 
product market in all value chain 
activities, and establish a new mix of 
industry participants 
Sets in motion a heterogeneous 
productive capability development 
process    
3. Endogenous investments in 
mundane transaction costs 
Exogenous shocks provide incentives 
to invest in modular product 
partitioning and standard-setting 
Unit-linked insurance companies invest 
ex-ante in specialised standards to take 
advantage of heterogeneous productive 
capabilities in certain product 
component intermediate markets   
4. Selection forces Selection forces amplify differences in 
profitability or market share 
With-profit insurance companies suffer 
decline in profitability and are 
prompted to imitate the unit-linked 
design 
5. Heterogeneous productive 
capabilities 
Specialisation amplifies the 
heterogeneity in productive 
capabilities, revealing gains from trade 
Heterogeneity in productive 
capabilities and ex-ante investments in 
mundane transaction costs create a 
stable unit-linked product architecture 
and specialised vertical architecture 
 
Table 29: Phase one: the 90s – modular innovation 
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In the mid to late-80s, insurance companies in the product market were vertically integrated, 
owing to the absence of efficient intermediate markets and, thus, reliance upon internal 
suppliers. However, exogenous shocks associated with deregulation in 1988 provided 
standards that attracted new unit-linked insurance companies to enter the product market in 
the manufacturer/assembler layer, as well as new entrants in upstream and downstream 
intermediate markets, causing industry fragmentation. Exogenous shocks also provided the 
impetus for product partitioning and standards to take root in the ‘peripheral’ fund and advice 
product components. I now turn to discuss the modularisation processes of these two product 
components.      
 
5.2.1.1.1 Modularisation of fund components 
 
With-profits insurance companies were vertically integrated. Developing Williamson’s 
(Williamson, 1983), three parameters of transaction costs69, modularisation can be 
characterised in terms of a technological uncertainty that presented transaction hazards, 
especially in the presence of architectural and knowledge specificity associated with a closed 
and integrated product architecture. Furthermore, with-profits insurance companies had scale-
efficient bureaucratic and production costs and no significant prior contracting relationships 
with external fund management groups which would seem likely to increase the perception of 
ex-post opportunism. With limited incentives to conduct market exchange, the sum of 
bureaucratic costs (BC) + internal production costs (IPC) can be characterised as less than 
external production costs (EPC)  + transaction costs (TC), which provided an efficiency-
based force in favour of vertical integration.     
 
On the other hand, upstream fund management groups had significant productive capabilities 
owing to their specialisation and global reach, and hence greater incentives to expand their 
knowledge and initiate new technological developments. Interviews suggest, however, that 
with-profits insurance companies held a perception that the correlation between productive 
capabilities was quite strong owing to, in some cases, 40 year+ knowledge and experience in 
managing with-profits funds.  
 
                                                          
69
 Williamson (1983) cites uncertainty, frequency of contract upgrades and asset specificity as the primary 
drivers of transaction costs and, hence, vertical integration  
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As a consequence, no significant gains from trade were perceived as appropriable. Moreover, 
in the presence of a transaction environment where BC + IPC < EPC + TC, the product 
architecture and vertical scope remained closed and integrated. In other words, any 
meaningful differences in productive capabilities, net of transaction costs, were not sufficient 
enough to reveal gains from trade – at least for a short while.  
 
For unit-linked insurance companies, there is a different story. New unit-linked insurance 
companies entered the product market with few existing productive capabilities in fund 
management. As such, there was a weak correlation in the productive capabilities of unit-
linked insurance companies and specialised upstream fund management groups, resulting in a 
strong upstream comparative advantage revealing gains from trade. Possessing a near-
modular IT architecture at the fund component level, ‘unit-linking’ across firm boundaries 
can be characterised as less of a technological change, and perhaps more as an ‘incremental 
innovation’, rather than a modular innovation.  
 
Characterising the innovation mode as incremental has a number of potential implications, 
(1) incremental innovation is typically characterised as an innovation mode within firm 
boundaries, however I find, in contrast, that the extent of comparative advantage held by fund 
management groups is significant enough to push the task activity across firm boundaries, (2) 
the prior product partitioning and specialised ‘mirror fund’ interface standards for connecting 
fund components can be characterised as an ex-ante mundane transaction cost (ie, Baldwin, 
2008) that also served to reduce threats of ex-post transaction costs, (3) investments in buyer-
supplier relationships further served to mitigate transaction hazards, and (4) as gains from 
specialisation attracted more upstream fund management groups to the product market, small 
numbers bargaining problems reduced over time.        
 
By the mid-90s, however, most with-profit insurance companies were sourcing modular fund 
components from upstream suppliers. Initially, with-profits insurance companies relied upon 
their own internal suppliers to play catch-up and replicate the modular innovation in order to 
mitigate against selection forces and a loss of market share. However, once internal suppliers 
had modularised fund components, moving the task activity across firm boundaries 
represented a lower level of technological change and hence lower transaction costs.  
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The process can be characterised as follows, (1) the codification process involved in 
modularising the product component interface subsequently permitted the task activity to be 
transferred across firm boundaries as a basis for efficient market exchange, (2) the 
intermediate market now offered a much wider range of specialised fund component 
suppliers, thereby reducing hazards associated with small numbers bargaining problems, and 
(3) the production costs of upstream fund management groups had reduced owing to scale 
efficiencies associated with supplying a number of manufacturer/assembler firms in the 
product market. In other words, the transaction cost environment was now pushing in the 
direction of modularisation and specialisation, as BC + IPC > EPC + TC.  
 
With external fund management groups offering access to an almost limitless range of UK 
and global stock markets and indices, the distance between the new technological alternatives 
and the manufacturer/assemblers capability base grew substantially, revealing latent gains 
from trade. Therefore, in the case of with-profits insurance companies, I find that superior 
productive capabilities in the intermediate market and efficiency considerations eventually 
reinforce each other to promote modularisation at the fund component level and a 
disintegrated vertical architecture. In sum, new unit-linked insurance companies ‘going 
modular’ served to create selection forces for all firms in the product market so that there was 
eventually no choice but to eventually follow (ie, Sanchez & Mahoney, 2013). 
 
5.2.1.1.2 Modularisation of advice components 
  
Advice and distribution components moved across firm boundaries in the late-80s and early-
90s for both with-profits and unit-linked insurance companies simultaneously. Prior to the 
emergence of Government-sponsored ‘industry standards’ for advice and distribution in 
1988, interviews suggest that manufacturer/assembler firms held strong productive 
capabilities for the provision of advice and distribution.  
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However, ‘standards’ had two main impacts, (1) regulation embodied in the Financial 
Services Act 1986 significantly increased the bureaucratic costs associated with internal 
management of the activity, and (2) characterised as an ex-ante mundane transaction cost, 
industry standards codified the nature of the relationship between manufacturer/assembler 
firms and external IFA firms. As such, the ‘modularisation’ of advice changed the nature of 
the relationship between internal costs and external costs, such that BC + IPC > EPC + TC, 
providing an efficiency-based force for specialisation across the entire roster of product 
market participants.    
 
Productive capabilities, however, seem to play only a minor or even non-existent role. The 
correlation of productive capabilities between manufacturer/assembler firms and downstream 
IFA firms can be characterised as strong, and under such circumstances it would be usual 
logic to suggest that negligible differences in productive capabilities would result in vertical 
integration, transaction costs permitting. However, in contrast, despite high external 
production costs (ie, the amount of commission demanded) and transaction costs (ie, ex-post 
opportunism), interviews suggest that the increases in internal bureaucratic costs arising from 
regulation were so significant as to reveal gains from trade from market-based exchanges.                
 
5.2.1.2 Phase two: early to mid-noughties – architectural innovation  
 
Table 30 provides a summary of the mechanisms underpinning the architectural innovation 
between 2000 and 2005.      
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Co-evolutionary cycle 2 – architectural 
innovation (“fund supermarkets”)  
Process Result 
1. Exogenous shocks Exogenous shocks provide a discontinuity 
to the vertical architecture of the product 
market 
Exogenous shocks such as tax changes to CIS 
funds and the launch of ISAs provide further 
industry standards (ie, exogenous reductions in 
mundane transaction costs) that promote 
product modularity and industry fragmentation 
Such shocks cannot be easily accommodated 
within existing stable unit-linked product 
architecture  
2. New vertical scope  Exogenous shocks and limits to 
specialisation gains (ie, through imitation) 
provide incentives for existing participants 
to re-evaluate vertical scope  
Upstream fund management groups forward 
integrate into product provision to leverage 
existing productive capabilities and limit 
volatility of specialisation gains 
3. Expanded roster of industry 
participants 
Exogenous shocks and new product 
architecture attract expanded roster of 
providers of complementary product 
components and sets in motion a new 
productive capability development process 
Wide range of new upstream firms enter the 
market providing complementary product 
components creating network effects 
4. Endogenous investments in mundane 
transaction costs 
Exogenous shocks provide incentives to 
invest in further product partitioning and 
standard-setting 
Standards agreed for connecting with numerous 
complementary product components  
5. Selection forces Selection forces amplify differences in 
profitability or market share 
Insurance companies suffer decline in 
profitability/market share and are prompted to 
imitate by quickly licensing-in new 
technologies 
6. Heterogeneous productive capabilities Heterogeneous productive capabilities 
promote further specialisation 
Specialisation gains begin to erode as a result of 
modular effects of commoditisation and 
imitation. Capability-destroying characteristics 
of new architecture lead insurance companies to 
develop systems integration capabilities   
 
Table 30: Phase two: 2000 – 2005 – architectural innovation 
 
The institutional structure of the product market presented in 5.2.1.1 was punctuated by an 
architectural innovation (“fund supermarkets”) in c2000, which resulted in further product 
modularity, but also forward vertical integration at the industry level, supporting the idea that 
architectures at different hierarchal levels may sometimes (temporarily) co-evolve in different 
directions.  
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Throughout the 90s, despite fund and advice and distribution components having moved 
across firm boundaries, interviews suggest that manufacturer/assembler firms maintained 
superior productive capabilities in unit-linked ‘pensions’ IT systems. Furthermore, at the 
industry level, gains from specialisation (ie, Jacobides, 2005) dominated a ‘stable’ vertical 
architecture as firms focused on task activities that yielded a comparative advantage and 
appropriable gains. For example, the institutional structure was characterised by (1) insurance 
companies with productive capabilities in IT and actuarial science, (2) fund management 
groups with productive capabilities in fund design and development, and (3) IFA firms who 
specialised in distribution and advice.   
 
However, the stability of the unit-linked product architecture and specialised vertical 
architecture was disrupted not by manufacturer/assembler firms with existing productive 
capabilities in ‘pensions’ IT systems, but rather by upstream fund management groups who 
forward integrated into product provision. Many upstream fund management groups had 
productive capabilities in modular ‘fund management’ IT systems, owing to the presence of 
existing industry standards for fund design and development70. 1999, however, saw the 
government-sponsored launch of Individual Savings Accounts (ISAs), a tax-efficient 
‘modular’ product for medium-term savings and investments. More importantly, the 
Government issued ‘ISA rules’, a set of quasi industry-standards that, in the stroke of a pen, 
gave fund management groups a capability-based advantage71 enshrined in the ISA rules.   
 
The launch of ISAs also occurred almost simultaneously with exogenous changes to the 
regulation and taxation of CIS funds designed by fund management groups that enabled them 
to also be held for the first-time directly in personal pensions (SIPPs), undermining the 
existing ‘mirror fund’ specialised standard propagated by insurance companies. As a 
consequence, fund management groups spotted an opportunity to not only forward integrate 
into ISAs but also SIPPs, and create, what the industry initially described as a multi-product 
‘fund supermarket’.  
 
 
                                                          
70
 Fund components were designed according to UCITS standards, a European standard 
71
 ISA rules allowed investments into CIS funds offered by fund management groups, but not unit-linked mirror 
funds offered by insurance companies 
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While the architectural innovation was competence-destroying for incumbent insurance 
companies, the innovation mode can be characterised as ‘modular’ for fund management 
groups, as it leveraged existing productive capabilities. As a modular innovation from the 
perspective of fund management groups, forward integration into product provision occurred 
for a number of reasons (1) downstream firms (ie, insurance companies) possessed few (if 
any) productive capabilities in ISA product provision, fund management or modular IT 
systems, (2) despite the presence of standards, as a brand new product category the ISA 
product is associated with a degree of technological uncertainty, and (3) within the fund 
management segment of the value chain, the trajectories of productive capabilities had 
become so super-specialised such that, according to interviews, they had reached a maximum 
yield. In a product market where classes of investment move in and out of fashion in line with 
the so-called investment cycle, there was a strong need to develop productive capabilities at 
the product system level in order to capture additional rents, or at least minimise the volatility 
of rents in their existing product portfolio.  
 
Few, if any, incumbent insurance companies held any substantive productive capabilities in 
the new multi-product systems architecture or its modular complementary product 
components. As a consequence, most insurance companies chose to quickly license-in fund 
supermarket architectures from fund management groups or from other external partners in 
the fund management supply chain, a type of ‘opening’ strategy that waives control of the 
commodity layer (West, 2003). However, despite these strategic risks, licensing the new 
technology allowed many insurance companies to take advantage of a number of 
opportunities: (1) it enabled them to reduce the sunk cost risks associated with technological 
uncertainty and to access new product markets (ie SIPP and ISA), (2) due to its greater 
modular properties, a number of providers of complementary product components had 
already begun to converge around the fund supermarket architecture, such as decision-based 
software tools and back-office suppliers, promoting supply-side network externalities and 
bandwagon effects (ie, Schilling, 1999; Sanchez, 2008), (3) it was becoming clear that fund 
supermarkets were quickly becoming established as a ‘supply-chain platform’ (Gawer, 2010; 
2014) that would replace the existing unit-linked product architectures as a dominant design.  
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From the perspective of manufacturer/assembler firms, architectural innovations are often 
associated with vertical integration (Walter & Veloso, 2008), the opposite of the case here. 
This is because architectural innovations are often associated with (1) high levels of 
technological uncertainty, (2) unforeseen product component interdependencies, (3) high 
levels of ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs, and (4) the need for close coordination, better 
accomplished within firm boundaries. However, despite technological uncertainty in the 
product market, explanations for why insurance companies turned to market-based exchanges 
despite these risks appear to be related to (1) the very weak correlation in productive 
capabilities at both the architectural and complementary product component level, (2) the 
sheer necessity of ensuring speed to market to mitigate against strong selection forces, (3) if 
the architectural innovation is characterised as participation in an existing (largely) modular 
systems architecture, the presence of a priori standards across many complementary product 
components may have mitigated ex-ante transaction costs, (4) the existing long-term 
relationships with fund management groups may have eased ex-post transaction costs, and 
hence resulting in more efficient market exchanges, and, (5) interestingly, incumbent 
insurance companies remained sceptical that the new architecture would become embedded 
as a dominant design, and continued to vociferously defend existing technologies (ie, 
Schilling, 1999) at the same time. In other words, market-based exchanges can be 
characterised as an effort to minimise the risks of technological obsolescence and uncertainty 
(Walter & Veloso, 2008) and maximise the ‘option value’ associated with the new 
technology (Baldwin & Clark, 2000).                    
  
In other words, while insurance companies had previously held productive capabilities in 
unit-linked ‘pensions’ IT systems, the architectural innovation at the ‘system-level’ had 
reinforced the direction of co-evolutionary forces towards product modularity and industry 
specialisation. Following, efficiency considerations where BC + IPC > EPC + TC, and the 
weak correlation across productive capabilities both pushed in the direction of increased 
product modularity and industry specialisation.  
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For many insurance companies, the cycle of modular and architectural innovations 
throughout the 90s and the noughties had ‘hollowed-out’ organisational capabilities (ie, 
Parmiagiani & Mitchell, 2009), with a loss of both core architectural and complementary 
product component knowledge. As a consequence, and as I discuss further in section 5.3, 
many insurance companies began to focus on developing systems integration capabilities (ie, 
Brusoni, et al., 2001, Ceci, et al., 2014). Perhaps through strategic necessity, insurance 
companies began to maintain a broader knowledge than task boundary across the value chain 
in order to acquire knowledge and productive capabilities in the new product architecture and 
‘critical’ complementary product components by maintaining intensive inter-firm 
collaboration devices such as co-location with fund management groups and other 
complementary product component suppliers. In other words, manufacturer/assembler firms 
began to try to reverse the weak correlation of productive capabilities as gains from 
specialisation and trade began to erode.       
 
5.2.1.3. Phase three: mid to late-noughties – architectural innovation 
 
Table 31 provides a summary of the mechanisms underpinning the architectural innovation 
between 2005 and 2012.       
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Co-evolutionary cycle 3 – architectural 
innovation (“product platforms”)  
Process Result 
1. Exogenous shocks Exogenous shocks provide a 
discontinuity to the vertical 
architecture of the industry.  
Exogenous shocks such as A-day 
provide further industry standards (ie, 
exogenous reductions in mundane 
transaction costs) that cannot be easily 
accommodated within the existing fund 
supermarket product architecture  
2. Expanded roster of industry 
participants 
Exogenous shocks provide incentives 
for further new firms to enter the 
product market  
Upstream IT systems providers enter 
the product market that reinforces the 
existing specialised vertical 
architecture 
3. Endogenous investments in 
mundane transaction costs 
Exogenous shocks provide incentives 
to invest in further product partitioning 
and standard-setting 
Further standards agreed for numerous 
complementary product components  
4. Selection forces Extreme modularity effects promote 
selection forces that begin to erode 
heterogeneity  
Insurance companies leapfrog the fund 
supermarket architecture and license-in 
new platform technologies 
5. Heterogeneous productive 
capabilities 
Specialisation amplifies heterogeneity 
in productive capabilities in many 
upstream value chain segments, but 
limits specialisation gains in others  
Insurance companies continue to focus 
on developing systems integration 
capabilities  
 
Table 31: Phase three: 2005 -2012 – architectural innovation 
 
It soon became apparent, however, that the fund supermarket architecture was not well-suited 
to operating as a ‘multi-product platform’, as it was based on a modular ‘fund administration 
hub’, and it remained difficult to design and develop a ‘product layer hub’ without designing 
a significant number of interdependencies and workarounds into the architecture.  
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By the mid-noughties a further systems-based architectural innovation disrupted the product 
market. Rather than the architectural innovation being instigated by firms in the 
manufacturer/assembler layer, or even by fund management groups who had earlier forward 
integrated into product provision, this time it was initiated by a number of new upstream 
platform systems IT architects who entered the market with open and modular IT 
architectures, with origins in Australia and New Zealand, where financial services product 
platforms had already become dominant in financial services product markets. Many 
incumbent insurance companies and a wide array of new entrants saw this as an opportunity 
to ‘technologically-leapfrog’ early-movers who had developed the fund supermarket 
architecture by licensing-in the new platform architecture technologies. 
   
From a productive capabilities perspective, the correlation between the productive 
capabilities of the platform systems architects and manufacturer/assembler firms was weak, 
and as a consequence the IT systems architects held a significant comparative advantage and 
hence gains from trade were appropriable. In efficiency terms, the platform systems architects 
had committed significant ex-ante investments in standards that served to reduce mundane 
transaction costs for buyers. Furthermore, although the platform systems architecture was a 
new innovation in the UK product market, the degree of technological uncertainty had been 
minimised through its prior embeddedness and dominance in other international product 
markets. As such, with low asset specificity and low technological uncertainty, the presence 
of transaction costs can be characterised as low, despite the hazards associated with 
coordination and exchange between unfamiliar market counterparties. New, productive inter-
firm relationships were required, and, in part, this was developed through an extended period 
of intense inter-firm collaboration between manufacturer/assembler firms, platform systems 
architects and providers of upstream complementary product components. 
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Interviews suggest that despite the known threat of commoditisation and imitation posed by 
extreme product and systems modularity, speed to market was, again, critical in the decision 
to license-in the new technology. The pensions simplification regime (“A-day”) was 
scheduled for 2006 which, at the stroke of a pen, unified all existing occupational and 
personal pensions rules into a coherent single set of rules – in other words, an ‘industry 
standard’ - that ultimately meant that consumers could consolidate all of their existing 
personal pensions, perhaps amassed from various pension schemes with previous employers, 
and personal schemes, into one product architecture – a SIPP. Furthermore, the ‘industry 
standard’ SIPP rules provided by government created a modular product standard, much like 
the ISA rules had done in 1999. As many in the industry stated, this was a ‘do or die’ or 
‘winner takes all’ moment (ie, Schilling, 1999), and speed to market was essential.  
 
In sum, from the perspective of manufacturer/assembler firms, there was a weak correlation 
between productive capabilities revealing gains from trade. In an environment where BC + 
IPC > EPC + TC, a continued push towards product modularity and industry specialisation 
ensued.  However, manufacturer/assembler firms continued to invest in developing systems 
integration capabilities as a mechanism to re-acquire knowledge and productive capabilities 
across the product system and in critical complementary product components.        
 
5.2.2.Progression towards product and industry reintegration (2012-2014) 
5.2.2.1 Phase 4: 2012-2014 – integrative innovation  
 
Table 32 provides a summary of the mechanisms underpinning integrative innovation 
between 2012 and 2014.        
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Co-evolutionary cycle 4 – integrative 
innovation 
Process Result 
1. Exogenous shocks Exogenous shocks provide a 
discontinuity to the vertical 
architecture of the industry.  
Exogenous shocks such RDR provide 
further industry standards (ie, 
exogenous reductions in mundane 
transaction costs)  
2. Selection forces Product modularity effects limit gains 
from specialisation and trade  
Insurance companies leverage existing 
systems integration capabilities to 
bundle product components to secure 
rents 
3. Endogenous investments in 
integrative innovation 
Selection forces promote investments 
throughout the value chain in 
integrative innovation 
Emergence of guided modularity and 
vertical specificity as integrative 
innovation modes 
4. Heterogeneous productive 
capabilities 
Integrative innovation amplifies 
heterogeneity in productive capabilities  
Acquisition of selected product 
component suppliers amplifies 
heterogeneity and reduces roster of 
participants 
 
Table 32: Phase four: 2012 – 2014 – integrative innovation 
 
Despite the commonality of core product components in the open and modular platform 
architecture, licensees could request co-development to establish proprietary product 
components, so long as the systems’ interface standards were maintained. However, licensing 
agreements only permitted exclusivity periods of c12-18 months, from which time the 
product component would be offered to other licensees as part of the standard licensing 
package. This created a significant challenge for manufacturer/assembler firms to sustain 
gains from trade and resist commoditisation and imitation threats. As West (2003) reminds 
us, without innovation, differentiation or some form of lock-in, it will be very difficult to 
appropriate gains. Furthermore, with c35-40 firms now competing in the 
manufacturer/assembler layer of the value chain, the product development process was slow 
and protracted, owing to limited capacity and responsiveness from platform systems’ 
suppliers.  
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In response, many manufacturer/assembler firms decided to try to appropriate rents through 
foregrounding the marketing of their own proprietary fund components, in line with West’s 
(2003) suggestion that marketing and branding may offer the only opportunity to secure rents. 
However, this approach had limited success owing to the superior and specialised productive 
capabilities of external fund management groups, and the multi-vendor configurations 
demanded by consumers (ie, Schilling, 1999; 2000). By 2012, coupled with further 
exogenous shocks, the need to innovate for differentiation and competitive advantage was 
pressing in order to deter continued commoditisation and imitation. As a consequence, 
‘integrative innovation’ came to the fore (ie, Fixson & Park, 2008), leveraged from the 
systems integration capabilities developed and enhanced throughout the noughties.  
 
Types of integrative innovation 
 Guided modularity Vertical specificity Insourcing 
Product component 
specificity 
Low High High 
Adherence to 
standards 
Yes Yes Yes 
Use Open Restricted Both 
Governance mode Market  Hybrid  Vertical integration 
 
Table 33: Integrative innovation modes 
 
According to interviews, integrative innovation took three different shapes, as shown in Table 
33. First, manufacturer/assembler firms bundled72 combinations of modular product and 
process components for particular market segments. The modular bundles consisted of 
peripheral product and process components, governed via weak organisational ties with 
upstream and downstream suppliers, and supported by marketing and branding. For instance, 
the bundles would be heavily marketed to the downstream IFA channel as a ‘governed’ 
proposition that would save them time and reduce compliance risk. To participate in the 
bundles, fund management groups and providers of complementary product components 
were squeezed ex-post so as to create rents for the manufacturer/assembler firm.  
 
                                                          
72
 I shall Đall this approaĐh ͚guided ŵodularitǇ͛ 
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This approach to ‘integrative innovation’ is similar to West’s (2003) description of bundling 
in the IT platform and computer games industries as a method to secure differentiation and 
competitive advantage in the face of open source software. However, the extent of product 
component specificity within the bundles was often marginal owing to weak incentives to 
participate and invest in integrative innovative activities.            
 
Second, modular product and process components were bundled for the specific and 
exclusive use of particular value chain combinations or, using different terminology, various 
heterogeneous ‘power blocks’ in the product market73. Each so-called ‘power block’ 
consisted of (1) the lead manufacturer/assembler firm, (2) the platform systems architect, (3) 
a number of participating upstream providers of complementary product components, and (4) 
a downstream IFA firm or network. Coordinated by the lead manufacturer/assembler firm, 
the modular product components would often be significantly reengineered within boundaries 
to suit the specific performance requirements of the power block, but maintaining adherence 
to the standards-based architecture. Interviews suggest that the key differences between 
guided modularity bundles and ‘vertical specificity’ bundles was (1) the extent of the 
reengineering or specificity of the inner-workings of the product and process components, (2) 
its exclusivity of use within the power block, and (3) the strength of the organisational tie, as 
often power blocks shifted to hybrid forms of governance, suggesting that as modularity 
reaches its architectural limits, firms may replace weak organisational ties across a diverse 
range of external firms and instead establish stronger ties with fewer players (ie, Chesbrough 
& Prencipe, 2008).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
73
 An approach I shall call vertical specificity 
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Seen through a productive capabilities lens, interviews suggest that vertical specificity can be 
characterised as a leveraging of productive capabilities in systems integration by 
manufacturer/assembler firms in order to appropriate gains from trade. Moreover, high-levels 
of information-sharing and co-development were enacted within the arrangement, including 
co-location for the design and development of reengineered product components. 
Furthermore, the closer organisational ties between participants in the power block served to 
establish parameters for how ex-ante investments and ex-post surplus would be divided and 
can also perhaps be characterised as an attempt to further increase efficiencies in a product 
market characterised by commoditisation and imitation.  
 
A third integrative innovation mechanism was insourcing the design and development of 
previously outsourced ‘critical’ product components. According to interviews, precisely 
which product components were insourced depended upon the specific particulars of firm-
level strategy and how different firms saw opportunities for differentiation and competitive 
advantage. In all cases, the modular properties of the insourced product components were 
maintained in order to ensure interoperability with the systems-based platform architecture, 
however it may be the case that integrative innovation eventually leads to a decrease in the 
overall modularity of the product system.  
 
Insourcing occurred via acquisition of the product component supplier in order to acquire 
superior productive capabilities at the product component level, and the findings in chapter 4 
include many examples of acquisition including upstream providers of commercial property, 
discretionary fund managers, stockbrokers, and downstream IFA firms. Moreover, insourced 
product components were also often reengineered and incorporated into power block 
configurations, so as to positively influence the ex-post division of surplus within the 
arrangement. Despite the low transaction cost environment associated with the platform 
architecture, acquisition of product component suppliers can also be characterised as an 
investment in mundane transaction costs to establish the product component within firm 
boundaries (Sanchez, et al., 2013).      
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Section summary and contribution 
 
This section summarises the discussion in sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 and identifies the research 
study’s main contribution to the extant literature on architectural co-evolution.   
         
First, I highlight the importance of a dynamic, co-evolutionary perspective towards the 
interaction between efficiency considerations and productive capabilities, and the findings 
support the work by Jacobides and Hitt (2005) and Jacobides and Winter (2005) in the US 
mortgage banking sector where vertical disintegration took root in the value chain where the 
correlation across productive capabilities was weak and prior ex-ante investments were made 
in standards, reducing transaction costs. However, I extend prior work by arguing that 
architectural co-evolution may be examined not only at the firm and systemic level, but also 
at the level of the individual product component, as firm-level decisions concerning the 
degree of modularisation and hence firm boundaries occur at the product component level. In 
other words, assuming the product component is modular with limited co-complementarity, I 
demonstrate that the boundaries of product components are also the boundary in which firms 
consider efficiency and productive capabilities trade-offs such that ‘thin crossing points’ 
(Baldwin, 2008) in the component boundary enabled by ex-ante standards are often the points 
at which task and firm boundaries break apart. Moreover, I also show how product 
modularity and industry specialisations can reverse as the commoditisation and imitation 
threats posed by ever-increasing modularity limit gains from specialisation and trade, and 
erode productive capabilities. I also show how the trade-offs at the individual product 
component level can impact the overall aggregate degree of product architecture modularity 
and vertical scope of the product market.  
 
Figure 38 summarises how efficiency considerations and productive capabilities may impact 
upon product component innovation and vertical scope. The figure is not intended to suggest 
cause-and-effect but rather the association between processes observed in the study.     
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Figure 38: Dynamic effects of productive capabilities and efficiency considerations on modular product component evolution 
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The findings suggest that firms are likely to remain integrated in the product component and 
the associated task activity where a firm possesses superior productive capabilities, regardless 
of prior ex-ante investments in standards. This scenario is indicative of product components 
in closed and modular and hybrid product architectures. On the other hand, selection forces 
and specialised productive capability trajectories in time weaken the correlation in productive 
capabilities and hence net gains from trade eventually ensue. In other words, subject to an 
efficient intermediate market, ex-ante investments in standards combined with superior 
productive capabilities in the intermediate market may propel a closed and modular product 
component in one time period across firm boundaries in a future time period.   
 
As product architectures are made up of a number of multiple product components, the 
different productive capabilities and efficiency trade-offs at the product component level may 
help illuminate the under-explored phenomena of hybridity at the aggregate level of the 
product architecture. It is probable that most product architectures exhibit different degrees of 
hybridity depending upon the precise productive capabilities and efficiency trade-offs 
occurring at the individual product component level at any one temporal cross-section. In 
other words, subject to prior investments in standards, product architecture hybridity may 
evolve towards or away from greater modularity dependent upon the level of ex-ante 
investments in standards and the degree of heterogeneity in productive capabilities at the 
individual product component level.  
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Figure 39: Dynamic effects of productive capabilities and efficiency considerations on integrative innovation 
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Second, I contribute to our understanding on the types of integrative innovation pursued by 
manufacture/assembler firms faced by the increasing modularity effects of commoditisation 
and imitation. Figure 39, again, is not intended to suggest cause-and-effect but rather the 
association between processes observed in the study. As shown, in response to the erosion of 
architectural and product component knowledge, I find that manufacturer/assembler firms 
turned to the development of systems integration capabilities in one time period (c2000) that 
led to three types of integrative innovation in another time period (2012-2014). Interviews 
suggest that, first, guided modularity is an integrative innovation mechanism characterised by 
(1) modular product and process component bundling, (2) limited investments in product 
component specificity, and (3) weak market-based organisational ties. Second, vertical 
specificity is characterised as comprising of (1) modular product and process component 
bundling, (2) significant investments in specificity within product component boundaries 
while maintaining adherence to standards, (3) exclusivity of use, (4) high-levels of 
knowledge exchange and knowledge integration, and (5) hybrid governance modes. Finally, 
product component insourcing via acquisition is characterised as (1) significant investments 
in specificity within product component boundaries, while maintaining adherence to 
standards, (2) a form of forward or backward vertical integration to acquire product 
component suppliers and associated productive capabilities.           
 
In other words, rather than reintegration taking root in the core platform architecture, control 
remained waived, and integrative innovation focused on ‘critical’ product components that 
offered manufacturer/assembler firms some form of differentiation or competitive advantage. 
For instance, coordinated by the manufacturer/assembler firms, the power blocks created high 
integrative mechanisms, switching costs, and shifted competition towards a ‘between power 
blocks’ mode, a quasi-integrated product market structure. Moreover, insourcing critical 
product components via acquisition had the benefit of acquiring critical productive 
capabilities, positively influencing the division of surplus, and also reduced the roster of 
firms available in the intermediate market.  
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Supporting the findings of Fixson and Park (2008) in the bicycle industry, the integrative 
innovation mechanisms are also endogenously-determined. Designers seeking value in 
integrative innovation can and do affect the degree of co-specialisation among product 
components which, in turn, may enhance product performance outcomes and the availability 
of gains. However, whereas Fixson and Park (2008) highlight the role of Shimano designing 
non-modular product components, in contrast, I find that integrative innovation occurs 
largely within existing product component boundaries, increasing specificity, but maintaining 
adherence to the standards-based platform architecture. In other words, product components 
remain interoperable with the standards-based architecture.  
 
However, reintegration occurred more tightly at the product market level via quasi-integrated 
power blocks governed via hybrid mechanisms such as alliances and, in some cases, joint 
venture arrangements, as well as forward and backward vertical integration through 
acquisition of product component suppliers, supporting the notion that reintegration at the 
product level can have profound implications for product market structure.          
 
Third, I contribute to our understanding of systems integrator firms. I show how the process 
of developing and maintaining systems integration capabilities in one time period may be 
associated with an ‘option value’ of reintegration in a subsequent time period. For example, 
(1), around 2000, interviews suggest that following the erosion of productive capabilities in 
the core systems architecture and peripheral product components, insurance companies 
turned to the development of systems integration capabilities and maintained close 
collaborative relationships with upstream and downstream suppliers as a mechanism to 
survive. By 2005, (2) as the architectural and product component knowledge of insurance 
companies grew, and new platform systems architects entered the product market, insurance 
companies initiated deeper and more intensive knowledge integration mechanisms across the 
value chain encompassing devices such as product component co-development, temporary 
co-location, and employee-rotation. By 2012, (3) insurance companies leveraged its system 
integration capabilities to form quasi-integrated power blocks in the product market, based on 
hybrid governance forms and insourced, via acquisition, productive capabilities in component 
design where the product component offered a form of differentiation or competitive 
advantage.     
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As shown in Table 34, the narrative suggests that the development of systems integration 
capabilities was (1) instrumental in coping with discontinuous, competence-destroying, 
architectural innovation, something which Henderson and Clark (1990) argue is difficult for 
incumbent firms to do, (2) remaining integrated in the knowledge domain for product 
components with the potential for differentiation or competitive advantage allowed insurance 
companies to strengthen the previously weak correlation in productive capabilities across 
time (as noted by Zirpoli and Becker, 2007; Zirpoli & Camuffo, 2009), and (3), in many 
cases, it eventually led to hybrid forms of governance within quasi-integrated power blocks 
and insourcing of product component via forward and backward vertical integration.  
 
Although I stop short of hypothesising a direct cause-and-effect relationship across time 
periods, it seems highly probable that the development of systems integration capabilities in 
one time period may provide an ‘option value’ of integrative innovation in a subsequent time 
period. Without such systems integration capabilities, it seems likely that firms would lose 
the productive capabilities required to innovate at the product system level, and fall into the 
‘modularity trap’ as envisaged by Chesbrough and Kusunoki (2001).   
 
 
Time period Time period Time period 
Early to mid-noughties Mid-noughties to late-noughties 2012-2014 
Systems integrator (1) Systems integrator (2) Systems integrator (3) 
Develops SIC to survive in 
response to architectural 
innovation and prior modular 
innovations.  
 
Maintains broader knowledge 
than task boundary to 
strengthen weak correlation in 
productive capabilities  
Extends SIC via component co-
development, co-location and 
employee exchanges across the 
value chain 
Leverages SIC through creation of 
power blocks and hybrid governance 
 
Insources superior  productive 
capabilities in component design via 
acquisition, where component offers 
differentiation or competitive 
advantage   
Primarily market-based 
transactions 
Primarily market-based exchanges Hybrid and some vertical reintegration 
 
Table 34: Evolution of systems integration capabilities 
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5.3 Architectural correspondence 
 
Table 35 is a summary of the correspondence v. non-correspondence of product component, 
task, knowledge and firm boundaries between 1984 and 2014. I show the degree to which 
correspondence is evident by drawing upon Colfer and Baldwin’s (2010) classification of 
‘support’, ‘no support’, partial support’ and ‘mixed support’ (although for simplicity, I 
collapse ‘partial’ and ‘mixed’ into one overall classification of ‘partial support’).  
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 Mid to late-
1980s 
Early to mid-1990s Mid-90s to 2000 2000-2005 2005-2014  
 Closed and 
integrated 
Closed and modular Hybrid (unit-linked) Hybrid (fund 
supermarket) 
Platform – open and 
modular (2005-2012) and 
Hybrid (2012-2014) 
Product 
component 
type 
Integrated 
product 
component  
Some product 
components 
partitioned and 
loosely-coupled 
within firm boundaries 
Some product 
components partitioned 
and loosely-coupled, 
within and across firm 
boundaries  
Some product 
components partitioned 
and loosely-coupled, 
within and across firm 
boundaries 
Most product components 
partitioned and loosely-
coupled, within and across 
firm boundaries, some 
reintegrated  
Task and 
firm 
boundaries 
Task boundaries 
partitioned based 
on functional 
specialism 
(partial) 
Where 
product/process 
components are 
loosely-coupled, 
product component 
and task boundaries 
are partitioned 
(support) but task 
remains within firm 
boundaries (support) 
Where product/process 
components are 
loosely-coupled, 
product component, 
task and firm 
boundaries are 
partitioned (support) 
Where product/process 
components are loosely-
coupled, product 
component, task and firm 
boundaries are 
partitioned (support) 
Where product/process 
components are loosely-
coupled, product 
component, task and firm 
boundaries are partitioned 
(support)  
Knowledge 
boundaries 
Knowledge 
boundaries 
partitioned across 
functional 
domains (partial) 
Architectural 
knowledge decoupled 
from product 
component knowledge 
(support) 
Architectural and 
product component 
knowledge held by 
systems integrator (no 
support). Product 
component knowledge 
held by component 
teams (support) 
Architectural and product 
component knowledge 
held by systems 
integrator (no support). 
Product component 
knowledge held by 
component teams 
(support) 
Architectural and product 
component knowledge 
held by platform systems 
integrator (no support). 
Product component 
knowledge held by 
component teams 
(support) 
Information-
sharing (IS) 
High within 
functions, but low 
across and 
between 
functions (partial) 
No data Low between 
component 
development teams 
(support), but high with 
systems integration 
team (no support) 
Low between component 
development teams 
(support) and high with 
systems integration team 
(no support). In some 
cases, ex-ante IS replaces 
ex-post IS (partial) 
High between component 
development teams (no 
support), and high with 
platform systems 
integration team (no 
support). In some cases, 
ex-ante IS replaces ex-
post IS (partial) 
Firm 
membership 
Firm co-
membership 
(support) 
Firm co-membership 
(support) 
Integrated components 
= firm co-membership 
(support), modular 
components = no firm 
co-membership 
(support) 
Integrated components = 
firm co-membership 
(support), modular 
components = no firm 
co-membership (support) 
Integrated components = 
firm co-membership 
(support), modular 
components = no firm co-
membership (support) 
Location Co-location 
(support) 
Co-location (no 
support) 
Loosely-coupled 
component teams 
geographically-
dispersed (support) 
Geographical dispersion 
only where product 
component is loosely-
coupled and low value 
add (partial) 
Geographical dispersion 
only where product 
component is loosely-
coupled and low value add 
(partial) 
 
Table 35: Summary of correspondence across time 
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5.3.1 Stage 1: Mid to late-1980s (closed and integrated product architecture) 
 
In the mid to late-1980s, interviews suggest that the with-profits personal pensions product 
architecture is characterised as closed and integrated. In the case of integrated product 
designs, there is unlikely to be a clear mapping of product component, task and knowledge 
boundaries and, as such, high-levels of information-sharing and co-location is often required 
to progress its design and development, and hence product development tasks are likely to be 
encompassed more efficiently within a single firm boundary (ie, Campagnolo & Camuffo, 
2010; Colfer, 2007, Colfer & Baldwin, 2010).  
 
In the period between 1984 and 1988, all firms in the product market exhibited high-levels of 
vertical integration, owing primarily to the absence of an intermediate market (with the 
exception of fund components) and high levels of architectural and knowledge specificity of 
the actuarial product development team who led the product development process. The 
actuarial product development function encompassed integration of architectural and product 
component knowledge of the core product design tasks such as product architecture 
development, pricing, and with-profits fund design. Business process tasks such as 
marketing, customer service, and distribution were partitioned on the basis of functional 
specialism, and all functions shared firm co-membership, supporting the view of Sanchez and 
Mahoney (1996) that integrated product development is enacted within a single firm.    
 
The extant literature assumes that high-levels of information-sharing are necessary between 
all product development actors throughout an integrated product development process (ie, 
Colfer & Baldwin, 2010; Galbraith, 1973), in order to resolve product interdependencies, and 
reduce information asymmetries. However, actuarial science is well-known in the product 
market for its function-specific dialect and language, and this may illuminate why 
information-sharing within the actuarial product development team was high, and co-location 
necessary. However, information-sharing between the actuarial product development team 
and the other supporting business functions (such as customer services, marketing, 
distribution) was comparatively low, an unusual finding.  
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For instance, many respondents referred to the presence of ‘Chinese walls’ that existed 
between the actuarial product development team and other business functions (perhaps owing 
to information asymmetries, routines, etc), often resulting in a number of iterative product 
redesigns and reworks. A close reading of the interviews suggests that it is probable that the 
transmission of rich, tacit and technical knowledge across all product development actors 
represented a high information cost (Galbraith, 1973), even within-firm boundaries.  
 
Co-location across all teams, however, was a dominant product development mode, perhaps 
owing to the smaller-size of firms in this period. In terms of correspondence, then, product 
development actors shared the organisational tie of firm co-membership and co-location (ie, 
Colfer & Baldwin, 2010), but the amount of information-sharing between actors offers only 
partial support.   
 
In general terms, there is support for correspondence based on product component 
integration, and the organisational ties of firm co-membership and co-location. However, the 
picture is not straight-forward. Task and knowledge boundaries were not integrated, and 
instead partitioned across functional boundaries, with low-levels of information-sharing 
between functional teams, as shown in Table 36.     
 
Closed and integrated (with-profits) mid to late-80s 
Product component integration Correspondence 
Task integration Partial – correspondence within actuarial product development, but 
non-correspondence across separate functionally specialist teams 
Knowledge integration Partial – correspondence within actuarial product development, but 
non-correspondence across separate functionally specialist teams 
Firm co-membership Correspondence 
Co-location Correspondence 
Information-Sharing (IS) Partial – correspondence within actuarial product development, but 
non-correspondence across separate functionally specialist teams 
 
Table 36: Correspondence summary: closed and integrated product architecture  
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5.3.2 Stage 2: early to mid-90s (closed and modular product architecture) 
 
By the early to-mid-1990s, the product architecture evolved towards a closed and modular 
design. Although the core unit-linked ‘pensions’ IT systems architecture remained tightly-
coupled and integrated throughout the period, the fund, advice and customer service 
components modularised, underpinned by specialised standards. Via the creation of fund and 
customer service teams, task and knowledge partitioning ensued within firm boundaries 
corresponding to the modular characteristics of the product/process components.  
 
In other words, the product component partitioning acted as a map for task and knowledge 
partitioning, but is not (as yet) associated with significant outsourcing. The findings have a 
strong resonance with the study of Black and Decker by Lehnerd (1987), where Black and 
Decker were able to design a family of modular products via collaboration across different 
intra-firm functional units, and the study of computer notebooks by Hoetker (2006) where 
product component modularisation need not be associated with the movement of task 
activities across firm boundaries. This finding highlights that product component modularity 
per se is not enough to shift tasks across firm boundaries. As discussed in section 5.2, a weak 
correlation in productive capabilities and gains from trade must also ensue (ie, Jacobides & 
Winter, 2005) and hence it is possible that temporal delays in reconfiguring firm boundaries 
to reflect co-evolutionary changes in productive capabilities and efficiency considerations 
may be one possible explanation.   
 
In terms of co-location v. geographical distance, co-location remained the dominant product 
development mode. This is possibly due to the continued small-size of firms at this point in 
time, and a temporal delay in shifting organisational structures to reflect modular product 
component and task boundaries. Temporal delay was highlighted as a potential explanation of 
non-correspondence by Zirpoli and Camuffo (2009) in their study of the motor vehicle 
industry.  
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In terms of information-sharing, I do not have sufficient meaningful data to make any 
observations, although it seems reasonable to assume that co-location may have resulted in 
high-levels of information-sharing ex-ante (to agree specialised standards) and ex-post (to 
coordinate activities across numerous product or process component teams).   
 
As discussed in 5.3.1, in the mid to late-80s the existing organisational structure produced a 
number of coordination problems owing to substantial design iterations and reworks. By the 
early to mid-90s, however, this was addressed through the emergence of a ‘product owner’ 
role. In this context, a ‘product owner’ is similar to the notion posited by Henderson and 
Clark (1990:11) of someone with ‘architectural knowledge’ – “knowledge about the ways in 
which components are integrated and linked together into a coherent whole”.   
 
According to interviews, architectural and product component knowledge was more or less 
partitioned, whereby the product owner focused on product architecture design, whereas 
product and process development teams focused on component level design. Product and 
process component development teams tended to work independently of each other and 
exchanged information via the product owner. It seems probable that there was minimal 
overlap between the component knowledge of product and process component development 
teams and the architectural knowledge held by the product owner.  
 
Closed and modular (unit-linked) early to mid-90s 
Product component partitioning Funds and customer service (within-firm) and advice (across-firm)  
Task partitioning  Correspondence 
Knowledge partitioning  Correspondence 
Firm co-membership Correspondence (with the exception of advice) 
Co-location v. geographic dispersion Correspondence (with the exception of advice) 
Information-Sharing (IS) No data 
 
Table 37: Correspondence summary: closed and modular product architecture 
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5.3.3 Stage 3: mid-90s to 2000 (hybrid unit-linked product architecture) 
 
By the mid-90s, there are a number of changes in organisational structure. Product 
development is now coordinated and orchestrated by a systems integrator who holds 
architectural knowledge and orchestrates and coordinates the design and development of 
product and process components. In this context, the systems integrator concept is similar to 
the distinction made by Ceci, et al., (2014) between a static systems integrator and a dynamic 
systems integrator. Here, the systems integrator role can perhaps be conceptualised as a static 
systems integrator, where architectural knowledge is used ex-ante to define product 
component partitioning schemes and to resolve system-wide issues ex-post.   
 
Co-location becomes less of a dominant product development mode. In many firms, the 
systems integrator and business functions remain co-located. Whereas the modularisation of 
fund, advice and customer service components is associated with so-called geographically-
distant ‘centres of excellence’.  
 
Despite a product component and task correspondence, interviews suggest that ex-post 
information-sharing is channelled through the systems integrator who coordinates and 
orchestrates the various task activities both within and across firm boundaries, and resolves 
system-wide issues. The high-levels of information-sharing between the systems integrator 
and the component development teams is associated with the broader knowledge than task 
boundary maintained by the systems integrator. In contrast, ex-post information-sharing 
between the de-coupled product and process component development teams was low, owing 
to a clear partitioning of product component, task and knowledge boundaries facilitated by 
the presence of standards. This is shown in Figure 40.  
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Figure 40: Information-sharing mid to late-90s  
 
Throughout the 90s, the unit-linked product architecture can be characterised as ‘stable’ 
(relative to post-2000) and, as such, this research study builds upon the work of Cabigiosu 
and Camuffo (2012) in the air-conditioning industry who found that depending upon whether 
the product architecture can be characterised as ‘stable’ or ‘complex’ impacted ex-post levels 
of information-sharing such that low-levels of ex-post information-sharing were observed 
across firm boundaries under conditions of a stable product architecture, and high-levels of 
ex-post information-sharing were observed in the context of complex product development.  
 
In general terms, I find resonance with their findings. However, I refine their observation 
further by highlighting that high-levels of ex-post information-sharing are maintained by the 
systems integrator, even under conditions of product architecture stability in order to resolve 
system-wide issues as they arise. In other words, modular product architecture stability may 
not be a sufficient condition to minimise information-sharing needs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proposition owner 
Component team 1 Component team 2 
High High 
Low 
252 
 
 
 
 
Hybrid (unit-linked) mid-90s to 2000 
Product component partitioning Customer service (within-firm), funds and advice (across-firm) 
Task partitioning  Correspondence 
Knowledge partitioning  Correspondence (with the exception of the ‘proposition owner’)   
Firm co-membership Correspondence 
Co-location v. geographic dispersion  Correspondence  
Information-Sharing (IS) Correspondence between component development teams, Non-
correspondence with proposition owner 
 
Table 38: Correspondence summary: hybrid (unit-linked) product architecture 
 
5.3.4. Phase 4: 2000-2005 (hybrid fund supermarket architecture) 
 
From c2000, the systems integration teams evolved in a quasi-SBU structure, with 
accountability for product profit and loss metrics. The evolution is accompanied by two 
mechanisms, (1) a competence-destroying architectural innovation in 2000 and, (2) the 
strategic need to develop and maintain outsourced architectural and product component 
knowledge.  
 
The need to develop and maintain external product component knowledge is critical in this 
period. The modular innovations throughout the 90s eroded product component knowledge, 
and the architectural innovation in 2000 served to erode any remaining architectural 
capabilities, leaving incumbents with ‘old’ and out-dated architectural and product 
component knowledge. Hence, insurance companies simply did not hold any meaningful 
productive capabilities and so turned to a strategy of developing systems integration 
capabilities in order to survive. This observation is associated with Cabigiuso, et al., (2013) 
study of air-conditioning systems in the motor vehicle industry, where the authors find that 
co-development practices with external suppliers were foregrounded as a result of the 
manufacturer/assembler firms lack of product component level knowledge.  
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As a consequence, information-sharing requirements also evolve. Interviews suggest that (1) 
ex-post information-sharing requirements continue to be low between modular product and 
process component development teams and, (2) high between component development teams 
and the systems integration team, both within- and across firm boundaries. However, the 
architectural innovation in c2000 triggers a need to vary ex-post information-sharing needs, 
depending upon the value characteristics of the product component type. For instance, (1) 
where a product component is perceived as low-value, ex-ante information-sharing is high in 
order to develop standards, followed by low levels of ex-post information-sharing. In such 
cases, geographical dispersion is considered an appropriate governance mode. In contrast, (2) 
where a product component is perceived as high-value (ie, it offers some form of 
differentiation or competitive advantage), high-levels of both ex-ante and ex-post 
information-sharing are maintained throughout. In such cases, temporary co-location is 
considered an appropriate governance mode.  This is summarised in Table 39.  
 
 Low value modular component High value modular component 
Knowledge integration Low High 
Ex-ante IS High High 
Ex-post IS Low High 
Location Geographic distance Co-location 
 
Table 39: Value characteristics of product components on knowledge integration, 
information-sharing and location 
 
This observation has some similarities with Furlan et al., (2014) who argue that product 
modularity only works as a substitute for inter-firm coordination when product components 
are stable. I find congruence with this observation but moreover, the product component must 
also be perceived as low-value. I also find resonance with Cabigosu, et al., (2013:673) who 
remark that product modularity has limited traction in easing inter-firm coordination, but I 
find that this observation only holds to the extent that the modular product component offers 
some form of differentiation and/or competitive advantage. In order words, inter-firm 
coordination is mediated by the firm’s strategy and value proposition, supporting the 
observation by Zirpoli and Camuffo (2009).  
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In sum, firms rely on knowledge integration, extensive information-sharing throughout, and 
co-location in order to co-develop outsourced high-value modular product components. On 
the other hand, where the modular product component is low-value, product modularity does 
seems to act as an embedded coordination mechanism a la Sanchez and Mahoney (1996) as 
firms choose to invest ex-ante in defining standards, and then revert to a low-level of ex-post 
information-sharing and geographical distance. This finding may help illuminate further the 
suggestion by Cabigiosu and Camoffo’s (2012) that many firms may rely on different 
strategies for product and organisation correspondence. For instance, I find that firms rely on 
a ‘trade-off hypothesis’ where the product component is low value, and the ‘complementarity 
hypothesis’ where the product component is high-value, such that “one strategy does not 
exclude the other” (Cabigiosu & Camuffo, 2012:699). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 41: Varying information-sharing needs based on value characteristics of the product 
component 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Product component –
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Product component – 
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Complementary 
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A correspondence summary between 2000 and 2005 is shown in Table 30.  
 
Hybrid (fund supermarket) 2000-2005 
Product component partitioning Customer service (within-firm), funds and advice (across-firm) 
Explosion of loosely-coupled complementary products (across-firm) 
Task partitioning  Correspondence 
Knowledge partitioning  Correspondence between component development teams, Non-
correspondence with systems integrator. Knowledge integration for 
high value components  
Firm co-membership Correspondence 
Co-location Partial correspondence 
Information-Sharing (IS) Correspondence between component development teams, Non-
correspondence with systems integrator 
 
Table 40:  Correspondence summary: hybrid (fund supermarket) product architecture 
 
5.3.4. Phase 5: 2005-2014 (open and modular and hybrid platform architecture) 
 
The emergence of a technological platform architecture in 2005 can be characterised as a 
further architectural innovation (Henderson & Clark, 1990), but one that did not render 
existing architectural or systems integration knowledge redundant. The evolution to a multi-
product platform is accompanied by the evolution of systems integration teams into platform 
integration teams. In other words, the product moves down a level in the overall systems 
hierarchy to become, in effect, a component of the platform architecture. Product systems 
integration teams subsequently become much smaller, and platform integration teams much 
larger as a result.  
  
Knowledge integration, high levels of information-sharing and co-location for high value 
components is maintained throughout the period between 2005 and 2014, perhaps owing to 
the fact that once a firm decides to act as a systems integrator and ‘know more than they do’ 
(Brusoni, et al., 2001), further changes in product architecture may not lead to subsequent 
changes in firm architecture.  
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However, the emergence of multi-product platforms is associated with changes to ex-post 
information-sharing between product and process component development teams, as shown 
in Figure 42.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 42: Information-sharing needs 2005 onwards  
 
Whereas between the mid-90s and mid-noughties, product and process component 
development teams shared minimal information between them, but high amounts of 
information with the system integration team, the emergence of a multi-product platform 
architecture changes this somewhat. Now, ex-post information-sharing increases not only 
between component development teams and the platform systems integration team, but also 
between the loosely-coupled component teams themselves, perhaps owing to increasing 
product complexity and unforeseen interdependencies at the platform system level. For 
example, fund component teams needed to share information not only with the platform 
integration team, but also the product team, and providers of complementary product 
components in order to ensure effective integration, despite the presence of standards. 
Therefore, it is probable that as product complexity increases, the intensity of information-
sharing across the entire system increases, perhaps owing to technological newness (Zirpoli 
and Becker, 2007), uneven rates of product component change and to resolve unforeseen 
system design issues (Busoni, et al., 2001; MacDuffie, 2013). 
 
 
 
 
Platform systems 
integrator 
Component team 1 Component team 2 
High High 
High 
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Platform architecture 2005-2014 
Product component partitioning Customer service (within-firm), funds and advice (across-firm) 
Explosion of loosely-coupled complementary products (across-firm) 
Task partitioning  Correspondence 
Knowledge partitioning  Correspondence between component development teams, Non-
correspondence with platform systems integrator  
Firm co-membership Correspondence 
Co-location Partial correspondence 
Information-Sharing (IS) Non-correspondence 
 
Table 41: Correspondence summary: open and modular and hybrid platform architecture 
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Section summary and contribution 
 
This section summarises the discussion in section 5.3 and identifies the research study’s main 
contribution to the extant literature on architectural correspondence.    
 
First, I show the extent to which architectural correspondence is sustained in the face of co-
evolutionary forces across time. By charting the correspondence across a 30-year period, I 
have shown how product markets may evolve through periods of correspondence and non-
correspondence. Although I have been unable to isolate the effect of temporal delays, the 
findings show that there is no simple relationship between the design characteristics of 
product, firm and industry architecture. Whether correspondence is evident at any temporal 
cross-section seems to depend upon a number of factors at both the product architecture and 
product component level, such as (1) the stylised productive architecture type, (2) the degree 
of product complexity, (3) whether the product component is integrated or modular, and (4) 
the degree to which the product component has differentiation or competitive advantage 
properties. Furthermore, it may also depend upon the target for correspondence, for instance 
(1) product component boundary, (2) task activity boundary, (3) knowledge boundary, or (4) 
firm boundary. Moreover, how correspondence is measured plays an important role and 
different results may be obtained depending upon whether an empirical study examines (1) 
information-sharing needs, (2) location, or (3) the presence or absence of firm co-
membership. There is clearly a need for uniformity in further research.           
 
In general terms, the findings show some support for the broad proposition that architectures 
correspond. But the support is not unqualified. Based upon the extant literature (ie, Colfer, 
2007; Colfer and Baldwin, 2010), I propose two different ways in which correspondence can 
be assessed: (1) a ‘standard test’ and, (3) a ‘strong test’. A standard test of correspondence 
may seek to examine the relationship between product component, task and firm boundaries, 
mapped against an organisational tie of either co-location/geographical distance or firm co-
membership (or both).  
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In such a test, the findings provide strong support for correspondence across all time periods. 
For instance, in many time periods (1) modular product components are associated with task 
partitioning and outsourcing and, (2) integrated product components are associated with task 
integration and insourcing. Furthermore, (1) modular product components are associated with 
geographical distance and an absence of firm co-membership and, (2) integrated product 
components are associated with co-location and the presence of firm co-membership. These 
observations highlight congruence with the simple observation that integrated products are 
developed by integrated firms, and modular products are developed by specialised firms (ie, 
Colfer, 2007; Fine, 1998).            
 
However, I find a clear exception to the rule. First, closed modularisation clearly breaches the 
assumption that product component modularity is associated with outsourcing and an absence 
of firm co-membership (ie, Chesbrough, 2003; Hoetker, 2006). In this research study, I have 
proposed in section 5.2 that closed modularisation occurs when ex-ante investments in 
standards precede the emergence of superior productive capabilities in intermediate markets. 
In other words, assuming a path-dependant and specialised productive capability trajectory, 
temporal delays in shifting firm boundaries to correspond to product component and task 
boundaries may be a probable explanation.  
 
A strong test of correspondence seeks to further examine the correspondence of knowledge 
boundaries and the degree of information-sharing as a measurement proxy. Much of the 
extant literature assumes that modular product architectures permit vertical74 knowledge 
partitioning and low-levels of ex-post information-sharing (ie Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996). I 
find the evidence mixed. In general terms, I find support for the notion that modular product 
architectures permit knowledge to be partitioned at the product component level, ie, product 
component, task and knowledge boundaries correspond. However, I find little evidence to 
support the notion of Sanchez & Mahoney (1996) and Sanchez (2003) that architectural 
knowledge and product component knowledge can be vertically decoupled. Interviews 
suggest that cycles of modular and architectural innovation necessitate the need for firms to 
develop systems integration capabilities, resulting in a ‘vertical’ integration of architectural 
and product component knowledge, and hence high levels of information-sharing throughout 
the product development process.  
                                                          
74
 Ie architectural and product component knowledge 
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As discussed in section 5.2, in the UK personal pensions product market, 
manufacturer/assembler firms, in response to competence-destroying innovations, turned to 
the development and maintenance of systems integration capabilities to ensure (1) survival, 
and (2) to attempt to reverse the weak correlation in productive capabilities for outsourced 
modular product components that offered a form of differentiation or competitive advantage. 
In other words, I can formalise a further contribution. While I find that the reasoning behind 
knowledge integration is similar to technological newness (Zirpoli and Becker, 2007), fast 
rates of product component change (Furlan, et al., 2014), and uneven rates of product 
component change (Brusoni, et al., 2001), I can extend prior work arguing that knowledge 
integration, high-levels of information-sharing and co-location are associated with (1) only 
high value outsourced modular product components and (2) as an option value for future 
integrative innovation modes. In other words, I can extend the work of Furlan, et al., (2014) 
on contingencies that ‘mist the mirror’ and argue that the value characteristics of the product 
component are important in determining knowledge boundaries and hence whether a strong 
test of correspondence is supported or unsupported.  
 
Many scholars have also highlighted the role of product complexity in determining the degree 
of architectural correspondence (ie, MacDuffie, 2013), as complexity is often associated with 
unforeseen product component interdependencies (ie, Pil & Cohen, 2006; Zirpoli and Becker, 
2007). Interviews suggest that the degree of product complexity in the UK personal pensions 
product market increases across time. As a consequence, the findings suggest the degree of 
product complexity may reach a ‘tipping point’ that necessitates the emergence of systems 
integration capabilities and knowledge integration. For example, in the early to mid-90s the 
product architecture was characterised as ‘simple’ and insurance companies relied upon a 
vertical division of knowledge. However, the architectural innovations in 2000 and 2005 are 
associated with a step-change increase in product complexity, owing to the multi-technology 
explosion of complementary product components that could plug and play into the 
architecture, and then a widening-out of the product layer to a multi-product and multi-
technology platform architecture.  
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In 2000, increases in product complexity are associated with manufacturer-assembler firms 
maintaining a broader knowledge than task boundary across firm boundaries, and high-levels 
of information-sharing throughout the product development process. Between 2005 and 2014, 
the multi-product, multi-technology characteristics of the platform architecture further 
increased product complexity which, in turn, necessitated even higher levels of knowledge 
integration such as co-location and employee rotation and higher levels of information-
sharing across the entire product system. As such, I can make a third contribution to prior 
work by arguing that increasing product complexity is associated with higher levels of 
knowledge integration, information-sharing, and co-location across the entire system. In other 
words, at least under conditions of a multi-product, multi-technology platform architecture, 
product complexity ‘mists the mirror’. However, while extant literature assumes that 
controlling product component interdependencies is the primary logic, in this research 
setting, incentives for increasing knowledge integration also appear to be associated with 
maintaining an option value to future integrative innovation in respect of high-value product 
components.                 
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6. Conclusions and contribution 
6.1 Contribution to knowledge 
This sub-section provides a summary of the contributions outlined in chapters 2 and 5. 
6.1.1 Architectural co-evolution 
In respect of architectural co-evolution, I contribute to the extant literature in the following 
ways:  
1. Existing product architecture typologies (ie, Sanchez, 2008; Shibata, et al., 2005) fail to 
capture the notion of hybridity in product architecture. The stylised product architecture 
typology developed in chapter 2 encompasses the notion of a hybrid product architecture 
and embeds a co-evolutionary perspective. While the typology formed the basis of the 
research methodology, as outlined in chapter 3, I hope future empirical work in the 
research community may provide opportunities to develop its construct validity and 
applicability in scholarly work.         
 
2. I show that the co-evolutionary dynamics of productive capabilities and efficiency 
considerations trade-off at the product component level, revealing either integration gains 
or gains from specialisation and trade. In other words, on an evolutionary path towards 
increasing product modularity and industry specialization, I find that exogenous shocks in 
the industry create the necessary selection forces to compel firms to (1) invest ex-ante in 
standards, however product component modularity is not a sufficient condition for 
outsourcing across firm boundaries. Rather, (2) superior productive capabilities must also 
be available in the intermediate market, (3) net of ex-post transaction costs. Subject to all 
three conditions being met, a modular product component may subsequently migrate 
across firm boundaries, providing a correspondence of product component, task and firm 
boundaries (as discussed in 6.1.2 to follow). Therefore, it is highly probable that the 
degree of product modularity in a product architecture at any one time is likely to be the 
aggregate sum of the respective productive capabilities and efficiency trade-offs at the 
underlying individual product component level. As product architectures are made up of 
multiple product components, it is probable that product modularity may emerge for some 
product components and not others, underlining the importance of embedding the notion 
of hybridity into future product architecture research.  
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3. In this research context, ‘extreme’ product modularity led to commoditization and 
imitation risks that ultimately posed limits to gains from specialization and trade which 
led to integrative innovation modes and industry consolidation. This finding supports the 
work of Fixson and Park (2008) foregrounding the role of ‘designers seeking value 
through integrative innovation’, but provides a different perspective to studies by 
Cacciatori and Jacobides (2005), Christensen, et al., (2002), and Jacobides and Winter 
(2005). On a path to increasing product and industry reintegration, I extend the work of 
Fixson and Park (2008) and show how manufacturer/assembler firms initiated three types 
of integrative innovation modes, (1) under guided modularity, manufacturer/assembler 
firms bundled combinations of modular product and process components, (2), power 
blocks emerged consisting of modular product and process components bundled for the 
specific and exclusive use of particular value chain combinations. Coordinated by the 
lead manufacturer/assembler firm, the modular product components would often be 
reengineered within its boundaries to suit the specific performance requirements of the 
power block, but maintaining adherence to the standards-based platform architecture, and 
(3) insourcing, via acquisition, the design and development of previously outsourced 
‘critical’ product components. I also show how the governance mode differed for each 
integrative innovation mode. In other words, (1) guided modularity was governed by bi-
lateral market contracts, (2) power blocks were often configured into hybrid governance 
modes such as alliances or joint venture initiatives, and (3) insourcing product component 
was governed by forward or backward vertical integration.       
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4. In terms of integrative innovation, Fixson and Park (2008) ask ‘where do the capabilities 
come from?’ I contribute to our understanding of systems integrator firms. I show how 
the process of developing and maintaining systems integration capabilities in one time 
period may be associated with an option value for integrative innovation modes in future 
time periods. For example, (1), around 2000, interviews suggest that in response to the 
erosion of productive capabilities in both the core systems architecture and peripheral 
product components, insurance companies turned to the development of systems 
integration capabilities and maintained close collaborative relationships with upstream 
and downstream suppliers as a mechanism to survive. By 2005, (2) as the architectural 
and product component knowledge of insurance companies grew, and new platform 
systems architects entered the product market upstream, manufacturer/assembler firms 
initiated deeper and more intensive knowledge integration mechanisms across the entire 
value chain encompassing devices such component co-development, temporary co-
location, and employee-rotation. By 2012, (3) manufacturer/assembler firms leveraged 
existing system integration capabilities developed across the time periods to exercise the 
options to form quasi-integrated power blocks based on hybrid forms of governance and 
insourced, via acquisition, productive capabilities in component design where the product 
component offered routes to differentiation or competitive advantage.     
 
6.1.2 Architectural correspondence 
I offer the following contributions:  
1. I show the extent to which architectural correspondence is sustained in the face of co-
evolutionary forces across time. By charting architectural correspondence across a 30-
year period, I have shown how product markets may evolve through periods of 
correspondence and non-correspondence across time. Moreover, I show how 
correspondence and non-correspondence may occur at the same time. This occurs 
depending upon which boundaries are being examined (ie, product component, task, 
knowledge and firm boundaries) and which measurement proxy is being used (ie, firm 
co-membership, geographical location and levels of information-sharing). 
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2. I develop further contingencies that may ‘mist the mirror’. At the product architecture 
level, I find that closed modularisations provide a contingency that has been 
previously highlighted in the extant literature (ie, Hoetker, 2006), calling into question 
the assumption that modular product architectures are always associated with 
outsourcing across firm boundaries. However, I extend prior work by proposing that 
closed and modular product architectures emerge under specific conditions when ex-
ante investments in standards precede the emergence of superior productive 
capabilities in intermediate markets. In other words, assuming a path-dependent 
productive capability trajectory, temporal delays in shifting firm boundaries to 
correspond to product component and task boundaries may be a probable explanation.  
 
3. At the product architecture level, I also highlight the role of product complexity in 
determining the degree of architectural correspondence. I find congruence with the 
prior work of MacDuffie (2013) and Zirpoli and Becker (2007) that increasing 
product complexity increases the need for a non-correspondence of knowledge 
boundaries, high-levels of information-sharing and co-location, even where the 
product component is modular. I find that the incentives for knowledge integration in 
one time period are associated with maintaining an option value to future integrative 
innovation in respect of high-value product components in a future time period.                 
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4. At the product component level, I highlight the importance of the value characteristics 
of the outsourced modular product component in determining knowledge boundary 
correspondence or non-correspondence. While I find that the reasoning behind 
knowledge integration is similar to the ideas of technological newness (Zirpoli and 
Becker, 2007), fast rates of product component change (Furlan, et al., 2014), and 
uneven rates of product component change (Brusoni, et al., 2001), I extend prior work 
by arguing that maintaining a broader knowledge than task boundary, high-levels of 
information-sharing throughout and co-location are associated with high-value 
product components. In other words, where an outsourced modular product 
component is high-value, firms use the ‘complementarity hypothesis’ (Cabigiosu & 
Camuffo, 2012) to organize its innovative activities. In contrast, where an outsourced 
modular product component is low value, firms will rely upon the ‘trade-off 
hypothesis’ (Cabigiosu & Camuffo, 2012),  invest ex-ante in standards and then revert 
to a low-level of ex-post information-sharing and geographic distance to manage 
product development.   
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6.2 Contribution to practice and public policy 
The ability for managers to understand and predict how a product architecture may evolve 
towards or away from product modularity should be of great strategic concern, both to 
existing incumbents and new entrants.  
For instance, this research study highlights that where a firm that has chosen to sponsor a 
closed and integrated product design it may be at risk of losing market share and ultimately 
risks technological lock-out if it does not adapt to firms ‘going modular’. In a similar vein, 
open and modular product architectures often result in commoditisation and imitation, and 
therefore the findings of this research study may help strategizing managers decide which 
aspects of a product architecture to retain control of and which to open-up. It is probable that 
retaining an intermediate degree of modularity may be the best strategy even in the face or 
forces pushing towards the extremes (Ethiraj, et al., 2008).  
The question arises as to how managers should decide between architectural choices. This is 
clearly a multi-dimensional issue and almost impossible to answer without detailed costs and 
benefits compared across a number of alternative architectural choices. However, this 
research study highlights the need for managers to take a dynamic view and ultimately it may 
depend perhaps on the prevailing stylised characteristics of the dominant product architecture 
design (Ethiraj, et al., 2008) at a particular point in time.  
For instance, where the prevailing architectural design is closed and integrated, and 
evolutionary processes are pushing towards a modular design, firms may be better off either 
retaining a closed and modular or hybrid product architecture in order to minimise the threats 
from imitation and commoditisation associated with extreme open and modular product 
architectures. On the other hand, in product markets where the dominant architecture is open 
and modular, firms may be better off developing or maintaining systems integration 
capabilities in order to develop superior productive capabilities and an option value for future 
integrative innovation in a subsequent time period.  
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As Fixson and Park (2008) acknowledge, changing the rules of the game requires a priori 
investments in maintaining a broad knowledge base, even when the product architecture is 
modular. Maintaining systems integration capabilities seems to be an important factor that 
managers should strive to develop. Systems integration capabilities may be essential if firms 
are to avoid a loss of both architectural control and access to product component level 
knowledge that may be strategically critical in determining which product components to 
insource and which to outsource, in other words, how best to partition product component, 
task, knowledge and firm boundaries. In fact, systems integration capabilities may confer 
firms a number of strategic advantages, (1) it may help firms avoid limits to gains from trade 
and/or specialisation in the face of increasing product modularity, (2) systems integration 
capabilities may allow firms to avoid knowledge decay at both the architectural and product 
component level, and, (3) it may create an ‘option value’ associated with future integrative 
innovation and the ability to vary the degree of product architecture modularity.       
MacDuffie (2013:37) suggests that managers also often tend to make the mistake of assuming 
that once product component boundaries have been partitioned, task, knowledge and firm 
boundaries can be subsequently partitioned so that firms can rely on external suppliers to 
design modular product components independently. In terms of architectural correspondence, 
the degree to which a product and task structure is modularised is an important strategic 
decision, and I have shown that firms should pay careful attention to not only the modular 
characteristics of each product component, but also the opportunity to create differentiation 
and competitive advantage. It may then be possible to pursue both a ‘trade-off’ and 
‘complementarity’ hypothesis (Cabigiosu & Camuffo, 2012) at the same time.  
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6.3 Limitations and recommendations for future research  
As a single industry case study, I acknowledge that such studies often run the risk of being 
non-generalisable (ie, Eisenhardt, 1989) to other product market contexts. I also acknowledge 
that it is also risky to attempt to generalise when co-evolutionary processes are still emergent 
(especially in the period following 2012). However, like any other contextualist process 
research, my aim has been to understand the dynamics of the specific product market setting 
rather than the concerns of generalisability of the research findings to other settings. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, I also acknowledge that my positionality may, despite my best 
efforts, have exerted an undue influence on the research design, methodology and methods. I 
have outlined what steps I have taken to ensure the credibility and plausibility of the research 
findings, including the use of an expert panel.    
 
It is also worth noting that the research design was created as a primarily deductive study. 
Based upon the valuable feedback from examiners, the literature review has been structured 
to focus on the main contributions of the study in order to improve readability. The author 
highlights that the main contributions of the study were only known following the initial 
drafting of the literature review.   
 
6.3.1 Architectural co-evolution 
 
I observe that further empirical research would be beneficial in the following areas:    
1. The stylised product architecture presented in chapter 2 would benefit from empirical 
application in other product market contexts. Moreover, although I have contributed 
to the extant literature in proposing three different integrative innovation mechanisms, 
future empirical work may seek to examine different product architecture hybridity 
types in different settings  
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2. I have focused on supply-side co-evolution processes. A future synthesis of supply-
side and demand-side processes may offer further opportunities to progress the 
direction of research. It is possible that demand-side factors, such as a buyer’s 
willingness to mix and match product components, may also exert a strong influence 
on the co-evolutionary path of products and industries 
3. Technological platform architectures in service-orientated environments remain a 
largely underexplored topic (Gawer, 2014). I have taken a small step in this direction, 
and further empirical research may wish to further develop a theory of how product 
architectures co-evolve into technological platform architectures. The literatures on 
product architecture and platforms remain largely separate and distinct and a synthesis 
of work across the two domains is necessary.  
 
6.3.2 Architectural correspondence 
In terms of architectural correspondence, this research study has responded to numerous calls 
in the extant literature for a longitudinal and retrospective perspective. However, there remain 
a number of additional gaps in the extant literature.   
1. I highlight the role of the value characteristics of product components in determining 
correspondence, and further research may be directed towards the economics of 
product modularity (ie, Campagnolo & Camuffo, 2010), specifically examining the 
precise value characteristics of product components in order to better understand how 
firms organize and manage different product development tasks.  
2. This research study is a single industry case study. Further empirical work may wish 
to examine cross-industry cases in order to uncover generalizable product market 
contingencies 
3. I have not attended to the performance implications of architectural correspondence 
and non-correspondence. Under what circumstance is a firm better-off corresponding 
or non-corresponding architectures? Affuah (2001) initiated work in this area, and 
further empirical studies remain necessary and relevant 
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4. The emergent perspective on the reverse mirroring hypothesis (ie, Sanchez, et al., 
2013) suggests that products may not design organisations, and a reverse direction of 
causation may be possible. Although Sako (2003) and Fixson and Park (2008) 
examine the direction of causality in their work, further empirical is required to 
unpack the precise paths of architectural correspondence or non-correspondence. 
This necessarily requires a longitudinal or retrospective perspective.          
 
6.4 Final thoughts and reflections 
I finish with a little speculation.  
 
It is too early to say whether architectures will continue to co-evolve towards increasing 
integration, or evolve back towards further openness and modularity. For example, Langlois 
(2003) has suggested that temporary shifts towards integration are short punctuations in the 
broader, macro shift towards modularity and disintegration. Fine (1998) similarly highlights 
the unstable nature of product architecture.  
 
However, in the interview process many respondents shared a commonly-held view of the 
direction they believed the product market would take. Many expected significant horizontal 
consolidation in all value chain segments, especially the advice and manufacturer/assembler 
segments as smaller firms are either forced to exit or are acquired by larger firms in the 
pursuit of scale, as predicted by Fixson and Park (2008). Some respondents believed that 
restricted access to IT product development resources would also force many 
manufacturer/assembler firms to exit. Commonly, many interviewees felt the product market 
could only sustain c5-10 industry platforms in the medium-term, and many were already 
plotting how to maximise value in the context of an exit strategy. Horizontal integration was 
expected to occur within the product market segment, as well as across product market 
segments. For example, ‘industry platforms’ also exist in the investment and retirement 
market such as ‘workplace platforms’, as well as share dealing platforms. Many respondents 
believed that these different product segment platforms would converge into an industry 
standard platform architecture across different segments.       
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Many respondents also believed that further vertical integration would follow, as 
manufacturers/assemblers acquired smaller specialist product component suppliers which 
may, of course, reduce the number of product component suppliers. In line with Gawer 
(2010, 2014), it also appears manufacturers/assembler firms have lost control of the value 
chain to some degree. For instance, many larger IFA firms are reportedly in the process of 
bypassing the manufacturer/assembler firm to contract directly with the platform systems 
providers in order to establish their own product platforms, following the lead of fund 
management groups in the late-90s and early-noughties. Moreover, back-office suppliers are 
creating ‘platforms of platforms’ in order to competitively attack and forward integrate into 
the product platform space. In general terms, it would appear that the product market is in a 
period of ‘ferment’ as described by Anderson and Tushman (1990).  
 
In a way, it is a shame that this research study was conducted soon after the introduction of 
RDR and auto-enrolment in 2012. As many industry commentators are predicting ‘the death 
of platforms as we know them’, it would be interesting and insightful to revisit the product 
market in a few years to uncover how the dynamics I describe in this research study have 
continued to evolve.  
Looking back at the PhD journey I feel it is appropriate at its closure to reflect on the research 
journey and its data collection, analysis and writing approach. After leaving the UK financial 
services sector in 2011 to pursue a career in academia it was very interesting to re-enter the 
financial world again after a 3-year absence. I had a suspicion that major changes may have 
taken place, but was nonetheless surprised by how fast the pace of change had progressed, 
and continues to progress. When I started the PhD, I had a loose set of ideas in mind, but 
found that researching the relevant literature extremely helpful in refining and revising my 
research question. In fact, one of the hardest parts of the journey was in deciding on the 
research question and de-marking the boundary of this research study; there were so many 
options, it was difficult to focus on one specific domain. Thank-you to the supervision team 
for assertively providing guidance.   
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However, the data collection process proved an extremely valuable learning experience 
having moved on from the literature review to data collection. I was fortunate to secure the 
time and funding to interview respondents during semester-time, and managed to conduct the 
thirty-one interviews over an approximate three-month period. I had to learn new skills in 
respect of interviewing, recording and listening. As a new qualitative researcher, I was also 
very conscious of my positionality and so I read numerous journal papers and talked to 
experienced researchers before the interviews in order to try to understand the issues. On the 
whole, however, I found the data collection process less difficult than anticipated and, in fact, 
rather enjoyable.  
 
The same cannot be said about data analysis. The data analysis proved very different than 
anticipated. I had no previous experience in using NVivo and so attended two day-long 
workshops in order to get a handle on the basics, and how to structure the longitudinal nature 
of the methodology within the software package. However, the qualitative data collected 
from the interviews proved a much longer and complex process than expected, producing 
over half-a-million words. Each interview took at least two days to analyse, consequently 
delaying the overall progress of the writing up phase of the PhD. In hindsight, it would have 
been impossible to analyse the data without the use of software (NVivo) to assist in the 
coding of the data and extracting the relevant themes. As a techno-phobe, my initial plan to 
use Microsoft Excel would have been a very bad decision. Although I achieved some level of 
saturation after about twenty-five interviews, I had thirty-one interviews in the diary and so 
progressed on. However, qualitative data analysis requires substantial time even with the 
assistance of software (NVivo) and so keeping the number of interviews to a manageable size 
is highly recommended. Thirty-one interviews took about sixty consecutive days to code and 
a similar amount to analyse into a hierarchal thematic structure.  
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With so much data, reporting the study findings became difficult as I would have to ‘leave 
out’ so much of interest. However, I followed a structured approach by focusing on aspects of 
the interview data that most closely related to the research questions. The writing-up process 
was quite difficult. I was fortunate to be awarded with a 14-week sabbatical, without which I 
would be some time away from completing this research study. As someone who needs large 
blocks of time to write, I found the sabbatical very helpful in making sustained progress.  
 
To break-up the process, I also developed two conceptual papers based upon the literature 
review. One paper has been submitted to Academy of Management Review, and the other 
submitted to Industry and Innovation. At the time of writing, I await responses. I hope more 
papers will follow as a direct result of this research study.   
 
Overall, I strongly believe that this research study offers a valuable insight into architectural 
co-evolution and correspondence in the UK personal pensions product market. With data that 
would have been almost impossible for other academic researchers to access, this research 
study provides a comprehensive account of the product market and how its product and 
industry architecture has evolved. As a consequence, I hope that the findings presented are of 
benefit for both fellow researchers and management practitioners. As such, my medium-term 
objective as a new researcher is to bring these findings into the public domain, with further 
papers to be submitted for publication.  
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Interview Date Reference Organisation reference Job title 
02/10/2014 Interviewee_1 Firm_1 Head of Product Development 
03/10/2014 Interviewee_2 Firm_2 Head of Product Development 
10/10/2014 Interviewee_3 Firm_3 Director of Product Development 
15/10/2014 Interviewee_4 Firm_1 Director of Product Development 
15/10/2014 Interviewee_5 Firm_2 Director of Product Development 
18/10/2014 Interviewee_6 Firm_2 Head of Product Development 
20/10/2014 Interviewee_7 Firm_1 Senior Product Development Manager 
20/10/2014 Interviewee_8 Firm_1 Head of Product Development 
21/10/2014 Interviewee_9 Firm_6 Head of Product Development 
21/10/2014 Interviewee_10 Firm_6 Head of Product Development 
22/10/2014 Interviewee_11 Firm_1 Head of Product Development 
23/10/2014 Interviewee_12 Firm_4 Head of Product Compliance 
24/10/2014 Interviewee_13 Firm_4 Director of Product Development 
25/10/2014 Interviewee_14 Firm_4 Head of Product Development 
30/10/2014 Interviewee_15 Firm_1 Director of Product Development 
31/10/2014 Interviewee_16 Firm_1 Director of Product Development 
04/11/2014 Interviewee_17 Firm_4 Director of Product Development 
07/11/2014 Interviewee_18 Firm_2 Director of Product Development 
08/11/2014 Interviewee_19 Firm_6 Director of Product Development 
11/11/2014 Interviewee_20 Firm_1 Senior Product Development Manager 
13/11/2014 Interviewee_21 Firm_2 Director of Product Development 
13/11/2014 Interviewee_22 Firm_1 Director of Product Development 
20/11/2014 Interviewee_23 Firm_1 Senior Product Development Manager 
20/11/2014 Interviewee_24 Firm_4 Director of Product Development 
21/11/2014 Interviewee_25 Firm_4 Director of Product Development 
24/11/2014 Interviewee_26 Firm_4 Head of Product Development 
24/11/2014 Interviewee_27 Firm_4 Director of Product Development 
12/12/2014 Interviewee_28 Firm_5 Head of Product Development 
14/12/2014 Interviewee_29 Firm_5 Director of Product Development 
16/12/2014 Interviewee_30 Firm_5 Senior Product Development Manager 
16/12/2014 Interviewee_31 Firm_5 Head of Product Development 
 
Appendix 1: Interview date, firm background and job title of interview respondents 
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INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
PART 1 
 
Introduction 
Background to research study aims and objectives  
Recorder 
Consider positionality 
Allow respondents time to read the product architecture typologies – estimate 5-8 min 
Respondents to create a product timeline  
Record results and leave out as aide memoir 
PART 2 
Product questions Examples 
What was going on? 
What led to that? 
What was the impact? 
What preceded that? 
What happened next? 
What happened first? 
What influenced it? 
Who started it?  
Who did it impact? 
Why did that happen?  
When did it start? 
When did it finish?   
Firm questions  
Industry questions 
Probes Tell me more about that 
Is there anything else? 
Why wasn’t the impact bigger/smaller? 
Why did it matter? 
How does that relate to…?  
Close 
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PRODUCT ARCHITECTURE TYPES 
  
CLOSED AND MODULAR (CM) Proprietary 
Protected by means of IP, secrecy or other means  
Low  no. of product components are tightly-coupled and 
integrated 
High no. of product components are loosely-coupled and 
independent of each other 
High no. of interfaces between product components are 
specified but firm-specific  
Low no. of interfaces between product components are 
idiosyncratic or non-existent 
CLOSED AND INTEGRATED (CI) Proprietary 
Protected by means of IP, secrecy or other means  
High no. of product components are tightly-coupled and 
integrated 
Low no. of product components are loosely-coupled and 
independent of each other 
Interfaces between product components are idiosyncratic or 
non-existent 
HYBRID (H) Some elements are proprietary and some are not 
Mix of product components that tightly-coupled and loosely-
coupled, integrated and independent  
Mix of interfaces between product components, some are 
firm-specific and some are industry standards 
OPEN AND MODULAR (OM) Non-protected, controlled by two or more firms 
High no. of product components are loosely-coupled and 
independent of each other 
Low no. of product components are tightly-coupled and 
integrated 
High no. of interfaces between product components are 
industry standards 
Low no. of interfaces between product components are firm-
specific  
 
Appendix 3: Product architecture descriptions 
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Closed and Integrated
Closed and Modular
Open and Modular
Hybrid
Closed and Integrated Closed and Modular Hybrid Open and Modular Hybrid
84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Respondent_1
Respondent_2
Respondent_3
Respondent_4
Respondent_5
Respondent_6 PA1
Respondent_7
Respondent_8
Respondent_9
Respondent_10
Respondent_11
Respondent_12
Respondent_14
Respondent_15
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Appendix 4: Synthesised product timelines 
 
Respondent_16
Respondent_17
Respondent_18
Respondent_19
Respondent_20
Respondent_21
Respondent_22
Respondent_23
Respondent_24
Respondent_25
Respondent_26
Respondent_27
Respondent_28
Respondent_29
Respondent _30
Respondent _31
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Faculty of Business and Law 
Informed Consent Form for research participants 
 
 
Title of Study: 
 
Multi-level architectural oscillation 
Person(s) conducting the research: 
 
Nicholas Burton 
 Programme of study: 
 
PhD 
Address of the researcher for correspondence: 
 
 
 
c/o Eagle Cottage, Chapel Street, Nunnington, YORK, 
North Yorkshire, YO62 5UP 
Telephone: 
 
01439 748510/07827 442914 
E-mail: 
 
Nicholas.burton@yahoo.co.uk 
Description of the broad nature of the research: 
 
 
 
To investigate the pre-conditions, motivations and effects 
of product architecture change over time, ands whether 
such change is mirrored by architectural changes in firm 
and industry structure  
Description of the involvement expected of participants 
including the broad nature of questions to be answered or 
events to be observed or activities to be undertaken, and 
the expected time commitment: 
 
The expected involvement of the research participants is 
as follows: 
  Initial  exercise assigning generic product firm 
and industry architecture descriptions to discreet 
time periods ((approximately 15 minutes)  Follow up telephone call (20 minutes)  Follow up interview (approximately 1 hour).  Any other meetings deemed necessary for the 
research upon negotiation with the research 
participant. 
 
The interviews will be semi structured and based upon 
individual’s experiences of product and firm architecture 
within a given industry context 
 
The initial exercise will involve research participants being 
emailed generic architecture ideal types. The ideal types 
are to be assigned by the research participant to discreet 
time periods. The research participant will also be given a 
list of architectural characteristics and need to tick present / 
not present. 
 
The follow up telephone call will be informed by the 
responses arising from the initial exercise and is aimed at 
clarifying any potential areas.  
 
The follow up interview will explore the pre-conditions, 
motivations and effects of any changes in product, firm and 
industry architecture over time.   
 
All interviews will be recorded with a digital voice recorder 
and transcribed. 
 
Anonymity will be assured by changing the names of the 
participants, the organizations and people that they name 
during the interview in the transcripts. 
 
Description of how the data you provide will be securely 
stored and/or destroyed upon completion of the project. 
 
All data will be stored securely either electronically on 
computer or in hard copy version in a locked cupboard. 
The recordings on the digital recorder will be deleted once 
they have been saved on the researcher’s password-
protected laptop. This will be done within 2 weeks of the 
initial recording. As part of the data analysis process, hard 
copies of the anonymised transcripts (raw data) may be 
given to the doctoral supervision team and a small number 
of other research participants to review. Hard copies will be 
returned to the researcher.      
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The saved audio recordings and text transcriptions will be 
deleted from the laptop at the end of the project’s ‘life’. 
However, it is envisaged that they will be held for a period 
of up to 5 years, to allow time to maximize the data for 
publication purposes 
 
Information obtained in this study, including this consent form, will be kept strictly confidential (i.e. will 
not be passed to others) and anonymous (i.e. individuals and organisations will not be identified 
unless this is expressly excluded in the details given above). 
 
Data obtained through this research may be reproduced and published in a variety of forms and for a 
variety of audiences related to the broad nature of the research detailed above. It will not be used for 
purposes other than those outlined above without your permission.  
 
Participation is entirely voluntary and participants may withdraw at any time. 
 
By signing this consent form, you are indicating that you fully understand the above 
information and agree to participate in this study on the basis of the above information. 
 
Participant’s signature:     Date: 
 
 
Student’s signature:      Date: 
 
Please keep one copy of this form for your own records 
 
Appendix 5: Informed consent form for research participants 
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Appendix 6: Summary of evolution towards a closed and modular product architecture
Mid-to-late 80s  Closed and integrated product architecture 
(with-profits) 
 
Fund Charges Customer service Risk components Advice 
Vertical integration 
Early to mid-
90s  
Closed and modular product architecture 
(unit-linked) 
Fund Charges Customer service Risk components Advice 
Vertical integration 
Fund 
Intermediate 
market Intermediate 
market 
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Appendix 7: Summary of evolution towards a hybrid product architecture 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C2000  Hybrid product architecture 
(fund supermarket) 
 
Charges Customer 
service 
Software tools Advice 
Vertical integration 
Fund 
SIPP, ISA and CIS funds 
Intermediate markets 
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Appendix 8: Summary of evolution towards an open and modular product architecture 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mid-noughties 
to 2012 
Open and modular product architecture 
(product platform) 
 
Charges
/fees 
Customer 
service 
Software 
tools 
Advice 
Vertical integration 
Fund 
SIPP, ISA, CIS funds and other risk products 
Intermediate markets 
DFMs Draw-down Self-
investment 
Commercial 
Property 
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Appendix 9:  Summary of evolution towards a hybrid (platform) architecture 
2012-2014 Hybrid product architecture 
(product platform) 
 
Charges
/fees 
Customer 
service 
Software 
tools 
Advice 
Vertical integration 
Fund 
SIPP, ISA, CIS funds and other risk products 
Intermediate markets 
DFMs Draw-down Self-
investment 
Commercial 
Property 
Selective vertical integration 
